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Abstract
This thesis explores the potential of the ‘Cognition and Culture' approach 
to serve as a conceptual framework to facilitate an integrated study of the 
contents of social group stereotypes and the cognitive processes and 
structures underpinning stereotyping. More specifically, it  explores the 
extent to which evolved cognitive predispositions may shape the contents 
of stereotypes, and facilitate the naturalization of status differences 
between groups.
Experiments 1-3 utilized the Minimal Group Paradigm to investigate 
whether cognitive predispositions shape the contents of social group 
stereotypes. Experiment 1 provided evidence for a default stereotyping 
mode based on two dimensions found to capture social group stereotypes 
universally: competence and morality/warmth. Participants rated members 
of their own group as competent and moral/warm. Experiment 2 provided 
evidence for a default status stereotyping mode. Participants rated 
members of high status groups as competent and members of low status 
groups as incompetent. Experiment 3 replicated the findings of experiment 
2 using an implicit measure of stereotyping. These are the first experiments 
to provide evidence for stereotyping in minimal groups.
The final three experiments explored whether humans hold essentialist 
beliefs about social status as this mode of category representation may 
facilitate the purported ability of stereotypes to naturalise status 
differences between groups. In experiment 4 it  was found that status 
differences trigger essentialist beliefs about social groups. Experiment 5 
explored essentialist beliefs about group-based social status using two 
thought experiment paradigms. No evidence was found for essentialist 
beliefs about group-based social status. However, there was an indication 
from participants' qualitative responses that these paradigms were not 
optimal. A final follow-up experiment found evidence for essentialist 
beliefs about group-based social status using the soul exchange paradigm.
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Implications for the social psychology of stereotyping, the ‘Cognition and 
Culture* approach and social policy are discussed.
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Introduction
Social Psychology of Stereotyping
Contemporary social psychologists typically define stereotypes as socially 
shared mental representations of a group and its members, which contain 
knowledge/information associated with that group (Hamilton and Sherman,
1994). Within Social Psychology stereotypes have, broadly speaking, been 
studied from two different approaches. Early research adopted a 
descriptive approach and focused on the specific contents of stereotypes, 
and how they are shaped by the social context. Since the 1970s the social 
cognition approach, which focuses on the cognitive processes underpinning 
stereotyping and the cognitive structure of social group concepts, has come 
to dominate the study of stereotypes. Although, in the past few years there 
has been a resurgence of interest in the contents of social group 
stereotypes and specifically the ideological functions of stereotypes i.e. 
how stereotypes can serve to justify and naturalise social status differences 
between groups (Jost and Banaji, 1994). However, both these approaches 
(descriptive and social cognition) only focus on one aspect of the 
phenomenon i.e. contents or cognitive process/structure, and as such only 
offer a partial explanation of stereotypes. Increasingly social psychologists 
have argued that a complete explanation must theoretically integrate a 
study of both stereotype contents and cognitive process/structure (Hogg 
and Abrams, 1988). What has been missing is an overarching conceptual 
framework which would allow for such an integration.
Cognition and Culture Approach
In this thesis, in an attempt to f ill this theoretical and empirical gap, I 
postulate that the Cognition and Culture approach is best suited to 
facilitate an integration of the study of the contents of stereotypes and the 
cognitive processes and structures underpinning them. The Cognition and 
Culture approach (also known as the epidemiology of representations 
approach) is an emerging inter-disciplinary perspective which explores the
13
complex connections between cognition and culture by drawing on theories 
and research from cognitive science, anthropology, social psychology and 
evolutionary psychology. This approach was developed by Scott Atran, Rita 
Astuti, Pascal Boyer, Bradley Franks, Susan Gelman, Lawrence Hirschfeld, 
Dan Sperber and Harvey Whitehouse amongst others. Cognition and Culture 
scholars seek to explain the role of evolved domain-specific cognitive 
abilities in enabling and constraining the contents and structure of mental 
representations (e.g. beliefs) and public representations (e.g. artifacts). 
The main features of a Cognition and Culture approach are as follows: First, 
evolution resulted in the emergence of domain-specific cognitive capacities 
that predispose organisms to particular kinds of conceptual representations 
in key domains. Second, on one such view, cultures can be construed as the 
outcome of cognitive epidemiologies in which human minds are “ infected” 
by representations, through an aggregation of individual processes of 
acquisition and communication. Third, the survival and spread of 
representations is influenced by both ecological and psychological factors. 
Finally, these domain-specific cognitive competences place a strong 
selective constraint on the contents and structure of representations 
(Boyer, 1999). In sum, the central claim is that due partly to human 
cognitive architecture, and partly to ecological environments some ideas, 
beliefs etc are more “ sticky” or “easier to think” about, communicate and 
therefore more likely to spread and become stabilized within cultural 
populations (Nisbett &nd Norenzayan, 2002).
Theoretical Framework
This thesis explored the potentials of applying the Cognition and Culture 
approach to the study of social group stereotypes. The main argument was 
that stereotypes fall into the actual domain of a domain-specific cognitive 
competence which underpins group-based social cognition, namely a Folk 
Sociology. Furthermore, as a result of this cognitive predispositions arising 
from a Folk Sociology influence both the contents and functions of social 
group stereotypes. This thesis contains six studies that investigated the
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overarching research question: To what extent, and in what ways, do 
evolved cognitive predispositions shape the contents of social group 
stereotypes, and facilitate the ability of status stereotypes to naturalise 
social status differences between groups?’
To this end this thesis explored the ways in which cognitive predispositions 
may impact upon:
(a) The content of stereotypes of social groups. It has been found that the 
dimensions of competence and morality/warmth are central to the 
contents of social group stereotypes. Whereas social psychologists claim 
that such stereotypes derive their content from the structure of inter-group 
relations, I explore the possibility that evolved cognitive predispositions 
arising from a Folk Sociology, in part, help to shape the content of such 
stereotypes.
(b) The ideological functions of stereotypes. One of the functions which 
stereotypes purportedly perform is to act as ideological representations 
which justify and naturalise social status differences between groups. 
However, while social psychologists focus solely on the ideological 
functions of the contents of stereotypes, I consider how the ability of 
stereotypes to function as ideological representations may be also be 
facilitated by the nature of the cognitive structure of social group 
concepts via the recruitment of an evolved cognitive predisposition, 
psychological essentialism, from a Folk Sociology. While in social scientific 
accounts essentialism is described as a by-product of philosophical and 
cultural traditions (Fuss, 1989), Cognition and Culture theorists have 
suggested that essentialism is in fact an evolved cognitive predisposition 
which underpins our representations of social groups.
15
Thesis Outline
Chapter I presents a review of the extant social psychology of stereotyping 
literature focusing on the two main approaches; descriptive approach and 
social cognition approach, with the aim of explicating the gap in this 
literature that motivates the current research. This is followed, in Chapter 
II, by an introduction to the Cognition and Culture approach, and a detailed 
articulation of how the application of this approach to social group 
stereotypes can help to fill this gap in the social psychology of stereotyping 
literature. In Chapters III - VII, an account is provided of the method and 
results of each of the experiments designed to lend empirical support to 
this theoretical framework. The three experiments reported in Chapters III, 
IV and V were designed to investigate the extent to which cognitive 
predispositions may shape the contents of social group stereotypes. The 
three experiments reported in Chapters VI and VII were designed to 
investigate whether psychological essentialism may facilitate the 
ideological functions of stereotypes.
Chapter III presents the findings of study 1 which explored whether humans 
may have evolved a default stereotyping mode based on two dimensions 
which have been found to capture the contents of group stereotypes: 
competence and morality/warmth. The findings of study 1 provided strong 
support for an in-group default stereotyping mode. However, as predicted, 
there was no evidence of stereotypes for out-groups. Chapter IV presents 
the findings of a follow-up study (2) which provides support for default 
group status stereotypes of both in-groups and out-groups. Chapter V 
reports the findings of a second follow-up study (3) which replicated the 
findings of study 2 using an implicit measure of stereotyping. Chapter VI 
reports the findings of study 4 which provides evidence that status 
differences trigger essentialist beliefs about social groups. Chapter VII 
reports the findings of two studies (5 and 6) using various thought 
experiment paradigms that explored whether humans essentialise group- 
based social status as this may facilitate the ability of stereotypes to
16
naturalise status differences between groups. No evidence was found for 
essentialist beliefs in study 5 which used the adoption and brain transplant 
paradigm. However an analysis of participants’ justifications for their 
responses in the brain transplant paradigm suggested that many 
participants did not perceive the brain to be central to status identity. 
Therefore, in order to overcome the shortcomings of using the brain 
transplant paradigm, study 6 re-examined essentialist beliefs about group- 
based social status using two alternative thought experiment paradigms: 
soul exchange and personality exchange. Evidence was found for 
essentialist beliefs about group status using the soul exchange paradigm.
The final chapter of this thesis critically assesses the extent to which the 
present research has been successful in achieving its aims, and lending 
support to the proposed theoretical framework. This chapter begins with a 
consideration of the potential implications of the theoretical framework 
and empirical findings for the social psychology of stereotyping literature 
and the Cognition and Culture approach. This is followed by a discussion of 
the limitations of the research presented in this thesis, and areas for future 
research are highlighted. The chapter ends by reflecting upon potential 
social policy implications of the research in helping to combat stereotyping 
and improving inter-group relations.
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Chapter I - The Social Psychology of Stereotyping - A Review
This chapter presents a review of the extant social psychology literature on 
stereotypes and stereotyping. This review will necessarily be selective 
given that there have been well over 5,000 empirical studies of stereotypes 
in the past 70 years (Schneider, 2004). It w ill be seen that, broadly 
speaking, the study of stereotypes has been approached from two different 
perspectives. Early research adopted a descriptive approach, focusing on 
the contents of stereotypes. However, since the late 1970s, the social 
cognition approach has come to dominate the study of stereotypes and the 
focus shifted to a study of the cognitive process of stereotyping and the 
cognitive structure of social group concepts. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting that a key gap in this literature is that these traditional 
approaches offer only a partial explanation of stereotypes because they 
focus largely on one aspect of the phenomenon, i.e. content or cognitive 
process/structure. A complete explanation must theoretically integrate a 
study of both stereotype contents and the cognitive processes/structures 
underpinning stereotyping (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
1.1 Social Psychology of Stereotyping - An introduction
The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms - Socrates
The word ‘stereotype' comes from the amalgamation of two Greek words: 
stereos, meaning “ solid” and typos, meaning “ the mark of a blow.” The 
term ‘stereotype' was first introduced to the social sciences by Walter 
Lippmann (1922) who, as a journalist, borrowed the phrase from the 
printing world. In printing a stereotype is the metal cast that is used to 
make repeated and identical images of a character on paper. Lippmann 
used the analogy to refer to the ways in which people apply the same cast 
to their impressions of a group. For instance, when someone views all 
women as lacking mathematical skills, they are applying the same cast to 
their impression of all members of the group. In effect, he viewed
18
stereotypes as simplified ‘pictures' of a social category (Augoustinos and 
Walker, 1995). While recognizing the debt owed to Lippmann, Allport 
(1954) accused Lippmann of confusing a stereotype with a category. 
Furthermore, Allport argued that stereotypes are more than just ‘pictures 
in the head', they are inaccurate pictures. Allport advanced the following 
definition of a stereotype: “whether favourable or unfavourable a 
stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (1954: 
191). This definition held sway in social psychology for many years. In the 
years that followed tens if not hundreds of definitions of stereotypes have 
been put forward (see Table 1.0 for a select few). These definitions tend to 
disagree about whether or not stereotypes are inaccurate. Social
psychologists such as Allport believed that inaccuracy is an integral 
characteristic of stereotypes. However, increasingly this feature is being 
excluded from definitions of stereotypes by social psychologists who argue 
that whether or not stereotypes are accurate is an empirical not a 
theoretical question; it  is something to be investigated and cannot be 
decided a priori. There have been some attempts to investigate the
accuracy of stereotypes but their conclusions have generally been
inconsistent (Judd, Ryan, and Park, 1991; Lee, Jussim, and McCauley,
1995). According to Stangor (2009) even if there is an element of truth to 
stereotypes they cannot accurately describe every single member of a 
given group and as such they are “ just plain wrong” (2009: 2).
For the purpose of the present research I shall adopt Mackie, Hamilton, 
Susskind and Rosselli’s (1996: 42) definition of a stereotype as “ a cognitive 
structure containing the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies 
about some human social group.” This definition was chosen as it is the 
most widely used and accepted definition in modern social psychology (cf. 
Schneider, 2004).
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TABLE 1.0: Some Classic Definitions of Stereotypes (Adapted from 
Schneider, 2004)
“A fixed impression which conforms very litt le  to the facts it  pretends to 
represent and results from our defining firs t and observing second” (Katz 
£t Braly, 1935: 181).
“A stereotype is a stimulus which arouses standardized preconceptions 
which are influential in determining one’s response to the stimulus” 
(Edwards, 1940: 357-358).
“ Whether favourable or unfavourable, a stereotype is an exaggerated 
belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify  (rationalize) our 
conduct in relation to that category”  (Allport, 1954: 197).
“Stereotyping has three characteristics: the categorization of persons, a 
consensus on attributed traits, and a discrepancy between attributed 
traits and actual traits” (Secord 6t Backman, 1964: 66).
“An ethnic stereotype is a generalization made about an ethnic group 
concerning a tra it attribution, which is considered to be unjustified by an 
observer” (Brigham, 1971: 29).
“A stereotype refers to those folk beliefs about the attributes 
characterizing a social category on which there is substantial agreement” 
(Mackie, 1973: 435).
“Stereotypes are sets of traits attributed to social groups”  (Stephan, 1985,
p. 600).
“Stereotypes are highly organized social categories that have properties of 
cognitive schemata” (Andersen, Klatzky Gt Murray, 1990, p. 192).
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We also need a definition of the term ‘social group’ . Even a cursory glance 
at the literature on inter-group relations reveals the diversity of meanings 
that have been attached to the term ‘group’ . Early research on inter-group 
relations emphasized the importance of role relationships and face-to-face 
interaction as key characteristics of groups (see for example Bales, 1950). 
However, such definitions exclude large scale social categories such as 
ethnic groups (Brown, 2000). Furthermore, Tajfel (1982) highlighted that 
there may be a discrepancy between the external criteria for group 
membership as applied by those ‘outside’ a social system for example by 
social scientists, and the criteria for group membership applied by those 
inside the system. Such considerations led some theorists to focus on 
people’s self-categorizations, and a group was defined as “ a collection of 
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category”  (Tajfel and Turner: 1986: 15). For our present purpose a social 
group is taken to mean “ two or more people who are perceived as sharing 
some common characteristic that is socially meaningful to themselves 
[and/]or others” (Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind and Rosselli, 1996: 42). This 
definition was chosen as it takes into account both external and internal 
criteria. A distinction is made in the literature between in-groups and out­
group; in-groups are social groups to which you belong, while out-groups 
are social groups to which you do not belong (Sumner, 1906).
Aside from representing our knowledge about a relevant social group, 
stereotypes also have a number of consequences. For instance, they lead us 
to assume that a specific group member is essentially identical to other 
members of the group, and the group as a whole is thus perceived and 
treated as being homogenous. This homogenization can vary in its 
extremity and rigidity, and it  is often associated with evaluation. That is, 
there is a tendency to attach derogatory stereotypes to outgroups and 
favourable ones to ingroups. Hence, stereotypes are seen as a central 
component of prejudice and inter-group relations (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). 
Within social psychology, prejudice has traditionally been viewed as the 
application of social stereotypes. According to Allport’s classic definition,
21
prejudice is “ an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization” 
(Allport, 1954: 9). Many classic and contemporary social psychologists share 
Allport’s view that prejudice is an inevitable outcome of categorization and 
stereotyping processes (e.g. Tajfel, 1981; Hilton and von Hippel, 1996). 
Nonetheless, increasingly social psychologists are recognizing that there is 
a more complex relationship between stereotyping and prejudice. More 
specifically, it has been found that prejudice can precede the formation of 
stereotypes. In other words stereotypes can lead to prejudice but prejudice 
can also contribute to stereotyping (Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind and 
Rosselli, 1996). Furthermore, most empirical investigations of the 
relationship between stereotyping and prejudice report modest correlations 
(e.g., Biernat and Crandall, 1994; Kawakami, Dion, and Dovidio, 1998; 
Stephan and Stephan, 1996). The upshot of all this is that there is no simple 
relationship between stereotyping and prejudice and the traditional 
‘ inevitability of prejudice’ approach is overly simplistic.
Stereotyping and prejudice are also closely related to discriminatory 
behaviour. They can have substantial effects on job hiring and performance 
evaluations (Glick, Zion, and Nelson, 1988). Discrimination has been 
blamed for the large percentage of Blacks living in poverty, and their lack 
of access to healthcare and prestigious jobs in the U.S. (Williams and 
Rucker, 2000). It has also been found that just thinking about social 
categories to which we belong can activate stereotypes associated with 
that category resulting in stereotype consistent behaviour, thus creating 
self-fulfilling prophecies (Steele and Aronson, 1995). For instance, Shih, 
Pittinsky and Ambady (2000) found that activating the category gender in 
Asian American women led to worse performance on a maths test 
(presumably priming gender identity activated the stereotype that women 
are not good at math). However, when ethnic identity was activated the 
same participants performed much better on the maths test (presumably 
priming ethnic identity activated the stereotype that Asians excel at math). 
This phenomenon is known as stereotype or social identity threat. Social 
identity threat is defined as “ a state of psychological discomfort that
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people experience when confronted by an unflattering group or individual 
reputation in situations where that reputation can be confirmed by one's 
behaviour” (Aronson and McGlone, 2009: 154). Social identity threat is not 
an experience limited to women. For example, experiments have found 
performance decrements among African Americans (Steele and Aronson,
1995); Latinos (Aronson and Salinas, 1997; Gonzales, Blanton, and Williams, 
2002); Native Americans (Osborne, 2001), and poor White college students 
in France (Croizet and Claire, 1998).
As noted above, within social psychology, stereotypes have, broadly 
speaking, been conceptualized and studied from two different approaches; 
a descriptive (content-based) approach and the social cognition (process- 
based) approach (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). These approaches and their 
concomitant advantages and drawbacks are reviewed below.
1.1.1 Stereotypes - a descriptive (content based) approach
Early research on stereotypes adopted a descriptive approach and focused 
on uncovering the contents of stereotypes of various social groups and the 
consensus surrounding such contents. Descriptive studies of stereotypes 
have generally been conducted within the framework of the cultural (or 
collective) approach. This approach draws heavily on anthropological and 
sociological concepts. Proponents of the cultural approach consider society 
itself to be the basis of stored knowledge. This knowledge includes the 
society's ideas, myths, customs, religions and sciences (Farr and Moscovici, 
1984). Stereotypes are considered public information about social groups 
that is widely shared among individuals within a given culture. Advocates of 
this approach note that it is the contents of stereotypes and consensus 
surrounding stereotypes in a culture that make stereotypes problematic. 
From this perspective, it  matters that the stereotypes of Blacks include 
“ lazy” and “ athletic” because they are involved in determining the social 
status of Blacks within society (Stangor and Schaller, 1996).
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Katz and Braly (1933) provided the framework for early research. They 
devised a procedure for eliciting people’s stereotypes of specific groups 
which allows researchers to assess both the contents of stereotypes, as well 
as the degree of consensus about such contents. Princeton University 
undergraduates were required to select adjectives they believed ‘to be 
typical of’ ethnic groups (in the U.S) such as African Americans, Jews, Irish, 
and Turks from a long list, and then indicate the five most characteristic of 
each group. Only the latter were subjected to analysis, and revealed 
extensive agreement between people about what constitutes the 
stereotype of a particular social group; for example, Katz and Braly report 
that 75% of their sample believed African-Americans to be lazy and 79% 
that Jews are shrewd. This study was replicated in 1951 by Gilbert and 
again in 1969 by Karlins, Coffman and Walters and the three studies are 
collectively known as the Princeton Trilogy studies (see Tables 1.1 and 
1.2). In their second classic study, Katz and Braly (1935) found that the 
rank order of preferences for the 10 groups (serving as a crude prejudice 
measure) was identical to the rankings of the average desirability of the 
traits assigned to groups. And so began a long tradition of social 
psychologists seeing stereotypes as closely linked to prejudice.
It is not uncommon for all members of a culture to share the same 
stereotypes of groups, even the members of the group who are the target 
of the stereotypes. It has been found that both blacks and whites hold 
highly similar stereotypes of blacks (Bayton, 1941; Makykovich, 1972). 
Hispanic and White Americans generally agree on the traits ascribed to 
each group (Triandis, Lisanky, Setiadi, Chang, Marin and Betacourt, 1982). 
One of the most extensive studies of national stereotypes was conducted by 
Peabody (1985). People in several European countries rated Americans and 
people from other European countries. Generally, there was considerable 
agreement across national samples (including the country being judged) as 
to the characteristics possessed by people in each national group.
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TABLE 1.1: Princeton Trilogy Studies: Stereotypic Traits of Select Social 
Groups________________________________________________________
Group 1933 1951 1969
Americans Industrious Materialistic Materialistic
Intelligent Intelligent Ambitious
Materialistic Industrious Pleasure-loving
Ambitious Pleasure-loving Industrious
Progressive Individualistic Conventional
Jews Shrewd Shrewd Ambitious
Mercenary Intelligent Materialistic
Industrious Industrious Intelligent
Grasping Mercenary Industrious
Intelligent Ambitious Shrewd
Afro-Americans Superstitious Superstitious Musical
Lazy Musical Happy-go-lucky
Ignorant Ignorant Pleasure-loving
Musical Pleasure-loving Ostentatious
Note. Adapted from Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffmin, and Walters, 1969; 
Katz and Braly, 1933.
TABLE 1.2: Princeton Trilogy Studies: Ten Most Frequently Selected 
Traits (and Percentages of Subjects Listing These Traits) for African- 
Americans
Trait 1933 1951 1969
Superstitious 84 41 13
Lazy 75 31 26
Happy-go-lucky 38 17 27
Ignorant 38 24 11
Musical 26 33 47
Ostentatious 26 11 25
Note. Adapted from Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffmin, and Walters, 1969; 
Katz and Braly, 1933.
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Several criticisms have been levelled at the Princeton trilogy and 
subsequent studies using their research paradigm. Devine (1989) noted that 
subjects may be aware of cultural stereotypes without necessarily 
endorsing them personally. Devine and Elliot (1995) argue that instead of 
asking people to provide traits they associated with various groups, a 
better measure might have been to ask which traits subjects thought were 
part of the general stereotype of a group. Using this latter method, Devine 
and Elliot (1995) found that many of the original Katz and Braly traits (such 
as being superstitious, naive and materialistic) had essentially disappeared 
from whites’ stereotypes of blacks, while other traits (such as being 
athletic, low in intelligence, criminal and loud) were endorsed by at least a 
third of the subjects. Another criticism is that the three studies used the 
same traits for comparability reasons, despite the obvious possibility that 
current racial stereotypes may include features that were not given to the 
earlier subjects (Schneider, 1996).
While initial research focused on national, racial and ethnic groups, later 
research began to focus on the contents of gender stereotypes. Although 
there was some early research on gender stereotypes (Sheriffs and Jarrett, 
1953), the major stimulus for research was a paper by Rosenkrantz, Vogel, 
Bee, Broverman, and Broverman (1968). These authors asked participants 
to rate the extent to which males and females exhibited 122 traits. The 41 
items that at least 75% of men and 75% of women agreed “ belonged” more 
to one gender than the other were designated as sex-stereotypic traits. 
There were 12 feminine traits (e.g, being talkative, religious, quiet, 
expressing tender feelings) and 29 masculine traits (e.g., being aggressive, 
objective, logical, self-confident, active). In the past quarter century more 
research has been directed to gender than any other category (cf., 
Schneider, 2004). For the next 20 years or so, most studies on stereotypes 
continued the same basic focus (see Brigham, 1971 for an extensive 
review). Tajfel (1978) summarized the general findings of these studies as 
follows: (1) people characterize vast human groups in terms of a few fairly 
crude common attributes; (2) such stereotypes are very slow to change,
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and such change occurs in response to social, political or economic 
changes; (3) stereotypes are learned at a very young age, even before the 
child has any clear knowledge about the group to which the stereotype 
refers, and (4) stereotypes are most harmful and destructive in a social 
climate of hostility and conflict.
Overall, the descriptive approach was indispensable in establishing the 
contents of the stereotypes of social groups, how strongly they are held, 
their evaluative connotations, and the level of social consensus about 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, it  appeared that the 
descriptive approach to the study of stereotypes had become somewhat 
stagnant. Brigham’s (1971) classic review covered about 100 studies and his 
general tone was somewhat pessimistic as while social psychologists had 
learned a lot about the specific contents of specific social group 
stereotypes, there was little  in the way of empirical generalizations. 
Furthermore, social psychologists began to recognise that such a content- 
based account failed to consider the social psychological processes 
responsible for stereotyping (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). This concern 
coincided with the cognitive revolution in psychology and generated the 
second wave of research on stereotypes. The 1970s were years of 
extraordinary development in cognitive psychology, and during the 1980s 
this perspective was applied rigorously to the study of how we perceive, 
remember and think about people and social events (see Baars, 1986; 
Gardner, 1986; Mandler, 2002; Miller, 2003). Cognitive psychology 
generally, and social cognition more particularly, emphasized the role of 
abstract cognitive structures in processing information about others. 
Stereotypes began to be seen as cognitive structures in their own right. 
Thus, emphasis shifted away from studying the contents of stereotypes to 
studying the general cognitive processes involved in stereotyping, and the 
nature of the cognitive structures of social group concepts (Hamilton, 
Stroessner and Driscoll, 1994).
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1.1.2 Stereotypes - a social-cognition approach
The study of the cognitive processes and cognitive structures underpinning 
stereotyping has primarily been associated with the dominant social 
cognition tradition within North America (cf. Fiske and Taylor, 1991). A 
strong emphasis is placed on the minutiae of cognitive processes, and how 
cognitive structures shape the encoding and representation of information, 
and it is thus intentionally based in cognitive psychology. Stereotype 
formation begins when an aggregate of persons is perceived as comprising a 
group, an entity. Individuals are categorized into different groups that are 
somehow perceived in relation to each other (women vs. men; Americans 
vs. Russians). Stereotypes are viewed as products of normal everyday 
cognitive processes of social categorization, social inference, and social 
judgment and so may be studied in terms of general principles of human 
cognitive activity (Borgida, Locksley, and Brekke, 1981). Several decades 
ahead of the cognitive revolution in Social Psychology, Allport presciently 
argued that:
The human mind must think with the aid of categories. Once formed, 
categories are the basis fo r normal prejudgement. We cannot possibly 
avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it. We like to solve 
problems easily. We can do so best i f  we can f i t  them rapidly into a 
satisfactory category and use this category as a means of prejudging the 
solution. I f  I can lump thirteen million of my fellow citizens under a simple 
formula ‘Negroes are stupid, dirty, and inferior ' I simplify my life  
enormously (Allport, 1954: 20-1).
Two lines of reasoning have been offered for why perceivers so readily 
categorize others into groups rather than maintaining their individuality. 
The first focuses on the cognitive underpinnings of categorization and 
emphasizes the value of cognitive efficiency. People are continuously 
engaged in trying to comprehend a complex world that can make more 
demands on information processing than the system can handle. 
Consequently, it  is efficient to identify the similarities and differences
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among various stimulus events and group those stimuli into categories on 
that basis. For many purposes, members of the same class can be treated 
as functionally equivalent, and different from stimuli in other categories. 
When these stimuli are people, this process leads us to group people into 
social categories (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). As Hilton and von Hippel (1996) 
point out, it is important to remember that although categorization 
involves “ information loss” through the failure to recognize the 
individuality of each category member, categorization also provides 
“ information gain”  through ascribing group characteristics to individual 
members. That is, once an individual is categorized as a group member, the 
observer can assume that that person possesses many features 
characteristic of group members, even in the absence of empirical 
evidence about that individual. On this view, categorization is a cognitive 
mechanism that is a natural consequence of the perceiver’s simultaneous 
need to both reduce and elaborate available information. Social cognition 
theorists note that categorization does not always eventuate in the 
formation of a full-blown stereotype. However, they readily acknowledge 
that they currently know little  about the conditions under which this 
transition takes place (Hilton and von Hippel, 1996).
The second perspective focuses on the self-evaluative benefits of 
differentiating one’s own group (in-group) from other groups (out-groups). 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), these 
differentiations are driven by the perceiver’s desire for positive social 
identity. ‘Social identity’ is defined as, “ that part of the individuals’ self- 
concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
of that membership” (Tajfel, 1981: 255). The major assumption of SIT is 
that even when there is no explicit or institutionalized conflict or 
competition between the groups, there is a tendency toward ingroup- 
favouring behaviour. SIT posits that part of one’s self evaluation derives 
from one’s membership in social groups. To the extent that we have 
favourable evaluations of our in-group, or can at least derogate out-groups,
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there w ill be some beneficial consequence for one's self-regard. On this 
view, then, intergroup categorization rests in part on this motive for self- 
enhancement. In terms of stereotype formation, social identity mechanisms 
provide motives for attributing positive qualities to the in-group and 
negative qualities to the out-group (Brewer, 1979). SIT theorists claim that 
even membership in a short-term, arbitrarily determined group can provide 
positive social identity. Indeed, Tajfel put forward SIT to account for the 
results of an experimental paradigm known as the Minimal Group Paradigm 
(MGP) (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament, 1971). The MGP describes an 
experimental context that creates an ad hoc basis for categorization and 
includes measures of evaluation of, and discrimination between, the groups 
involved. The unique characteristic of this minimal group paradigm was 
that the groups represented the most basic form of social categorization, 
based on simply being in one group or the other. The major dependent 
variable was the distribution by each subject of points worth money 
between two other anonymous subjects who were either one from the in­
group and one from the out-group, both from the in-group, or both from 
the out-group. The results showed clear evidence of bias in favour of the 
in-group via the adoption of the in-group favouritism strategy (a 
combination of maximizing points for in-group and maximizing the 
difference in favour of the in-group in the number of points awarded) even 
in this minimal context.
This mere categorization effect has been replicated many times using many 
different ways of categorizing people and many different measures of 
evaluation. In the original experiment, inter-group categorization was 
based on differing aesthetic preferences. However, participants also show 
in-group bias when divided into groups on an explicitly random basis, such 
as flipping coins (Billig and Tajfel, 1973). They have shown in-group bias 
not only when allocating money (Tajfel et a/., 1971) but also when 
evaluating the behaviours of in-group and out-group members (Howard & 
Rothbart, 1980). In a recent study, Otten and Wentura (1999) illustrated 
that such a bias may also operate at an implicit level. Otten and Wentura 
contend that a minimal in-group's positive distinctiveness might, at least
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partly, be based upon an automatically activated, implicit positive attitude 
towards the self-including social category. They conducted two 
experiments to investigate implicit inter-group bias in minimal groups. In 
both studies, participants were anonymously assigned to a social category 
and the category labels were then used in an affective priming task. It was 
found that in-group category labels - compared to out-group category 
labels - facilitated reactions towards positive targets, while out-group 
category labels facilitated reactions towards negative targets. The category 
label priming effect was also found to correlate meaningfully with explicit 
measures of in-group identification and in-group favouritism. These MGP 
research findings are important, claim advocates of SIT, because they 
suggest that there is a psychological component to prejudice, beyond any 
economic, political, or historical factor (Crisp, 2007). Tajfel’s work 
provided a major stimulus for research on inter-group relations, and social 
psychologists have continued to explore new domains for over 20 years. 
This effort has generated an entire literature on in-group bias (for a 
review, see Brewer, 1979).
Nonetheless, there have been several criticisms levelled at Social Identity 
Theory. One of the most persistent is that SIT is not well-equipped to 
account for the fact that most real-life inter-group situations are 
characterized by social stratification based on status inequalities that exist 
between groups. If, as SIT contends, the need for positive social identity 
motivates discrimination, then we should expect people in low-status 
groups to be even more motivated to discriminate than people in high 
status groups. However, a substantial body of research shows that members 
of low-status groups often acknowledge the superiority of high-status 
groups and often discriminate in favour of high status groups. One of the 
most well-known examples of such ‘out-group favouritism’ is Clark and 
Clark’s study (1947) doll study in which Black children showed a distinct 
preference for White dolls rather than Black dolls. Field studies conducted 
by, amongst others, Brown (1978), Hewstone and Ward (1985), and others 
have turned up strong evidence of out-group favouritism among members
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of various low-status groups. In a meta-analytic review of tests of the in­
group bias hypothesis, Mullen, Brown and Smith (1992) found that for the 
42 hypothesis tests where the in-group was judged to be of lower status, 
there was a weak in-group bias effect. Using a variant of the MGP, Sachdev 
and Bourhis (1987) formed ad hoc high, low and equal status groups. 
Results showed that high and equal status group members were more 
discriminatory against the out-group, and more positive about their own 
group membership than were low status group members. Low status group 
members engaged in significant amounts of out-group favouritism by 
distributing more resources to high status out-group members. It is 
important to stress that the subject of out-group favouritism has been 
addressed in some detail by social identity theorists such as Tajfel (1982), 
Turner and Brown (1978) and others. However, such ideas are not 
coherently built into SIT itself. We shall return to the role of social status 
in inter-group relations in Chapter II.
While some research during the 1960s and 1970s had a cognitive focus, the 
real beginnings of the cognitive approach to stereotyping took place in the 
1980s. Researchers within the social cognition tradition focused their 
attention on trying to unearth the nature of the cognitive structures of 
social group concepts. Three general approaches as to how information 
about social groups is represented within memory have been proposed. 
These are group schemas, group prototypes and exemplars. The most 
traditional approach to stereotyping within the social cognition approach is 
based on the cognitive schema (Fiske and Linville, 1980). Schemas are 
abstract knowledge structures that specify the defining features and 
relevant attributes of a given concept. Schemas give meaning to social 
information and promote parsimonious information processing. As 
representations of social groups, group schemas are collections of beliefs 
about the characteristics of a social group. Once developed schemas 
influence attention to and interpretation of social information, as well as 
judgments of and behaviour towards others (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). One 
particular limitation of the schema approach is that it does not make clear
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predictions about how one should measure stereotypes independently of 
the schematic effects themselves. Although diverse measures, including 
biased memory (Fyock and Stangor, 1994) and reaction times (Bern, 1981) 
have been used as measures of schematic processing, there is no well 
established method of validating the existence of the schema 
independently of its outcomes.
Because one of the primary goals of the cognitive approach has been to 
“ get specific” , researchers have turned away from the schema towards a 
conceptualization of stereotypes in terms of more clearly articulated 
models of mental representation (Hamilton and Sherman, 1994). One 
popular concept in this regard is the group prototype. Group prototypes are 
mental representations consisting of a collection of associations between 
group labels (e.g., Italians) and the features that are assumed to be true of 
the group (e.g., a feature of Italians might be “ romantic” ). Thus, 
prototypes are similar to group schemas, but at a lower and more specific 
level of representation. One advantage of this approach is that because 
stereotypes are defined as mental associations between category labels and 
trait terms, stereotypes can be measured by the extent to which these 
traits are activated upon exposure to category labels, that is, if  the trait 
“ romantic” is stereotypic of Italians, then when thinking about Italians, 
“ romantic” should come to mind quickly through spreading activation 
(Collins and Loftus, 1975).
Finally, an exemplar-based alternative to the abstraction based models has 
been proposed (Andersen and Cole, 1990). According to the exemplar 
model, groups are represented through particular concrete exemplars. The 
stereotype of African Americans as athletic, for example, is thought to be 
stored in the form of specific individuals (e.g. Michael Jordan, Carl Lewis). 
Which exemplars are called to mind upon encountering an individual 
depends on how attention is directed. Because of this feature, exemplar 
models place considerable emphasis on the role that goals and context play 
in determining which stereotypes are activated and applied (Smith and
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Zarate, 1992). While these accounts differ in many respects they all assume 
that category representation is based one way or another on similarity 
judgments. However, there is increasing evidence that at least some 
categories are not formed on the basis of perceptual similarity. There is 
evidence that even in making judgments about the similarity of two or 
more people we must use a “ theory” of sorts to decide which features are 
important (Rips and Collins, 1993). In recent years, there has been 
considerable interest in so-called ‘theory-based' approaches to category 
representation. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
A recent development in the social cognition field has been the surge of 
interest in the use of implicit methods. Indeed this is one of the fastest 
growing areas of research in social psychology therefore I shall not attempt 
to provide a comprehensive review of the field (for an extensive review see 
Bargh, 2007). A variety of implicit measurements techniques have been 
developed and used to study attitudes (e.g., Fazio, Jackman, Dunton and 
Williams, 1995; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995); self-esteem (e.g., Rudman, 
Ashmore and Gary, 2001) and stereotypes (e.g., Wittenbrink, Park and 
Judd, 1997; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald, 2002). One of the simplest 
techniques used is reaction time or latency. Participants are given some 
task and the speed with which they complete the task is measured. Thus a 
straightforward way of studying stereotypes has been to ask participants 
whether a given group possesses a certain trait and to measure latency of 
answering. Several studies have shown that information consistent with the 
stereotype of a given group is processed more rapidly than information 
inconsistent with the stereotype (e.g., Brewer, Dull, and Lui, 1981; Lalonde 
and Gardner, 1989; MacRae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten, 1994). Other 
popular measures include priming paradigms (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman 
and Tyler, 1990), the implicit association test (IAT) (Nosek, Greenwald and 
Banaji, 1995) and lexical decision tasks (Wittenbrink et a/., 1997). What all 
implicit methods share is that they seek to measure the construct of 
interest without having to directly ask the participant for a verbal report. 
The major appeal of implicit methods is that these indirect estimates are
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likely to be free of social desirability concerns. For many years social 
psychologists have been using direct measures of stereotypes. The two 
most extensively used methodologies used to study stereotypes and 
prejudice are free-response measures (directly asking participants which 
traits they associate with a given group) or attribute checking measures 
(giving participants a list of traits and asking them to select which traits 
they associate with a group) (Schneider, 2004). However, over the years 
social psychologists have found that participants in experiments are much 
less willing to admit that they are prejudiced or hold stereotypes. Hence, 
implicit methods have been of particular interest to social psychologists 
studying stereotypes and prejudice as they can reveal information that 
people might explicitly reject because their expression may have negative 
social consequences (Stangor, 2009). Furthermore, such implicit measures 
f it  present definitions of stereotypes as being the beliefs about the traits 
that are associated with social groups very well.
At the time of the cognitive revolution in social psychology in the 1970s it 
was widely believed that cognition was deliberate and conscious. However, 
by the 1980s cognitive psychologists began to investigate unconscious or 
automatic cognitive processes. This resulted in the hypothesis of a 
dichotomy between automatic cognitive processes (characterized by lack of 
awareness, unintentionally, uncontrollable and efficient) and controlled 
cognitive processes (characterized by awareness, intentionality, 
controllability and limited capacity). Building on this model, Devine (1989) 
proposed that prejudice and stereotyping are governed by a mixture of 
controlled, consciously held beliefs and automatic, preconscious processes. 
Furthermore, Devine (1989) argued that these two processes operate and 
can be measured independently. Early work on automaticity in stereotyping 
was strongly influenced by this dual process conception of cognition. There 
is ample evidence that stereotypic trait information about a group can be 
automatically activated by exposure to a group-related stimulus; these 
include age (Perdue and Gurtman, 1990), gender (Pratto and Bargh, 1991), 
and ‘ race* (Devine, 1989; Macrae et al., 1994). The literature has included
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much discussion of the relationship between implicit and explicit measures. 
Within the domain of prejudice and stereotyping, the correlations tend to 
be quite low (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton Et Williams, 1995, Greenwald, 
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), although there are occasional reports of 
significant correlations (e.g., Lepore and Brown, 1997, Wittenbrink et al.,
1997).
Within the past few years, psychologists have recognised that the 
dichotomy between automatic and controlled mental processes is too 
simplistic. It appears that most psychological phenomena comprise both 
automatic and controlled components (Payne and Stewart, 2007). In 
addition, Fazio and Olson (2003) have expressed some misgivings about the 
very terms “ implicit” and “ explicit”  having been imported from cognitive 
psychology, at least insofar as they are used to refer to implicit vs. explicit 
attitudes, stereotypes etc. In cognitive psychology, individuals are said to 
display implicit memory for a prior event when their performance on some 
task shows evidence of their having been influenced by that prior event, 
even though they display no explicit memory for the event, i.e., they 
report no awareness of the event having occurred (see Schacter, 1982). If 
this terminology is to have similar meaning for attitudes, stereotypes etc 
then it has to imply that implicit attitudes are ones for which individuals 
lack awareness. Fazio and Olson (2003) point out that nothing about our 
current implicit measurement procedures guarantees that participants are 
unaware of their attitudes. Furthermore, they argue that discordance 
between scores on an implicit and an explicit measure should not, in and of 
itself, be taken as evidence that the implicitly measured construct is an 
unconscious construct. Hence, they stipulate that it is more appropriate to 
view the measure as implicit or explicit, not the attitude, stereotype etc.
By and large, the social cognition approach has come to dominate social 
psychology generally, as well as the study of stereotypes more specifically 
(cf. Hamilton and Sherman, 1994; Stangor and Lange, 1994). One of the 
central advantages of this approach is that by drawing on cognitive
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psychology it allows social psychologists to unite the study of stereotypes 
with social knowledge more generally, through the language of mental 
representation. For example, conceptualizing stereotypes as the cognitive 
component of prejudice provides a way of studying stereotypes within the 
broader literature on attitudes (Fazio, 1990). However despite these 
important contributions, the social cognition approach has several 
drawbacks. The social cognition perspective does not place much emphasis 
on the content of stereotypes (Schneider, 1996). Furthermore, it  overlooks 
the socially important outcomes of stereotyping (Stangor and Schaller, 
1996).
1.1.3 Stereotypes - The new look in content
In recent years, in lieu of the criticisms levelled at the social cognition 
approach, there has been a return to examining the contents of 
stereotypes. However, what distinguishes this new look in content from 
the old is the deliberate attempt to make empirical generalizations about 
the contents of stereotypes. In order to achieve this goal, social 
psychologists have focused their attention on how structural factors shape 
the contents of stereotypes. One of the first studies to demonstrate that 
people’s intergroup attitudes were a product of their group’s interests in a 
specifically structured, inter-group relationship were the Sherif and Sherif 
(1966) Robbers’ Cave experiments. Sherif and Sherif (1996) demonstrated 
that groups interacting in a conflict of interest situation developed hostile 
intergroup attitudes and behaviour:
The sufficient condition fo r the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds...and 
fo r the standardization of social distance justified by derogatory /mages of 
the outgroup was the existence of two groups competing fo r goals that 
only one group could attain (Sherif, 1966, 85).
As noted earlier, following Allport (1954), social psychologists have 
typically viewed only unflattering stereotypes as indicative of prejudice, 
where prejudice is a uniform antipathy towards an out-group. However
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recent research has indicated that many intergroup relations (race, class or 
gender) do not correspond to the expectations of Allport’s prejudice model 
i.e. free-ranging, hostile feelings and unmitigated derogatory stereotypes. 
Jackman (2005) has argued that in order to understand inter-group 
attitudes it is critical to assess the structure of the relations between the 
groups. Similarly, Eagly and Diekman (2005) outline a new theory of role- 
incongruity prejudice which suggests that in order to understand prejudice 
we need to take into account the social-structural position of targeted 
groups. The key eliciting condition for prejudice, they claim, is the 
potential or actual entry of group members into social roles to which they 
are stereotypically mismatched (Eagly and Dieken, 2005). Hoffman and 
Hurst (1990) provided experimental evidence for the contribution of role- 
determined behaviours to the acquisition of stereotypes. In their study, 
subjects read descriptions of fictitious inhabitants of a distant planet - 
‘Orinthians’ and ‘Ackmians’ . After hearing most Orinthians described as 
involved in child-care, subjects judged them to be typically nurturing, 
affectionate and gentle, whereas Ackmians, who were described as mainly 
employed outside of the home, were seen as competitive and ambitious. 
Each group was seen as having psychological characteristics appropriate for 
its role. Additional evidence indicated that true stereotypes of these groups 
had been acquired. Indeed, subjects later applied these stereotypes to 
individual group members whose occupations clashed with the stereotype: 
they saw an employed Ackmian as more competitive and ambitious than an 
employed Orinthian.
An important new theory which focuses directly on the relationship 
between the structure of inter-group relations and the content of 
stereotypes is Fiske, Cuddy and Glick’s (2007) Stereotype Content Model 
(SCM). Fiske and colleagues have found that two core dimensions underlie 
the contents of social group stereotypes: competence and warmth (for an 
extensive review of these dimension, see Cuddy, Fiske and Glick, 2008). 
Their competence scales have included traits such as ‘capable’ , ‘skillful’ , 
‘ intelligent’ , and ‘confident.’ While their warmth scales have included
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traits such as ‘good-natured’ , ‘trustworthy’ , ‘tolerant’ , ‘friendly’ , and 
‘sincere’ . They do not deny that specific social group stereotypes have 
idiosyncratic content (e.g., the notion that African-Americans are athletic) 
but they argue that much of the variance in group stereotypes can be 
explained by warmth and competence dimensions. Evidence for the 
spontaneous use of these dimensions in stereotyping comes from a re­
analysis of the Princeton stereotyping series begun by Katz and Braly (1933) 
(see above). Using the original list of 100 adjectives, five independent 
judges categorized each trait appearing in any of the stereotypes in all of 
the four studies. Using 60% agreement as a criterion, 17 traits were 
categorized as warmth traits, 33 traits were categorized as competence 
traits, and 34 traits were categorized as neither, so 60% of the 
spontaneously checked adjectives for ten ethnic groups over 75 years f it  
competence and warmth dimensions (Cuddy, Fiske and Glick, 2008).
Numerous studies have revealed that warmth and competence are central 
dimensions of stereotypes of a wide variety of social groups, including age- 
groups (Cuddy, Norton and Fiske, 2005); Asians and Asian Americans (Kitano 
and Sue, 1973; Lin, Kwan, Cheung and Fiske, 2005); immigrants (Lee and 
Fiske, 2006); subgroups of gay men (Clausell and Fiske, 2005); subgroups of 
Black Americans (Williams and Fiske, 2006); European nationalities (Cuddy, 
Fiske, Kwan, Glick et o/., 2009; Peeters, 1993); enemy outgroups 
(Alexander, Brewer and Livingston, 1999); linguistic groups (Ruscher, 2001; 
Yzerbyt, Provost and Corneille, 2005); and fascist depictions of racial 
groups (Volpato, Durante and Fiske, 2007). Wojciszke and colleagues’ have 
also conducted extensive experimental work on the two dimensions of 
competence and morality (instead of warmth). Wojciszke, Bazinska and 
Jaworski (1998) use the terms morality and competence, but the moral 
traits include ‘fair’ , ‘generous’ , ‘helpful’ , ‘ righteous’ , ‘sincere’ , ‘tolerant’ , 
and ‘understanding’ , which overlap entirely with the warmth dimension 
used in the studies cited above. They have discovered that together these 
two dimensions account for approximately 82% of the variance in global 
impressions of well-known others (Wojiciszke, Bazinska, and Jaworski,
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1998). Finally, the warmth and competence dimensions also emerge in 
analyses of emotional prejudice towards specific social groups, for example 
high warmth and high competence stereotypes elicit admiration, while high 
warm and low competence elicit pity (For a discussion of these findings, 
please see Cuddy, Fiske and Glick, 2007).
The SCM model is supported by research conducted across eighteen nations 
tested so far, including North America, nine European nations, three East 
Asian nations, three Latin American nations, and two Israeli samples 
(Cuddy, Fiske, Kwan, Glick, et al., 2009). Fiske et al. have found that 
although some outgroups are perceived negatively on both warmth and 
competence (such as the homeless or welfare recipients), most social 
groups are perceived ambivalently (high on one dimension and low on the 
other). Some groups are seen as incompetent but warm, including African 
Americans (Jackman, 1994); older people (Cuddy and Fiske, 2002) and 
traditional women (Glick and Fiske, 2001). Other groups are viewed as 
competent but cold, including non-traditional women (Glick and Fiske, 
2001); Asian Americans (Lin, Kwan, Cheung and Fiske, 2005) and Jews 
(Allport, 1954; Glick, 2002).
The SCM proposes that the universality of the dimensions competence and 
warmth to stereotypes stem from the structure of inter-group relations. 
More specifically, they arise from appraisals of inter-group competition and 
inter-group social status differentials. In relation to inter-group 
competition, when a group explicitly competes with the in-group, its intent 
is seen as unfriendly and untrustworthy (i.e. not warm). By contrast when a 
group cooperates with or does not hinder the in-group, then their intent is 
seen as friendly and trustworthy (i.e. warm). As this theory predicts, the 
perceived warmth and interdependence (cooperation-competition) of 
groups are negatively correlated (on average - 0.52 across groups in US, 
Western European and Asian samples) (Cuddy et al., 2009). The other 
dimension, competence, results from appraisals of inter-group status 
differences. Perceivers view high status and low status groups as meriting
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their positions because they are respectively, more versus less competent. 
Of the 18 nations they have studied the status-competence correlations 
average 0.94 across groups (Cuddy et a/., 2009). Fiske and colleagues have 
also found that often these two traits are negatively correlated and cluster 
into two types based on group status; high status group members are 
perceived as competent but cold, while low status group members are 
perceived as incompetent but warm (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy and Glick, 1999). 
Aside from correlational studies, these structural predictors have also 
received support from experiments on intergroup perception (Caprariello, 
Cuddy, and Fiske, 2007; Oldmeadow and Fiske, 2007). Fiske et al.'s studies 
focus almost wholly on stereotypes of out-groups. In relation to the in­
group it is claimed that due to in-group favouritism people may perceive 
their in-group to be high in both competence and warmth. In two studies 
they explicitly included in-group ratings and found that participants rated 
their in-groups (e.g., Americans, students, middle-class and Whites) as 
highly competent and highly warm (Cuddy et al., 2007, Study 1; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick and Xu, 2002, Study 2). However, these groups are all high- 
status groups and the results may be due to the status of the groups rather 
than in-group favouritism per se. So far, to my knowledge, there has been 
no investigation of ratings of other in-groups (e.g., women, men, Hispanics, 
Asians and Blacks).
It has also been found that morality/warmth judgements may be primary. 
In a series of studies, Wojciszke, Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998) 
demonstrated the primary of warmth/morality traits in global evaluations 
of others. For instance, participants asked to list the most important 
personality traits listed significantly more morality/warmth traits than 
competence traits. In lexical decision tasks, social perceivers identify 
warmth-related trait words faster than competence-related trait words, 
even when controlling for word length (Ybarra, Chan, and Park, 2001). In 
another series of studies perceivers judged warmth faster than competence 
in (a) an anticipated interaction paradigm, (b) a photo evaluation task
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without contextual cues, and (c) a photo evaluation task including social 
groups that varied in status (Hack, Goodwin, and Fiske, 2007).
1.1.4 The Social Outcomes of Stereotyping
Once you stereotype me, you negate me - Soren Kierkegaard
In addition to the inability to account for the specific contents of 
stereotypes, the second biggest criticism leveled at the modern social 
cognition account of stereotyping is its lack of focus on the social 
consequences of stereotypes. Tajfel argued that stereotypes serve 
functions for both individuals and society, and that it  is very important to 
link theoretically these two classes of functions (Tajfel, 1981). Jost and 
Banaji (1994) have noted that while social psychological theories have 
emphasized the self- and group-justification functions of stereotypes, very 
little  has been written about the ideological functions of stereotypes. They 
suggest that:
Stereotypes serve ideological functions, in particular...they justify the 
exploitation of certain groups over others, and...they explain the poverty 
of powerlessness of some groups and the success of others in ways that 
makes these differences seem legitimate and even natural (Jost and 
Banaji, 1994: 10).
In other words, they argue that stereotypes serve important ideological 
functions by rationalizing and justifying the status quo. The concept of 
ideology is highly contested within the social sciences, and has resulted in 
many competing definitions (see Eagleton, 1991, for an extensive review). 
The predominant conception of ideology by psychologists has been as a 
coherent set of political beliefs and values (e.g., Eysenck 8t Wilson, 1978; 
Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). This is in stark contrast to the critical Marxist 
tradition in which ideology has variously been defined as: a system of 
beliefs and practices oriented to political change; as the interests of a
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particular class; and as false beliefs which legitimize existing social 
practices and power relations (Eagleton, 1991). Augoustinos and Walker 
(1998) argue that these critical approaches to ideology are consistent with 
Jost and Banaji's analysis of the ideological functions of stereotypes. 
Indeed, Augoustinos and Walker (1998) extend this analysis further and 
argue that stereotypes are not only ideologically functional, they are, in 
and of themselves, ideological representations which “ are used to justify 
and legitimize existing social and power relations within a society”  (1998: 
630).
Stereotypic beliefs about groups often function to provide a rationale for, 
and justification of, status disparities, especially differences favouring the 
in-group. One theory that focuses specifically on status stereotypes is the 
Stereotype Content Model. It has been argued that the ambivalent 
stereotypes of high status groups as competent and cold, and low status 
groups as incompetent and warm help to imbue hierarchical social systems 
with legitimacy (Glick and Fiske, 2001). Jost, Burgess, and Mosso (2001) 
argue that high status groups justify their advantage by viewing the status 
quo as fair, while low status groups often endorse this view because it 
explains their position. They report data from a survey of stereotypes about 
Northerners and Southerners in the United States. Respondents rated both 
groups on competence-related and warmth-related traits either before or 
after rating the magnitude, legitimacy and stability of status differences 
between them. In addition to the typical effect of stereotyping the high 
status group as more competent (and the low status group more warm), 
those who made stereotypical judgments first then went on to rate the 
magnitude, legitimacy and stability of the status difference between the 
groups as higher compared to those who made stereotypical judgments 
last. In another series of studies, participants exposed to a ‘poor, happy 
and honest' or ‘ rich, unhappy and dishonest' target rated the social system 
as fairer and more legitimate than participants exposed to a ‘poor and 
unhappy or dishonest' or ‘rich and happy or honest' target (Kay and Jost, 
2003). Thus, it  seems, complimentary or ambivalent stereotypes have a
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particular power to legitimize social inequalities. Nonetheless, even the 
simple status = competence correlation, regardless of the out-group’s 
perceived warmth, endorses the existing system’s meritocracy (Glick and 
Fiske, 2001).
Social psychologists are increasingly recognising that gender and race based 
inequities are maintained and reinforced through benevolence and 
paternalism rather than overt hostility as previously believed (Jackman, 
1994; Pratto and Walker 2001). Furthermore, the idea that ambivalent 
stereotypes help to maintain and reinforce inequities between groups is an 
implicit aspect of theories of racial prejudice e.g. aversive and ambivalent 
racism theories (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; Katz and Hass, 1988) and 
contemporary theories of sexism (Eagly, 1987). As noted earlier, Eagly and 
Diekman (2005) argue that prejudice becomes an acknowledged social 
problem when a substantial number of group members aspire to 
incongruent social roles. In short, group members who try to move up in a 
social hierarchy into new roles become targets of prejudice. In contrast, 
group members who continue to accept their group’s traditional roles, such 
as women in the domestic role and African Americans in service roles, may 
be generally appreciated. Consistent with this argument, a meta-analysis of 
studies of leadership behaviour showed that women are more devalued, 
compared with equivalent men, when occupying male-dominated roles that 
are presumably incongruent for women (Eagly, Makhijani and Klonsky, 
1992). Similarly, Glick and Fiske’s (2001) research on “ ambivalent sexism” 
has shown that attitudes towards women bifurcate into “ benevolent”  and 
“ hostile” types of sexism, depending on whether the female target follows 
the traditional, deferential (communal) model, or the career-oriented 
feminist (agentic) model. Hostility is reserved only for those women who 
defy traditional, discriminatory injunction. It is important to note that 
benevolent attitudes toward women and minority groups can have negative 
consequences, even while, on the surface, appearing to be favourable 
(Rudman and Goodwin, 2004).
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To date the majority of research on these stereotypes has emphasised their 
socio-structural correlates, while paying less attention to the processes 
that might affect their expression and endorsement. Although, in recent 
years there has been a body of social psychological research which 
attempts to account for the role of motivational processes. There are 
broadly three accounts of such motivational processes. The first is Just 
World Theory (Lerner, 1977), which proposes that people are generally 
motivated to view the world as a just and fair place, where good people 
and good deeds reap good outcomes. The Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale 
was designed to measures individual differences in motivation to believe 
the world is a fair and just place (Rubin and Peplau, 1975). To maintain this 
belief, people tend to interpret or respond to situations in ways that make 
the situation seem fair or deserved. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
such norms not only justify the disadvantaged positions of less successful 
groups, but also let advantaged groups off the hook morally: believing that 
inequalities are deserved negates the need to examine one’s own 
privileged position. In an empirical test of this assumption, Oldmeadow and 
Fiske (2008) found that BJW moderates the relationship between perceived 
status and competence. The relationship was stronger among participants 
relatively high in BJW than among those relatively low in BJW.
In a similar vein, according to System Justification Theory (SJT) (Jost and 
Banaji, 1994), people are generally motivated to endorse ideologies and 
stereotypes that reinforce the status quo, but doing so involves a complex 
process of balancing needs for self, group and system justification. 
Legitimizing ideologies relieve people’s discomfort about participating in a 
social system that inflicts pain on self or others by justifying the system as 
fair. Hence high status groups justify their advantage by viewing the status 
quo as fair, and even low status groups may endorse this view because it 
explains their own outcomes (Jost, Burgess, and Mosso, 2001). Finally 
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have put forth Social Dominance Theory (SDT), 
according to which all human societies tend to be structured as systems of 
group-based social hierarchies. Among other things, the dominant group is
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characterized by its possession of a disproportionately large share of 
positive social value that an individual possesses as a result of his or her 
membership in a particular group such as ‘ race’ . Research on Social 
Dominance Theory (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994), for 
example, shows that endorsement of ideologies that either attenuate or 
enhance social inequality is related to people’s attitudes towards social 
inequality in general. That is, people high in social dominance orientation 
(SDO) tend to endorse ideologies that provide moral and intellectual 
support for inequalities between groups, even when those inequalities 
disadvantage one’s own group. SDO is defined as a “ general attitudinal 
orientation towards intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally 
prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical”  (Pratto et a/., 1994: 
742). SDT conceptualises SDO as a relatively stable individual-difference 
variable, and it predicts support for ideologies that either enhance or 
attentuate group-based inequalities, such as anti-Black racism, social 
Darwinism, and meritocracy (Pratto et al., 1994). In a second study, 
Oldmeadow and Fiske (2007) also found that the relationship between 
status and competence was stronger among participants high in SDO than 
those low in SDO.
1.2 Stereotype content and stereotyping process/structure - a 
rapprochement
It has been seen that the study of group stereotypes has been approached 
from two different perspectives. The descriptive approach to stereotyping 
has focused on the contents of stereotypes and the consensus surrounding 
these contents. However, this approach does not directly address the 
underlying cognitive processes and structures responsible for stereotyping. 
On the other hand, the social-cognition approach has focused on the 
cognitive processes underpinning stereotyping and the nature of mental 
representations of stereotypes. Yet, the social cognition treatment of 
stereotyping fails to account for the specific contents of stereotypes and 
how they come to be widely shared. Most social psychologists would agree
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that these two approaches are complementary but very little  attempt has 
been made to integrate them (for an exception, see Schaller, Conway, and 
Tanchuk, 2002, who found that traits that were high in communicability 
were more prevalent in stereotypes of minority groups in Canada). Such an 
integration is much needed, as Stangor and Schaller (1996) point out “ an 
integrating perspective may yield insights that are unlikely to emerge from 
any single line of enquiry. A full understanding of stereotypes demands 
some simultaneous adoption of both perspectives” (1996: 20).
However, a key stumbling block to such an integration has been the lack of 
an overarching conceptual framework which would enable social 
psychologists to interrelate the study of stereotype contents and a study of 
the cognitive processes and cognitive structures underpinning stereotypes. 
In an attempt to fill this conceptual and empirical gap I posit that the 
Cognition and Culture approach provides just such a conceptual framework, 
and as such allows for a rapprochement of the contents of stereotypes and 
the cognitive processes and structures which facilitate stereotyping. It is 
important to point out, that the intention is not to integrate the 
descriptive and social cognition approaches. It will be seen that the 
Cognition and Culture approach leads to a reformulation of our 
understanding of the relationship between the contents of stereotypes and 
the cognitive processes/structures underpinning stereotyping. Those who 
adopt the descriptive approach argue that the contents of stereotypes are 
wholly derived from the structure of inter-group relations. In contrast, the 
Cognition and Culture account highlights the role of evolved cognitive 
predispositions in shaping the contents of mental and cultural 
representations. Modern social cognition research focuses on processing 
and pays little  attention to the content of what is being processed. From 
this perspective, as Schneider (2004: 25) points out, “ process is process, 
and content is, well superfluous.”  The bottom line is that according to this 
approach our cognitive machinery does not care about the contents of our 
stereotypes. Social cognition theorists provide a domain-general account of 
cognitive processes and structures and do not consider how such processes
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and structures may vary as a function of domain (e.g. physical objects vs. 
social objects). In contrast to the social cognition approach, the Cognition 
and Culture approach provides a domain-specific account of the cognitive 
processes underpinning social categorisation and the cognitive structure of 
social group concepts. Furthermore, this approach allows us to bring 
together a study of cognitive processes and structures and contents of 
stereotypes as this approach makes claims about the universality not only 
of cognitive processes and structures, but also of cognitive contents across 
cultures.
A key criticism of social cognition accounts of stereotypes has been their 
lack of focus on the ideological functions of stereotypes (Jost and Banaji, 
1994). As seen above, in recent years there has been a body of social 
psychological research which attempts to account for how motivational 
processes may impact upon the expression and endorsement of 
stereotypes. However, these accounts can only elucidate the conditions 
under which people express or endorse such stereotypes once they are in 
cultural circulation and not why such stereotypes are able to achieve 
cultural success in the first instance. Furthermore, social psychologists 
focus on the ideological functions of stereotype contents and do not 
consider the potential role of cognitive structures. By drawing on the 
Cognition and Culture approach it shall be shown that the ability of 
stereotypes to function as ideological representations may also be 
facilitated by the cognitive structure of social group concepts. Overall, it 
w ill be shown in the next chapter that by adopting a Cognition and Culture 
approach, we can articulate more clearly the nature of the relationship 
between the cognitive processes and structures underpinning stereotyping 
and the contents of stereotypes.
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Chapter II - Exploring the Potentials of a Cognition and Culture 
Account of Social Group Stereotypes
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter is an attempt to 
illustrate how the Cognition and Culture approach can be applied to social 
group stereotypes, and facilitate an integrative analysis of the contents of 
stereotypes and the cognitive processes/structures underpinning 
stereotyping. The theoretical framework combines theoretical and 
empirical insights from the Cognition and Culture approach and the Social 
Psychology of stereotyping. The chapter begins with an introduction to the 
Cognition and Culture approach, and then proceeds with an articulation of 
the theoretical framework focusing specifically on how evolved cognitive 
predispositions may, in part, help to shape the contents of social group 
stereotypes and account for their purported function of naturalising social 
status differences between groups.
11.1 The Cognition and Culture Approach - An Introduction
Every living creature is in fact a sort o f lock, whose wards and springs 
presupposes special forms of keys - which keys however are not born 
attached to the locks, but are sure to be found in the world nearby as life  
goes on. And the locks are indifferent to any but their own keys (James, 
1884: 191).
For many years social scientists have relied on a view of the mind, if not 
literally as a ‘blank slate’ , at least as an unbiased learning machine made 
up of a set of relatively domain-general and content-free faculties, such as 
“ memory”  and “ reasoning” which are applied in equal fashion to diverse 
problems. As a result the human mind is construed as a mere enabler of 
culture with no constraints which might shape or bias cultural contents 
(Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). However, it  has been argued that this 
position is untenable for two reasons: because human cultures display 
universal and recurrent features that belie this account (Brown, 1991), and
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because the very notion of a general, unprejudiced learning capacity makes 
little  cognitive and evolutionary sense (Mithen, 1996; Tooby and Cosmides, 
1992). Furthermore, this ‘standard social science* conception of the mind 
has been challenged by Cognition and Culture scholars, who drawing on 
arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology, developmental 
psychology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics and cognitive anthropology 
have, often independently, concluded that some human cognitive abilities 
are specialized to handle specific tasks or domains i.e. they are domain- 
specific (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994). The Cognition and Culture 
approach seeks to investigate the nature of these domain specific 
competences, their evolutionary origin, their role in cognitive development 
and their effect on culture (Sperber, 1996).
Generally, each domain-specific competence represents a knowledge 
structure that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena assumed to be 
of a distinct and general type i.e. broad domains such as PERSON, ANIAAAL, 
PLANT, or ARTIFACT. There is evidence that categorical distinctions along 
ontological lines are present from infancy (Mandler and Bauer, 1988). 
Furthermore, an important result of experimental studies of early 
conceptual development is the evidence for the existence of sets of 
domain-specific principles applied to these different domains. During 
conceptual development in the first years these specific principles (i) 
orient the child’s attention to particular perceptual cues for each domain; 
(ii) constrain the child’s inferences derived from those cues and (iii) 
develop in relatively autonomous developmental trajectories (Gelman, 
1990). Identifying objects as belonging to such categories as PERSON, 
ANIAAAL, PLANT, or ARTIFACT triggers the activation of specific forms of 
inference which focus on particular aspects of the objects considered, and 
only handle information pertinent to that aspect (Boyer, 1999). Finally, 
these domain-specific competences are described as evolved adaptations to
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specific problems faced by our ancestral populations in the human 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)1 (Boyer and Barrett, 2005).
On the basis of cross-cultural and developmental research there is strong 
evidence to suggest that the ability to interpret human action in terms of 
beliefs and desires is governed by a domain-specific ability, known as a 
Theory of Mind (Avis & Harris, 1991); that the capacity to partition and 
explain living things in terms of biological principles like growth and 
inheritance is similarly governed by a Folk Biology (Atran, 1990, 2002; 
Gelman and Hirschfeld, 1999); that the capacity to form consistent 
predictions about the integrity and movements of inert objects is governed 
by a Naive Physics (Vosniadou, 1994). There is also evidence for a Folk 
Mathematics underpinning our capacity to distinguish collections of objects 
according to the (small) number of elements in the collection (Wynn, 2000) 
and a Folk Sociology, that governs the capacity to sort conspecifics into 
inductively rich categories, membership in which is based on (supposedly) 
shared intrinsic natures (Astuti, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996).
At first sight, there might seem to be a tension between the recognition of 
these evolved domain-specific competencies, and the recognition of the 
roles of learning and cultural diversity. Gelman (2000), using the metaphor 
of a skeleton, illustrates how the fact that a given domain can benefit from 
the presence of innate structures does not foreclose the role of learning or 
cultural input. On the one hand, were there no skeletons to dictate the 
shape and contents of the bodies of mental structures, then the acquired 
representations would not cohere. On the other hand, skeletons lack flesh 
and relevant body structures. Therefore, they do not represent full-blown 
knowledge of their domain; instead they contribute to the acquisition of 
their respective flesh and structures as they interact with the kinds of 
environment that have the potential to nurture such development. For 
instance, it  has been argued that humans have an evolved domain-specific
1 The term EEA, coined by John Bowlby (1969), refers to the environment to which a species 
is adapted. The period most relevant to human evolution is the Pleistocene era (roughly 
spanning the last 2 million years).
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competence for classifying living kinds, a Folk B/o/ogy. Cross-cultural 
research in this area has shown that there are three universally shared 
features in the structure and general content of Folk Biology. Firstly, many 
cultures classify animals and plants into species-specific groups for instance 
elephant or tiger. The second is the application of psychological 
essentialism whereby an entity is treated as if it has an underlying essence 
which confers its identity and is responsible for its observable features 
(Medin and Ortony, 1989). Finally, animals and plants are often categorised 
as members of a taxonomy in which the categories are construed as 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (Berlin, 1992). However, even in 
the case of living kinds where knowledge acquisition is guided by a domain 
specific competence there is a role for environmental input as local floras 
and faunas vary and therefore so do the precise contents of taxonomies. 
Hence this approach puts to rest the old innate versus learned debates and 
is best classified as a rationalist constructivist approach (Gelman, 2000).
Advocates of this perspective reject the “ ontological autonomy of culture” 
thesis, as popularized in the social sciences, and adopt a naturalistic 
approach to culture (Sperber, 1994). Within this approach, also known as 
the epidemiological approach, cultural facts are not seen as mental facts 
but rather as distributions of causally linked mental and public facts in a 
population. More specifically, chains of interaction - of communication in 
particular - may distribute similar mental representations and public 
productions (such as behaviour and artifacts) throughout a population. 
Types of mental representations and public productions that are stabilized 
through such causal chains are in fact what is described as cultural. To help 
explain why some items stabilize and become cultural, it  is suggested that 
domain-specific evolved dispositions act as receptors and tend to fix 
specific kinds of contents. In other words, many cultural representations 
stabilize because they resonate with domain-specific principles (Sperber, 
1996). Hence, from this perspective there are innate constraints on both 
the mind and culture, therefore not only are innate domain-specific
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abilities compatible with cultural diversity, but they actually contribute to 
explaining it.
Evolutionary  
constraints  
on mind 
and 
culture
Mind Culture
Figure 1.0: Cognition and Culture Approach - Breaking the Circularity 
between Mind and Culture
A domain-specific competence is an adaptation to a range of phenomena 
that presented problems or opportunities in the ancestral environment of 
the species, and processes information that meets specific input 
conditions. Sperber (1996) has distinguished between the actual and the 
proper domain of a domain-specific competence. The actual domain is all 
the information in the environment which satisfies the competence’s input 
conditions. The proper domain is defined as the information that the 
competence evolved to process. Given that cognition is a probabilistic 
activity in many cases there is disjunction between the actual and the 
proper domain. Some items belonging to the proper domain of the module 
might fail to satisfy them - a snake can look like a piece of wood. Some 
items not belonging to the proper domain of a module might nevertheless 
satisfy its input conditions - a piece of wood can look like a snake. Mimicry 
and camouflage use this non-congruence; non-poisonous butterflies may 
evolve the same bright colours as poisonous ones to avoid predation by 
birds. The proper (evolved) domain of the birds’ bright-coloured bug
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avoidance system is the set of poisonous insects, the actual domain is that 
of all insects that look like them (Sperber, 1996).
In general, systematic mismatch between the proper and actual domains of 
a domain-specific competence is likely to occur when the competence is 
manipulated by other individuals of the same or different species. Sperber 
(1996) claims that a reliable way to attract attention is to produce 
information that falls within the actual domain of a domain-specific 
competence, whether or not it  also falls within their proper domain. When 
some specific type of information is culturally produced to activate a 
domain-specific competence, it can be described as a cultural domain of 
the competene (ibid). For instance, Folk Biology evolved to provide us with 
ways of categorizing animals that we may encounter, i.e. its proper 
domain. However, due to cultural input we also construct concepts of 
animals we will never encounter, for instance dragons. Thus this 
competence can enrich its categories with information about both familiar 
and unfamiliar species, information the relevance of which is often cultural 
rather than practical. Indeed, Folk Biology strikingly illustrates how the 
fact that the human mind attends to and organizes information in a 
domain-specific way lends itself to massive cultural exploitation. As an 
example of such exploitation, Sperber (1996) points to how despite the fact 
that wolves are rarely if ever encountered by humans, young children 
acquire a culturally transmitted representation of wolves as dangerous 
predators (in some cultures). This representation is a strong attention 
catcher and plays an important role in folklore and children's literature. 
Culturally reinterpreted wolves have become what ethologists call 
‘superstimuli.' Super-stimuli are exaggerated versions of a stimulus to 
which there is an existing response tendency. A great variety of cultural 
products are super-stimuli aimed at specific domain-specific competences 
(Sperber, 1996). The effectiveness of these cultural products is in part 
explained by the fact that they rely on and indeed exploit such 
competences. Thus, while the natural inputs of a competence may not vary 
greatly across environments, different cultures may produce widely
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different artificial inputs that, nevertheless, meet the input conditions of 
the same competence (Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004).
In summary, in some domains, cultural input seems to provide information 
that enriches the skeletal categories and inferential principles of the 
domain-specific competences described above. In these domains, domain- 
specific competences strongly influence the contents and structure of 
cultural representations. One should predict, ceteris paribus, that input 
that does not result in representations enriching these principles will either 
be distorted or ignored. On the contrary, information that either is 
expected because of intuitive principles or enriches skeletal principles 
should enjoy a selective advantage in cultural transmission (Boyer, 1999). 
However, not all cultural representations enrich existing domain-specific 
competences nor do they fall into the cultural domain of any single existing 
domain-specific competence, for example supernatural beliefs. 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of Cognition and Culture religious 
concepts, as all others, w ill be constrained by our cognitive architecture, 
therefore we should expect to find some similarities in the structure and 
even content of different religious beliefs. Accordingly Boyer (1999), has 
found that religious concepts are based on a small number of templates.
From a Cognition and Culture perspective both ecological and 
psychological factors need to be explored in order to account for the 
cultural success of cultural representations and public productions (e.g. 
behaviours). Sperber (2006) maintains that the effectiveness of public 
productions is dependent upon their respecting or taking advantage of 
ecological constraints. These constraints can help to account for recurring 
aspects of public productions across cultures. For instance, all culturally 
stable architectural forms must obey the laws of physics. Much of the 
ecology that contributes to human culture is itself cultural, a process 
described by some biologists as “ niche construction” (see Odling-Smee, 
Laland, and Feldman, 2003). In relation to the cultural transmission of 
ideas, previous research has highlighted the role of ecological factors such
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as the degree of prior exposure to an idea in a population, and various 
social facilitators and barriers to communication that reinforce or repress 
an idea (Heath and Heath, 2009). Of all the psychological factors, the 
mnemonic feature of an idea is regarded as one of the most important. In 
fact, Sperber (1996) puts memorability as a “ law” of the epidemiology of 
representations, as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for cultural 
success. An idea that is not memorable cannot be transmitted and cannot 
achieve cultural success.
II.2 A Cognition and Culture Approach to Stereotyping
It has been seen that the Cognition and Culture approach takes as its 
starting point a view of the mind as a set of domain-specific mental 
competences, each of which evolved to solve adaptive problems in 
mankind's evolutionary past. These domain-specific cognitive 
competences, it  is argued, predispose humans to particular kinds of 
conceptual representations (with particular structures and contents) in key 
domains. Cultures are construed as the outcomes of cognitive epidemics 
whereby cultural representations in order to become stabilized rely on and 
exploit these domain-specific competences. In the following section I shall 
explore the potentials of applying the Cognition and Culture approach to 
the study of social group stereotypes. It w ill be argued that stereotypes fall 
under the domain of a domain-specific cognitive competence, a Folk 
Sociology, which underpins social-group based reasoning, and therefore 
cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk Sociology influence both the 
contents and functions of stereotypes. In the first part I shall consider the 
potential role of a Folk Sociology in shaping the contents of stereotypes, 
and in the second part I shall focus on how it may help to facilitate the 
purported ability of stereotypes to naturalise social status differences 
between groups.
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Folk Sociology - an introduction
Social psychologists adopt a domain-general view of the human mind 
leading them to assume that the same cognitive competence is responsible 
for the categorization of all categories regardless of their origin and 
structure. For instance, it is assumed that the same cognitive competence 
underpins the categorization of physical and social objects (Neisser, 1987). 
Furthermore, as human categories are culturally and historically 
constituted, social scientists have argued that a cognitive ability, whose 
triggering inputs and outputs are largely fixed, would be unable to account 
for human social categorization (Gelman, 2003). Nonetheless, it has been 
shown above that a domain-specific view of cognitive organization is more 
than compatible with cultural variation. In an attempt to account for 
human systems of social categorization, Hirschfeld (2001) has posited the 
existence of an innate domain-specific competence, a Folk Sociology, 
governing our ability to represent, acquire and communicate notions about 
human social groupings which originally evolved to detect social groupings 
in the human EEA. Given that stereotypes are about social groups it will be 
argued that stereotypes spread and stabilize in different cultures because 
they are culturally contrived super-stimuli that fall into the cultural domain 
and therefore the actual domain of a Folk Sociology. More importantly, it  
w ill be argued that as a result of this the contents of stereotypes are 
shaped, in part, by cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk Sociology.
Primates (human and nonhuman) simultaneously belong to many social 
groupings (based on intragroup status, biological relatedness, and 
alliances), membership in any of which provides a basis for predicting and 
interpreting the behavior of others (Hirschfeld, 2001). Furthermore, it has 
been argued that unique human attributes (cognitive virtuosity, complex 
language etc) all derive from social cooperation with members of the same 
specifics (conspecifics) independently of genetic kinship. Bingham (1999) 
defines social groups or alliances as “ collections of animals (humans) who 
engage in kinship independent cooperation” (1999: 249). There is evidence
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that our ancestors relied on nonkin to hunt, gather and scavenge for 
subsistence, and therefore formed groups and alliances. Under such 
conditions to negotiate their social world successfully, our ancestors would 
have benefited by being equipped with a domain-specific competence to 
govern group-based reasoning (Hirschfeld, 2001). Hirschfeld (2001) has 
argued that there is evidence for such a competence from several lines of 
research. Firstly, despite considerable variation in their elaborations across 
cultures, a surprisingly small number of social taxonomies appear to 
predominate in all cultures and across all historical periods: sex/gender, 
age, kinship, language spoken, and race/ethnicity. Several lines of 
evidence reveal that human infants are capable of differentiating others on 
information diagnostic of precisely those social dimensions that ultimately 
play a predominant role in categorizing humans into groups in virtually all 
known societies. These include age (Brooks and Lewis, 1976), gender 
(Miller, 1983), language spoken (Mehler, Jusczyk, Lambertz, Halsted, 
Bertoncini and Amiel-Tison, 1988), and even race (Kelly, Quinn, Slater, 
Leek, Gibson, Smith, Ge and Pascalis, 2005).
Secondly, these dimensions of social difference are generally linked to a 
singular mode of category representation; psychological essentialism. 
Whereas in standard social scientific accounts essentialism is described as a 
by-product of philosophical and cultural traditions (Fuss, 1989), Cognition 
and Culture theorists have suggested that essentialism is an evolved 
cognitive predisposition. Psychological essentialism leads people to believe 
that members of a category share a deep underlying causal essence which 
confers their identity, and is responsible for many of their observable 
features both perceptual and behavioural (Medin and Ortony, 1989). There 
is support from experimental studies for a varied set of essentialist-like 
beliefs about social categories such as caste (Mahalingham, 2001) gender 
(Taylor, 1996), kinship (Hirschfeld, 1986), ‘ race’ (Hirschfeld, 1996) and 
ethnicity (Gil-White, 2001). This w ill be discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter.
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Given that social taxonomies vary culturally, using the distinction Sperber 
(1996) proposed between the proper and actual domains of a domain- 
specific cognitive competence, Hirschfeld (2001) argues that in the case of 
a Folk Sociology, while it evolved to recognize group affiliation of 
conspecifics (its proper domain), its actual domain is characterized by 
whatever cues makes it possible to identify group membership (in an 
individual's bodily appearance, behaviour, or language). Hirschfeld (2001) 
proposes that the culturalisation of social groupings consisted in the 
elaboration of these cues of group membership. For instance, to natural 
sexual dimorphism was added a cultural gender dimorphism. In this way the 
existing Folk Sociology competence was presented with culturally contrived 
super-stimuli. Thus, cognitively groups are characterized by whatever cues 
make it possible to identify members, and the inferences such an 
identification supports. In the case of humans the recognition of social 
groups draws heavily on cultural input such as verbal labels and 
stereotypes. Indeed, Hirschfeld (1996) found that even in the case of a 
putatively ‘concrete’ category such as ‘ race’ developmentally, attention to 
verbal information precedes attention to perceptual.
11.2.1 The Potential Role of Folk Sociology in Shaping Stereotype Content
(1)
Hirschfeld’s proposal of a Folk Sociology helps to account for the cultural 
success of stereotypes as resulting, in part, from the fact that they are 
culturally contrived super-stimuli that fall into the cultural domain of a 
Folk Sociology. Indeed, Hirschfeld (2001) uses evidence that stereotypes 
can be activated implicitly as empirical evidence in favour of a Folk 
Sociology. How does this fact account for the contents of social group 
stereotypes? I shall now consider how by integrating insights from Cognition 
and Culture, and social psychological theories and research on stereotyping 
we can help to elucidate how cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk 
Sociology may shape stereotype contents.
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Research conducted under the rubric of the Stereotype Content Model, 
reviewed above, provides evidence that the dimensions competence and 
morality/warmth are central to the contents of stereotypes. However, SCM 
researchers propose that the universality of these dimensions stems from 
the structure of inter-group relations. They do not consider the potential 
role of cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk Sociology in shaping 
such content. Yet, Hirschfeld’s proposal does not enable one to account for 
how the Folk Sociology might shape the specific contents of stereotypes. 
Although, in recent years many evolutionary social psychologists have been 
focusing on the nature of the cognitive adaptations governing human inter­
group relations, under various guises which can be integrated with 
Hirschfeld’s account. It will be shown below how such accounts allow us to 
additionally articulate how sensitivity to the dimensions of competence and 
morality /warmth may be motivated, in part, by cognitive predispositions 
arising from a Folk Sociology.
Evolutionary social psychology, a relatively new branch of evolutionary 
psychology, proposes that because other people constituted a prominent 
feature of human environments, the human mind evolved to be a highly 
social mind, comprising many functional psychological adaptations 
specifically designed to solve problems associated with group life (Tooby 
and Cosmides, 1992). This discipline clearly dovetails with the Cognition 
and Culture approach. Furthermore, evolutionary social psychologists have 
argued that if  we are to understand social cognition fully, it  is useful to 
employ the following strategy: First, identify the set of fitness-relevant 
“ problems” recurrently posed by human social environments (opportunities 
and dangers other people traditionally posed). Second, deduce plausible 
cognitive adaptations that would have helped “ solve” these problems and 
the specific implications of these adaptations for human cognition in 
contemporary social environments. And third, test those hypothesized 
implications rigorously with empirical data (Schaller, Park and Kenrick, 
2008). Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) suggest that human group- 
based reasoning is sensitive to two factors: (i) patterns of coordinated
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action, cooperation and competition, (ii) cues that predict - either 
purposefully or incidentally - each individual's political allegiance. In 
support of this, Kurzban et al. (2001) have demonstrated that when cues of 
group affiliation no longer track or correspond to ‘ race’ , subjects markedly 
reduce the extent to which they categorize others by ‘ race'.
Hagen and Bryant (2003) have postulated that music and dance may have 
evolved as a group signalling system that could, among other things, 
credibly communicate group quality, thus permitting meaningful 
cooperative relationships between groups. They conducted a study in which 
manipulation of music synchrony was found to significantly alter subjects' 
perceptions of music quality, and subjects' perceptions of music quality 
were found to correlate with their perceptions of group quality. Therefore, 
in addition to the two factors put forward by Kurzban et al (2001) one 
would expect our group-based reasoning to be capable of identifying 
reliable and competent group members and advertising oneself as an 
attractive partner (Van Vugt, Roberts and Hardy, 2007). Hence, a key 
adaptive problem faced by our ancestors was to find competent group 
members and to assess the competence of other groups. Applying the 
evolutionary social psychology strategy outlined above, it  is plausible that, 
in order to solve this problem, humans have evolved a sensitivity to cues of 
competence.
What, then, of the second dimension central to social group stereotypes of 
morality/warmth? Aside from finding competent group members, Van Vugt 
and Schaller (2008) point out that among ancestral humans, fitness may 
have depended upon the acquisition and sharing of valued resources such as 
food, but this created the problem of finding trustworthy partners to share 
to share food with. Because it was potentially lethal to share with people 
unlikely to reciprocate or free-riders, natural selection processes may have 
facilitated psychological mechanisms that facilitate the identification, 
avoidance and ostracism of non-reciprocators. There is growing evidence 
that humans indeed have specialized decision rules for cheater detection
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and social exclusion (Kurzban and Leary, 2001). The plausibility of a special 
“ cheater-detection” mode of reasoning has been the focus of an extensive 
line of research. Abundant evidence suggests that people show enhanced 
facility for a specific form of propositional reasoning under conditions in 
which the reasoning task is clearly relevant to social contract violations 
(e.g. Cosmides 1989; Sugiyama, Tooby and Cosmides, 2002). Several studies 
have shown that the faces of “ cheaters” - individuals who violate social 
contracts - are especially memorable (see Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, 
Shimoma and Kanazawa, 2003). Humans dislike group members who are 
disloyal. In opinion groups, members who hold different opinions than the 
majority are disliked and ignored - the black sheep effect (Marques, 
Yzerbyt and Leyens, 1988). One recent study found that group members 
spend a substantial portion of their experimental earnings (25%) to 
altruistically punish disloyal group members (Van Vugt and Chang, 2008). 
Humans have a tendency to derogate or even actively harm outgroup 
members. For instance, people tend to think that outgroup members are 
less moral and trustworthy than members of the ingroup (Judd and Park, 
1988). Van Vugt and Park (2009) suggest that when such free-rider threats 
are salient we should expect an intergroup psychology that is characterized 
by anger and stereotypic beliefs of outgroup members pertaining to 
dishonesty and untrustworthiness. Hence, aside from finding competent 
group members, human ancestors also faced the adaptive problem of 
finding warm/moral group members. As with the dimension of competence, 
it  appears that humans are likely to be sensitive to cues of 
warmth/morality in group-based social judgements.
Evolutionary social psychologists have also proposed that humans evolved 
what they call an “ adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific heuristics which 
evolved to solve such adaptive problems, including: forming social groups, 
finding mates etc. The function of a heuristic is “ to guide someone who has 
little  relevant information toward one or a few valid cues within a sea of 
possibilities” (Haselton and Funder, 2006: 22). There is evidence that 
animals rely on heuristic cues to infer the extent to which a conspecific is
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genetically related; and like many other animal species, humans use cues 
pertaining to familiarity and phenotypic similarity (Rendall, 2004). More 
recently, it has been found that attitudinal similarity, even in a total 
stranger, appears to serve as a heuristic cue signalling kinship. Attitudinal 
similarity was found to automatically activate semantic cognitions 
connoting kinship and was associated with a variety of prosocial intentions 
(Park and Schaller, 2005). It is plausible that in order to solve the adaptive 
problem of finding competent and moral/warm group members, humans 
evolved a sensitivity to cues of competence and morality /warmth. 
Furthermore, we may have evolved a heuristic leading people to assume 
that members of a group of which we are already members are competent 
and moral/warm i.e. a default competence and morality/warmth 
assumption.
A large part of social psychology consists of demonstrations of how humans 
make flawed or incorrect judgments, for example, the fundamental 
attribution error, false consensus effect, confirmatory bias etc (for a 
review, see Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). Within social 
psychology these biases or errors are accounted for in terms of trade-offs 
against constraining factors such as limited cognitive resources, the 
availability of information, or lack of time. Haselton and Funder (2006) 
point out that such explanations fail to account for the particular direction 
of the resulting bias in judgment. In an attempt to f ill this explanatory gap, 
Haselton and Nettle (2006) have put forward Error Management Theory 
according to which whenever the costs of errors in a given domain were 
consistently asymmetric over evolutionary history, judgment or decision­
making adaptations should evolve to bias inferences toward the less costly 
error. Systems designed according to this principle, they argue, w ill tend to 
make more errors overall, but the errors will tend to be relatively cheap. 
They suggest that people should be optimistic in some circumstances, but 
paranoid in others (i.e., they should be paranoid optimists, Hasleton and 
Nettle, 2006). According to this theory if errors are produced by useful 
heuristics that sometimes break down, they are best thought of as by­
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products of otherwise adaptive systems. Hence following Haselton and 
Funder (2006) I would like to posit that default competence and 
morality/warmth assumptions are the by-product of an evolved sensitivity 
to cues of competence and morality/warmth. This theory may also account 
for the primacy of cues of morality/warmth over cues of competence (see 
‘new look in content* above). It is possible that the costs of falsely 
assuming that a member of one’s group is competent is lower than the cost 
of assuming that a member of one’s group is moral/warm. The former 
would result in some loss in resources but the latter could result in injury 
or even loss of life.
In summary, it  would appear that for good evolutionary reasons humans 
may be particularly sensitive to cues of competence and morality/warmth 
in group-based social judgements. This suggests that, aside from the 
structure of inter-group relations, the dimensions of competence and 
warmth /morality may also be strongly motivated by evolved cognitive 
predispositions which are a part of a Folk Sociology. From this perspective, 
the centrality of traits denoting competence and morality/warmth to social 
group stereotypes is not only not surprising but wholly predictable.
11.2.2 The Potential Role of Folk Sociology in Shaping Stereotype Content
(2)
We come into the world equipped with a nervous system that worries 
about rank - Robert Frank, 1985
According to SCM the contents of stereotypes are determined by the 
structure of inter-group relations such as inter-group status differentials. I 
shall argue in the following section that the domain of Folk Sociology could 
be expanded to incorporate a status detector. Furthermore that this 
evolved sensitivity to social status differentials may work in concert with 
structural factors in shaping the contents of stereotypes about groups 
varying in social status. I shall begin by reviewing existing empirical
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evidence for just such an evolved sensitivity to social status before 
considering how this may help to shed light upon stereotype content.
An Evolved Status Detector?
The word status is derived from the Latin word statum or standing, and is a 
term used by social scientists to describe the position of an individual or a 
group in a hierarchical social structure. There is wide consensus among 
evolutionary psychologists that if  there ever were a reasonable candidate 
for a universal human motive, status striving would be at or near the top of 
the list (Barkow, 1989). Yet, oddly, thus far no complete theories of human 
status hierarchies have been proposed. Brown (1991) has suggested that in 
order to make a case for any adaptation the following conditions must be 
met: similar behaviour amongst primates and human ancestors,
universality, unusual ease in acquiring a specific knowledge or skill, and a 
critical period for development. In order to support Frank's conjecture that 
humans have an evolved sensitivity to social status, I shall begin by 
reviewing the existing data from animal behaviourists, primatology, 
ethology and evolutionary psychology. I shall then propose a theoretical 
framework through which this data can be brought together with a view to 
shedding light on how an understanding of the nature of human mental 
representations of social status may help us to understand the contents of 
stereotypes of social groups varying in social status.
Dominance hierarchies have been documented in a wide variety of 
nonhuman animals, from crayfish to chimpanzees. In functional terms, a 
dominance hierarchy refers to the fact that some individuals within a group 
reliably gain more access than others to key resources that contribute to 
survival or reproduction. In the simplest form, dominance hierarchies are 
transitive, meaning that if A is dominant over B, and B is dominant over C, 
then A w ill be dominant over C (Cummins, 2005). Humans evolved from ape 
ancestors whose social structure was almost certainly a dominance 
hierarchy (de Waal, 1988). In our living primate relatives, such as
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chimpanzees, social rank differentials lead to corresponding resource 
differentials with a dominance hierarchy of high ranking males securing a 
disproportionate share of food, as well as mating opportunities (Barkow, 
1975). A survey of seven hundred studies of chimpanzees concluded that 
middle-to high ranking males typically have a reproductive advantage over 
the lowest ranking males (Ellis, 1995). Two other key features of primate 
dominance hierarchies have been noted: first, these hierarchies are not 
static. Individuals continually compete for elevated position and sometimes 
overthrow the dominant male; second, the physical size of a primate is not 
the primary determinant of rank. Rising in primate hierarchies instead 
depends heavily on social skills, notably the ability to recruit allies on 
whom one can rely for support in contests with other individuals (Cummins, 
2005).
Historical records of man from several thousand years ago tell us that 
whether we speak of the ancient Babylonians, Persians, Hebrews, 
Egyptians, Indians or Greeks, that hierarchical arrangements were the 
natural order of things. In the better documented periods, starting 2,000 
years ago social hierarchies appears to be a universal feature of modern 
human societies in which the economic systems demonstrate a markedly 
unequal distribution of resources (Buss, 1999). In modern industrialized 
societies social status is usually measured by income, education, and 
occupation (Fiske and Berdahl, 2007). Although, as Weber (1922), pointed 
out status differences are not always accompanied by differences in 
material resources and power. He described a key feature of status groups 
being the fact that they are formed on the basis of common amounts of 
socially ascribed prestige or honour. Yet social stratification, at least in its 
modern guise, is only a recently occurring phenomenon. It has been argued 
that human ancestral societies were based on a nomadic hunter-gatherer 
“ immediate return” economy (Woodburn, 1982). Such societies operated by 
collecting food or material goods and there was no storage of accumulated 
resources. Hence, it has been suggested that ancestral societies were to a 
large degree egalitarian without significant or sustained differentials in
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resources among men of the same age. There is a general consensus in the 
anthropological and evolutionary psychology literature that prior to the 
Neolithic few (if any) members of the species Homo Sapiens would have 
lived in societies large-scale and complex enough to support 
institutionalized social hierarchies, or social stratification (Boehm, 1993).
This apparent discontinuity between modern and ancestral human societies 
has proved intriguing for social scientists. Evolutionary psychologists have 
put forth a number of explanations to account for this discrepancy. One 
plausible hypothesis is that equal sharing is enforced upon high status 
individuals by spontaneously arising counter-dominant coalitions of lower 
status individuals (Boehm, 1993). It has been argued that given the 
existence of the “ dominance” instincts which we inherited from our ape 
ancestors, “ counter-dominant”  instincts must have evolved to enable the 
egalitarian economic structure of Paleolithic foraging nomads (Erdal and 
Whiten, 1994). Hence, egalitarian human societies are the result of a 
dynamic equilibrium between both dominance and counter-dominance 
instincts, and this equilibrium can be altered by a change of circumstance. 
Under delayed-return economies the redistributive effect of egalitarian 
instincts is overwhelmed by an amplification of the outcome of older 
“ dominance” instincts leading to an unequal resource distribution (Erdal 
and Whiten, 1994). Another explanation is that equality in ancestral 
societies has been over-emphasized. Despite resource equality, status 
differentials nevertheless existed in simple hunter-gather societies and 
status differentials are associated with differences in reproductive success. 
High status men are more attractive to women, have more sexual partners, 
younger and healthier partners and therefore leave more offspring (Buss, 
1994).
Ethologists studying the formation of hierarchies in children have found 
evidence that social hierarchies develop from pre-school onwards (e.g., 
Pettit, Bakshi, Dodge and Coie, 1990; Strayer and Strayer, 1976; Weisfeld 
and Weisfeld, 1984). Edelmark and Omark (1973) found children asked
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“Who's toughest?” of a given dyad tend to agree on the relative standing of 
individuals. In addition, other studies using different measures of relative 
social rank (e.g., which child of a dyad averts his eyes first in a staring 
encounter and which child seizes control of resources) also indicate a social 
hierarchy beginning at about the age of three or four years (see Gage and 
Lieberman, 1978). Replication studies in Zurich and Ethiopia support the 
view that the formation of such social hierarchies in groups of children may 
well be a universal phenomenon (Barkow, 1975). Smith (1988) found 
evidence that children acquire concepts of rank and transitivity in dealing 
with other children, well before these skills can be detected using non­
social tests (cf. Byrne and Whiten, 1997). Furthermore, as Dunham, Baron 
and Banaji (2008) point out, children show an early sensitivity to the status 
of social groups to which they belong relative to other social groups within 
a culture. In a study of implicit attitudes among Hispanic children and 
adults it  was found that such participants show positive implicit self­
esteem and a preference for and identification with their in-group when 
the comparison group was another disadvantaged minority group (African- 
American). However, young Hispanic children do not show implicit 
preference for or identification with their in-group when the comparison 
was the more advantaged White majority (Dunham, Baron and Banaji, 
2007).
The accumulation of all this evidence supports the view that humans may 
have evolved a cognitive disposition sensitive to cues of social status. The 
question which arises is what is the proper domain of this status detector? 
However, a number of conceptual issues need to be resolved before this 
matter can be addressed. A key problem in answering this problem is the 
conflation of terms such as hierarchies, dominance and status across the 
different literatures that have been surveyed. Hence, before proceeding 
further it is necessary to distinguish between these terms. Following a 
review of all these disciplines, I put forward the following definitions of 
these concepts: a hierarchy is defined as “ an explicit or implicit rank 
ordering of individuals or groups with respect to a valued social dimension,
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including dominance, status, authority, power, respect”  (Fiske 8t Berdahl, 
2007; Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Tumin, 1967). 
Dominance is defined as “ the imposition of social rankings (or relative 
balance of power in a group) through force or force threat in competitive 
situations resulting in submission and deference by subordinates and 
priority of access to resources (food, mates etc) by dominants (Barkow, 
1975; Cummins, 2000; Hinde, 1975; Strayer and Strayer, 1976; Wilson, 
1975). Finally, social status is defined as “ the formal or informal position of 
individuals or groups in a hierarchy on the basis of socially defined 
characteristics resulting in relative amounts of respect, prestige, honour, 
admiration, esteem, influence, deference, competence, moral evaluation 
and social power” (Boone, 2000; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy and Glick, 1999; Fiske 
and Berdhal, 2007; Parsons, 1995; Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Ridgeway, 
1991; Weber, 1922).
Furthermore, while some evolutionary scholars see human status as 
homologous to non-human dominance (Barkow, 1975), others argue that 
status is an exaptation of dominance (Heinrich and Gil-White, 2001). A 
review of the literature across these different disciplines reveals that there 
are some differences in the indicators and outcomes of dominance and 
social status as bases for hierarchies. A key difference between dominance 
rank and social status rank (as reflected in the definitions provided above) 
is the absence of agonistic displays as a indicator of rank in social status 
hierarchies. There are also differences in what are deemed to be the 
outcomes of rank in dominance hierarchies as compared to rank in social 
status hierarchies. The outcomes of rank in dominance hierarchies include 
power resulting in priority of access to resources (e.g., food, shelter, 
mating opportunities) (Cummins, 2000), and behavioural displays such as 
overt submissive displays by subordinates (Mazur, 1975), and the attention 
structure (Chance, 1967). Aside from power over physical outcomes such as 
food and shelter and non-verbal displays such as visual dominance and 
attention structure, rank in status hierarchies additionally leads to access 
to and control over economic outcomes e.g. money and occupation, and
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finally to social outcomes which include liking and respect (Fiske and 
Berdahl, 2008); deference (Barkow, 1975); expectations of competence 
(Fiske, Xu, Cuddy and Glick, 1999) and positive evaluation (Jost and Banaji, 
1994). How are we to understand this apparent discontinuity between non- 
human primate dominance hierarchies and those found in young human 
children and modern-day human status hierarchies? Hawley (1999) proposes 
that “ social dominance is grounded in differential ability to acquire 
resources in the social group regardless of the means by which this is done” 
(1999: 105). From this point of view, it  can be argued that the proper 
domain of the proposed status detector would be hierarchical social 
relations, triggered by any reliable cues of differential ability to acquire 
resources whether that be via dominance or social status.
Another puzzle is that in our closest primate relatives, while there is plenty 
of evidence for intra-group hierarchies there is little  evidence of inter­
group or group-based social hierarchies (Cummins, 2005). However, as 
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) point out modern human societies also contain 
group-based social hierarchies. At the very minimum, this hierarchical 
social structure consists of one or a small number of dominant and 
hegemonic groups at the top and one or a number of small subordinate 
groups at the bottom. Among other things the dominant group is 
characterized by its possession of a disproportionately large share of 
positive social value such things as power, wealth and high social status. A 
group-based social hierarchy is something quite distinct from an individual- 
based social hierarchy. In an individual-based social hierarchy, individuals 
enjoy great power, prestige or wealth by virtue of their own highly valued 
characteristics such as athletic ability, high intelligence, or artistic, 
political or scientific talent or achievement. Group-based social hierarchy 
on the other hand refers to the social power, prestige and privilege that an 
individual possesses in virtue of his or her ascribed membership in a 
particularly socially constructed group such as race, religion, clan, tribe, 
lineage, ethnic group, or social class. This is not to imply that the power, 
prestige, and privilege of individuals in group-based social hierarchies are
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completely independent of the individuars personal characteristics 
(Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).
It was noted above that Cognition and Culture scholars make a distinction 
between what a domain-specific competence evolved to process i.e. its 
proper domain and what currently meets its input conditions i.e. its actual 
domain. It was additionally noted above that social rank is usually within- 
group in non-human primates and the human Pleistocene. Therefore, I 
suggest that proper domain for the proposed status detector is intra-group 
hierarchical relations. The actual domain also includes inter-group 
hierarchical relations. The cultural domain includes inter-group hierarchical 
relations such as caste, or 'racial' hierarchies.
In sum, it is conventional in the social sciences to locate social status as 
being external to mental representations - in societal roles, practices and 
discourse. And whilst not denying that it  does exist there, I am proposing 
that humans may have evolved a cognitive disposition sensitive to cues of 
social status. Furthermore, I propose that the domain of Folk Sociology can 
be expanded to incorporate a status detector. Dunham, Baron and Banaji 
(2008) have similarly proposed a broadening of Folk Sociology's domain to 
include the detection of hierarchical relations between social groups. An 
alternative possibility is that the representation of social categories such as 
'race' as a hierarchy may be the by-product of two distinct domain-specific 
competences, one which evolved to detect social groupings i.e. Folk 
Sociology, and a second which evolved to detect social hierarchies, 
tentatively labelled a Folk Politics. I shall return to this latter possibility in 
the concluding chapter of the thesis.
More importantly, for our present purpose, this status detector may 
additionally allow us to shed light on the contents of stereotypes of groups 
varying in social status. Fiske and colleagues have shown that group status 
stereotype cluster into two types; high status group members are perceived 
as competent but cold, while low status group members are perceived as
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incompetent but warm (Fiske et al., 1999). It was seen above that humans 
are expected to be sensitive to cues of competence. The question this 
raises, is what indicators of competence do we employ? It is plausible that 
humans solved the adaptive problem of identifying the quality or 
competence of potential group members by preferring to form groups with 
those of high status. Most of the literature on status focuses on the 
outcomes of status differentials rather than on the actual content of 
mental representations of status. Boone (2000) has noted that social status 
is not a characteristic or quality that a particular individual can have, but 
rather it  is “ a quality of an individual that resides in the perceptions of 
others in a social group and their resultant behaviour toward that 
individual”  (2000: 87). The question this raises is what is this ‘quality’ that 
is being signalled. In humans societies, social status is based more on 
expected contributions that member will make to a group than it is on the 
ability to dominate other group members (Ridgeway, 1982). There is an 
element of self-fulfilling prophecy to this process. On the one hand, 
expectations for competence determine status rank. On the other hand, 
high status members are evaluated as more competent because they have 
high status and competent performances by low-status individuals are 
devalued and subject to negative sanctions (ibid).
Numerous experiments document the effect of social rank on performance 
independently of actual ability. Jemmott and Gonzalez (1989) assigned 9- 
10 year old children to the role of “ boss” as opposed to “ helper” in a group 
activity. Subsequently when asked to perform word puzzles those assigned 
to the role of “ bosses” out-performed the “ helpers’ . In a more rigorous set 
of experiments, Lovaglia, Lucas, Houser, Thye and Markovsky (1998) found 
similar results. In these experiments, members of groups were randomly 
assigned high or low status based on left or right handedness. In one set of 
trials, right-handedness was associated with higher ability in the task and 
other positive traits. This established a spurious status hierarchy among the 
members of the group. The subjects were then administered a standardized 
test of mental ability having no correlation with handedness. The status
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hierarchy was found to have a significant effect on performance: high 
status group members out-performed low status group members. Steele 
and Aronson (1995) document similar effects in a study of racial groups. 
They found when social status was not associated with success on an exam, 
black and white students performed equally well. However, when they 
believed the exam measured mental ability, a status worthy characteristic, 
blacks performed poorly compared to whites. The experiments outlined 
above demonstrate the effect of an individual’s social position on task 
completion, even when the characteristics determining social rank are 
irrelevant to the task. This begs the question why does social status have 
such a profound effect on individual performance? Berger, Rosenholtz and 
Zelditch (1980) argue that social rankings create “ distortions” in agents’ 
belief processes. Key to this distortion effect appears to be the mental 
association between status and competence which presumably mediates 
the impact of social rank on performance. However, very little  research 
has attempted to uncover the nature of this mental association between 
status and competence. An exception is Fiske et a/’s SCM research outlined 
above.
In relation to the morality/warmth dimension, Cummins (2000) proposed 
that humans have evolved strategies for reasoning about social norms 
involving dominance hierarchies. These include understanding aspects of 
permissions (e.g., who is allowed to mate with whom), obligations (e.g., 
who must support who in a social contest) and prohibitions (e.g., who is 
forbidden to mate with whom). A number of studies have found when 
humans reason about deontic rules, they spontaneously adopt a strategy of 
seeking rule violators. For example, it  has been found that deontic 
reasoning (reasoning about what a person is permitted, obliged or 
forbidden to do) emerges reliably early in life, and it has been documented 
in children as young as three years (Cummins, 2000). In another study, 
participants were shown pictures of men along with biographical 
information that revealed each man’s social status (high versus low) and 
character (history of cheating, irrelevant information, or history of
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trustworthiness). A week later participants returned to the lab and were 
asked to report which of the photographs they remembered from the 
previous week. Several important results emerged. First, the “ cheaters” 
were remembered far more frequently than the non-cheaters. Second, 
memory for cheaters was especially enhanced if the cheaters were low in 
status, whereas the memory bias for cheaters diminished if the cheaters 
were high in status (Mealey, Daood, and Krage, 1996). According to 
Cummins (2000) these results support the proposal that humans have 
evolved selective attention and memorial storage mechanisms that are 
especially sensitive to who has cheated, and the status of who has cheated. 
In a more direct test of the effects of status on social reasoning, Cummins
(1999) asked participants to take the perspective of a high ranking 
individual versus a low ranking individual and found that 65% of participants 
looked for potential rule violations when given the task of supervising 
people lower in status than themselves, whereas only 20% looked for 
potential rule violations when supervising people of equal or higher status 
than themselves.
Hence, in summary, it would appear that when thinking about hierarchical 
social relations humans may be particularly sensitive to cues of competence 
and morality/warmth.
II.2.3 Accounting for the ideological functions of stereotypes: the 
potential role of psychological essentialism
It was seen in Chapter I that social psychologists have argued that 
stereotypes can serve ideological functions. More specifically, they can 
justify and naturalise social status differences between groups. Social 
psychologists have put forward three accounts for how stereotypes may 
serve ideological functions: belief in a just world; system justification 
theory and social dominance theory. However, these approaches are based 
on a study of individual differences and therefore can only explain why 
such stereotypes are more attractive to some people than others. 
Furthermore, these accounts can only elucidate the conditions under which
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people express or endorse such stereotypes, and not why such stereotypes 
are able to achieve cultural success in the first instance. As seen in Chapter 
I, social psychologists have tended to focus on the ideological functions of 
the contents of stereotypes and have neglected to consider the potential 
role of the conceptual structure of representations of social groups. In this 
section, by drawing on the Cognition and Culture approach, I shall argue 
that we can gain a better understanding of the ideological functions of 
stereotypes by considering the conceptual structure of social group 
concepts. More specifically, I shall consider how the ability of stereotypes 
to function as ideological representations may be facilitated by the 
recruitment of an evolved cognitive predisposition, namely psychological 
essentialism from the domain of a Folk Sociology.
As discussed in Chapter I, social cognition researchers have focused on 
trying to uncover the nature of the mental representations of stereotypes. 
To this end, three approaches to how social group information is 
represented have been proposed: group schemas, group prototypes and 
exemplars. While these accounts differ in many respects they share the 
assumption that category representation is based on similarity judgements. 
On such a view, categories are constructed on the basis of judgements 
about the similarity of members to one another, in terms of schemas, 
prototypes or exemplars. In a widely cited critique, Murphy and Medin 
(1985) pointed out that these approaches cannot account for the selection 
of the particular features that make up a category, nor do they explain 
what rules govern the computation of similarity. Furthermore, there is now 
significant evidence suggesting that at least some categories are not 
formed on the basis of perceptual similarity. Rather, even in making 
judgements about the similarity of two or more people we use a theory of 
sorts to decide which features are important (Rips and Collins, 1993). As a 
result, cognitive psychologists have increasingly been adopting ‘theory- 
based' approaches to category representation, as opposed to similarity- 
based approaches (McGarty, Yzerbyt and Spears, 2002). As seen earlier, 
Cognition and Culture theorists argue that concepts are guided by and
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grounded in naive or folk theories (as opposed to simply being a collection 
of covarying attributes), and such theories are often specific to particular 
conceptual domains (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994). I shall now focus on 
one such theory-based approach to social categorization, namely 
psychological essentialism.
Psychological essentialism - an introduction
[Essence is] the very being of anything, whereby it is what it  is. And thus 
the real internal, but generally...unknown constitution of things, whereon 
their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence - John 
Locke (1690)
Essence originally refers to the Latin word “essentia”  which is a 
nominalization of the verb “ esse” meaning to be. Essentialist accounts have 
been around, in one form or another, for thousands of years, extending 
back at least as far as Plato's cave allegory in The Republic (Gelman, 
2003). Aside from philosophy, the concept of essentialism has seen the 
most use within critical social theory. The term essentialism is most often 
used in relation to critiques of theories of gender, race and sexual 
orientation often carried out in the name of social constructionism (e.g., 
Fuss, 1989; Grosz, 1990). Theories are labelled essentialist if  they claim 
social categories such as gender or ‘ race' have biological underpinnings, or 
that they are not susceptible to cultural shaping. Most social scientific 
accounts suggest that essentialism is culturally-specific; it has emerged as 
a by-product of Western philosophical and cultural traditions, and it  is used 
to further the political and economic aims of certain groups (Fuss, 1989; 
Guillaumin, 1980). It has been argued, for instance, that we are essentialist 
because we have access to scientific knowledge about unobservable 
entities such as DNA (Fodor, 1998). However, this account cannot explain 
why even pre-school children are essentialist. In contrast, Cognition and 
Culture theorists have suggested that essentialism is not a historical 
accident, nor is it  learned from culture, but rather essentialism is an
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evolved cognitive predisposition which is beneficial for our interactions 
with the world (Atran, 1990; Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996). People are 
essentialist, it  is claimed, without the benefit of Western science and 
Plato's writings. This certainly provides a parsimonious explanation as to 
why essentialism recurs across historical periods, cultures, and 
developmental ages (cf. Gelman, 2003).
Psychological essentialism is a theory of category representation, first 
developed by Medin and Ortony (1989), which posits that humans approach 
the categorization of certain entities with an essentialist heuristic. This 
heuristic leads people to believe that members of a category share a deep 
underlying essence which confers their identity, and is responsible for many 
of their observable features, both perceptual and behavioural. Take, for 
example, the category ‘tiger*, all tigers are assumed to have a tiger 
essence which results in their stripes, their sharp teeth and hunting skills. 
It is important to note that a distinction is made between metaphysical 
essentialism, the view that things have essences, and psychological 
essentialism, the view that people's representations of these things might 
reflect such a belief (as erroneous as it  may be) (Medin and Ortony, 1989).
It is also important to distinguish this notion of a ‘causal essence' from two 
other conceptualizations that can be found in the literature. The first is a 
sortal essence which is a set of defining or essential characteristics that all 
and only all members of a category share, and help us to determine 
whether or not an entity belongs in a given category. This, as Gelman 
(2003) noted, is simply a restatement of the classical view of concepts 
outlined above. Whereas the sortal essence could apply to any entity (pens, 
coins, tigers), the causal essence is applied only to entities for which 
hidden inherent properties determine membership and observable 
properties. The second is an ‘ ideal essence’ which, in contrast to both the 
causal and sortal essence, does not have a real world instantiation. Ideal 
essences have been virtually overlooked in studies of concept 
representation (but see Sperber, 1975).
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Furthermore, while in some cases people might have specific ideas as to 
the location of the essence as residing in the soul or DNA (Gelman, 2003), 
in other cases people's concepts may contain what Medin and Ortony 
(1989) describe as an ‘essence placeholder':
The knowledge representation people have fo r concepts may contain what 
might be called an essence placeholder. There are several possibilities for 
what is in such a placeholder. In some cases, but by no means in all, it  
might be filled  with beliefs about what properties are necessary and 
sufficient fo r the thing to be what it  is. In other cases it  might be filled  
with a more complex, and possibly more inchoate “ theory” of what makes 
the thing the thing that it  is. It might, additionally, contain the belief that 
there are people, experts, who really know what makes the thing the thing 
that it  is or scholars who are trying to figure out exactly what it  is. Just as 
with theories, what the placeholder contains may change, but the 
placeholder remains (1989: 184-5).
Given that essentialism is an intuitive heuristic, and given that while 
people believe that a category has an underlying essence they may not 
know what it is, or which observable features of category members are 
linked to this essence, it is difficult to obtain direct evidence for 
essentialism. Nonetheless, there is support from experimental studies of 
concepts for a varied set of essentialist-like beliefs about natural kind (i.e. 
animal) categories emerging as early as two and a half years and across 
cultures. These include (1) the expectation that category members share 
non-obvious similarities even when these similarities concern internal or 
non-visible features, and even when category membership competes with 
perceptual similarity. For example, preschool children infer that a legless 
lizard shares more non-obvious properties with a typical lizard than a 
snake, even though the legless lizard and the snake look much more alike 
(Gelman and Markman, 1986); (2) category membership is believed to 
remain stable over time and over transformations such as growth, or 
metamorphosis. For example, Keil (1989) told children a story about a
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skunk that was surgically altered to resemble a raccoon but still had the 
parents and internal structure of a skunk. By approximately age five 
children reported that the animal was still a skunk, despite its outward 
appearances. They did not do so for artifacts, such as a coffee pot altered 
to resemble a bird feeder; and (3) properties of category members are 
considered to have innate origins and unlikely to change as a function of 
changing environmental conditions. For instance, Gelman and Wellman 
(1991) told four-year old children about a baby kangaroo brought up on a 
goat farm and asked them whether when it grew up it would be good at 
hopping or climbing and whether it  would have a pouch. They found 
children almost always answered on the basis of category membership or 
innate potential. Thus, the kangaroo raised among goats would hop and 
have a pouch.
While early formulations of psychological essentialism posited that it 
characterises the representation of natural kinds (i.e. animals, plants and 
minerals), in recent years evidence has emerged which suggests that 
humans also essentialise many social categories, such as caste 
(Mahalingham, 2001); gender (Taylor, 1996; Prentice and Miller, 2006); 
kinship (Hirschfeld, 1989); ‘ race' (Hirschfeld, 1996) and ethnicity (Gil- 
White, 2001; McIntosh, 2005). In order to explain why social categories 
such as gender are essentialised it  has been suggested that children 
perceive phenomenal variation in humans, and in order to make sense of 
this they resort to the essentialist mode of construal from the domain of 
Folk Biology (Atran, 2000). However, unlike natural kind categories, young 
children's representations of social categories such as ‘ race' are not rich in 
perceptual information. Hirschfeld (1993) conducted a series of studies in 
which children were asked to asked to pair racial labels with referents and 
found 3 year olds were correct in 17% of the trials and 4 year olds were 
correct in 40% of the trials. A possible explanation for this is that while 
children understand that there are physical correlates to ‘ race' they know 
very little  about which physical correlates go with which racial categories. 
Furthermore, a crucial difference between animal and social categories is
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the role of culture in categorization. Although children and adults from 
various cultures seem to hold similar beliefs about animal categories, 
cultures differ in terms of how they conceive of the same social categories 
and which categories they essentialize (Astuti, Solomon and Carey, 2004).
In order to account for the essentialization of social categories (focusing 
mainly on race), Hirschfeld (2001) has suggested that essentialism is 
recruited from a domain-specific competence for the social domain, a Folk 
Sociology. As seen above Hirschfeld (1996) has argued that Folk Sociology 
evolved to detect social groups and alliances. According to Hirschfeld, the 
Folk Sociology competence does not determine which groups are relevant 
within a society, but interacts with specific cultural environments in which 
some groups are salient. What a Folk Sociology does is to provide a mode of 
construal i.e. psychological essentialism which activates curiousity about 
the social world leading children (and adults) to seek out information about 
which social aggregates are salient in their cultural environment 
(Hirschfeld, 2001). As Hirschfeld states: “ children spontaneously explore 
the social world around them in search of intrinsic human kinds or groups of 
individuals that are thought to bear some deep and enduring commonality. 
Different cultures inscribe the social environment with different human 
kinds” (1997: 86).
II.2.4 Naturalising Group-based Social Status Hierarchies: the
relationship between stereotypes and psychological essentialism.
In this section, I shall explore how research on psychological essentialism 
can shed some light on the purported ability of stereotypes to help 
naturalise social status differences between groups. The rationale for 
exploring how research on category representation can shed light upon the 
study of stereotypes is quite straightforward. Despite the diversity of the 
literature on stereotyping, cutting across this diversity is one common 
feature: the participants were viewing each other in categorical terms. 
Stereotypes are based or rely upon categories, and in particular they rely 
on categories of people. The research on psychological essentialism
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represents a theoretical departure from social psychological approaches to 
categorization. Research on essentialism calls into question several core 
assumptions that guide how social cognition theorists think about concepts. 
These include the assumption that categories as formed on the basis of 
similarity judgements, that a single domain-general model can be applied 
to all concepts, and the separation of categorization from higher-level 
cognitive processes (Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2000). In contrast, as 
seen above, Cognition and Culture theorists understand categories to be 
embedded in domain-specific theories. Nonetheless, as Haslam et al. 
(2000) note “ the study of essentialist beliefs has the potential to illuminate 
aspects of stereotyping and prejudice, and to connect rather distinct 
domains of psychological theory”  (Haslam et al., 2000: 126).
There is some existing theoretical and empirical work which has explored 
the relationship between stereotyping and essentialist beliefs. 
Unsurprisingly, Allport (1954) was one of the first psychologists to recognize 
that essentialist ways of thinking underlie out-group stereotyping. One of 
the first attempts to bring the research on psychological essentialism to 
bear on social psychology was made by Rothbart and Taylor (1992). In a 
theoretical paper, these authors argued that people treat social categories 
as if they were natural kinds, and that several findings in the social 
categorization literature can be parsimoniously explained by this 
ontological error. Similarly, Yzerbyt, Rocher and Schadron (1997) argue 
that we must understand stereotypes as containing underlying theory-based 
explanations for the relations among their contents, as opposed to viewing 
stereotypes as simply perceptions of social groups. Perhaps the clearest 
articulation of the link between essentialism and stereotyping is provided 
by Susan Gelman:
Essentialism seems to motivate and underlie stereotyping. These are the 
“bad implications” o f essentialism fo r human reasoning. To put it  bluntly, 
stereotyping borrows the language and conceptual framework of 
essentializing. Different groups o f people are treated in distinct, non-
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obvious ways, and social group differences are assumed to be innately 
determined and fixed. To the extent that people buy into this way of 
thinking they w ill have a basis fo r treating social group differences as 
central to an individual’s identity, fo r drawing inferences about an 
individual based on the group to which the individual belongs. The 
stereotyping individual treats social groups as natural kinds (2003: 13-14).
It was argued above that given that stereotypes are about social groups 
they spread and stabilize in different cultures because they are culturally 
contrived super-stimuli that fall into the cultural domain and therefore the 
actual domain of a Folk Sociology. It has also been seen that there is 
evidence that representations of social categories are underpinned by 
psychological essentialism which Hirschfeld (1996, 2001) claims is endemic 
to the domain of a Folk Sociology. Hence, it appears as though, as noted by 
Gelman (2003), essentialism as a theory of category representation 
underpins stereotypes. To see how this works, it  is useful to consider what 
it  means to essentialise a social category. Research on essentialist beliefs 
about social categories shows that when a social category is essentialized 
the social group it refers to is maximally differentiated from other groups, 
the group is seen as having well-defined boundaries, its members are seen 
as homogenous, the category is imbued with inductive potential in that its 
members appearance, beliefs, behaviours are explained and predicted by 
their shared underlying essence. Therefore, it  is highly plausible that the 
ability of stereotypes to naturalise social status differences between groups 
is facilitated by the recruitment of psychological essentialism from the 
domain of a Folk Sociology. Hence, my argument is that rather than 
viewing stereotypes, in and of themselves, as naturalising social status 
differences, we should consider that such naturalization occurs as a result 
of the essentialist nature of social group category representations which 
underpin stereotypes. There is some theoretical support for this. Yzerbyt, 
Rocher and Schadron (1997) contend that the rationalization of existing 
social relations occurs because people hold essentialist beliefs about social 
groups. Thus, for example, racial group differences in socio-economic
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status are rationalized and explained by beliefs in the existence of inherent 
genetic differences in intelligence between the groups.
There are two straightforward ways in which psychological essentialism 
may facilitate the naturalization of status differences between groups. 
Given that psychological essentialism is triggered by the salience of social 
categories within a cultural context, and given the proposed evolved 
sensitivity to social status (see above), it  is possible that social status 
differences trigger essentialist beliefs about associated social groups. In 
other words, we essentialize membership in social groups which vary in 
social standing (for example ‘racial’ groups). On this view, the social status 
of the group is external to the essentialist representation of the group. 
Another possibility is that the social status of a social group is essentialized 
by proxy - it  is construed as an attribute of an essentialized social group. 
You may recall that an essentialist heuristic leads us to assume a causal link 
between membership in a social group, and the attributes of group 
members. Under this proposal, the social status of the group is conceived 
of as causally linked to the group essence, and therefore as internal to the 
essentialist representation of the group. Of course, these two proposals are 
not mutually exclusive as social status (as well as other attributes of social 
groups) may both trigger essentialist beliefs about group membership, and 
be perceived as an essentialized attribute of the group.
There is some existing evidence for essentialist beliefs about groups varying 
in social status. For instance, Mahaligham (2001) explored the 
essentialisation of caste group membership in India. He found that 
members of a low-status group (Dalits) are less likely to essentialise group 
membership than members of a high status group (Brahmins). Haslam et al.
(2000) conducted a study where adults were asked to rate 20 social 
categories including sex and ‘ race’ , on a set of nine essentialist factors, as 
well as one evaluative item about the social status of the social categories. 
Two distinct dimensions emerged, which Haslam et al. refer to as 
“ naturalness” (encompassing discreteness, naturalness, immutability,
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stability and necessity) and “entitativity” (encompassing uniformity, 
informativeness, inherence and exclusivity). The entitativity dimension was 
significantly negatively correlated with status and the more devalued 
member of each category pair was generally judged to be more entitative. 
The two dimensions of essentialism interact, so that when social categories 
are essentialized in both ways, they are especially likely to be stigmatized. 
However, no previous research on essentialism has attempted to 
experimentally manipulate social status.
11.3 Summary and Implications
Stereotypes are generalizations about people based on membership in a 
social group. Within social psychology the study of group stereotypes has 
been approached from two different perspectives. The descriptive 
approach to stereotyping has emphasized the contents of stereotypes. 
However, this approach does not directly address the underlying cognitive 
processes/structures responsible for stereotyping. On the other hand, the 
social cognition approach has focused on the cognitive processes and 
structures underpinning stereotyping. However, such accounts fail to 
account for the specific contents of stereotypes. In the past few years 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the contents of social group 
stereotypes and specifically in the ideological functions of stereotypes i.e. 
how stereotypes can serve to justify and naturalise social status differences 
between groups (Jost and Banaji, 1994). However, both these approaches 
only focus on one aspect of the phenomenon i.e. contents or cognitive 
process/structure and as such only offer a partial explanation of 
stereotypes. Social psychologists have acknowledged that a complete 
account must focus on both.
In this thesis, in an attempt to f ill this gap, I have argued that the 
Cognition and Culture approach is best suited to facilitate an integration of 
the study of the contents of stereotypes and the cognitive processes and 
structures underpinning them. By adopting this approach, I explored how
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cognitive predispositions may impact on the contents and functions of 
stereotypes. It has been found that the dimensions of competence and 
morality/warmth are central to the contents of social group stereotypes. 
Whereas social psychologists claim that such stereotypes derive their 
content from the structure of inter-group relations, I explored the 
possibility that evolved cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk 
Sociology may, in part, help to shape the contents of such stereotypes. I 
also considered how the ability of stereotypes to function as ideological 
representations may be facilitated by the conceptual structure of social 
group concepts via the recruitment of an evolved heuristic, psychological 
essentialism, from a Folk Sociology. Hence, the primary research question 
which the present research addressed was ‘To what extent, and in what 
ways, do innate cognitive predispositions shape the content of social group 
stereotypes and their functions? To this end, the empirical research 
reported in this thesis explored the way in which cognitive predispositions 
impact upon: (i) the content of stereotypes (see Chapters III, IV and V) and 
(ii) the ability of stereotypes to naturalise social status differences 
between groups of stereotypes (see Chapter VI and VII).
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Chapter III - Exploring the Role of Cognitive Predispositions in 
Shaping Stereotype Content Part 1: An Investigation of Default 
Stereotyping using the Minimal Group Paradigm
111.1 Introduction
It was seen in Chapter I that the dimensions of competence and 
morality/warmth are central to the contents of stereotypes of social 
groups, and how these stereotypes may serve ideological functions. Social 
psychologists claim that stereotypes derive their contents from the social 
context of inter-group relations. In Chapter II, by drawing on the Cognition 
and Culture approach, I explored the possibility that evolved cognitive 
predispositions arising from a Folk Sociology may, in part, help to shape the 
contents of such stereotypes. It was argued that human social cognition 
may be particularly sensitive to traits denoting competence and 
morality/warmth. It was noted how the Cognition and Culture approach 
dovetails with evolutionary social psychology. Evolutionary social 
psychologists have argued that to understand social cognition we should 
employ the following strategy: First, identify the set of fitness-relevant 
“ problems” recurrently posed by human social environments. Second, 
deduce plausible cognitive adaptations that would have helped “ solve” 
these problems and the specific implications of these adaptations for 
human cognition in contemporary social environments. And third, test 
those hypothesized implications rigorously with empirical data.
In relation to the implications of cognitive adaptations for human cognition 
evolutionary social psychologists have proposed that humans evolved what 
they call an “adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific heuristics which evolved 
to solve problems faced by our ancestors. Applying the strategy outlined 
above, it  was argued that it is plausible that in order to solve the adaptive 
problem of finding competent and moral/warm group members, humans 
evolved a sensitivity to cues of competence and morality/warmth. 
Furthermore, it  was argued that humans may have evolved a heuristic
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leading people to assume that members of a group to which we belong (i.e. 
our in-group) are competent and moral/warm i.e. a default competence 
and morality/warmth assumption. There is some indirect evidence for the 
default competence assumption from ‘Minimal Group Paradigm* studies. In 
many of these studies, the measure of in-group bias was participants* 
assessments of products ostensibly created by in-group and out-group 
members (Sachdev and Bourhis, 1987). The fact that participants rate 
products of their in-group as superior to products of the out-group is 
consistent with a default competence assumption. Fiske et al. (1999) argue 
that people rate in-group members as high in competence and 
morality/warmth. Hence, it is highly plausible that we also hold a default 
morality/warmth assumption. However, previous research indicates that 
humans may be more sensitive to morality/warmth traits than competence 
traits. In Chapter II, applying Hasleton and Nettle*s (2006) Error 
Management Theory I suggested that this may be a result of the costs of 
falsely assuming that an individual or group member is competent may be 
lower than the cost of falsely assuming they are moral/warm. The former 
would result in some loss in resources but the latter could result in injury 
or even loss of life. With this in mind, the first empirical study of this thesis 
aims to provide a test of this hypothesized default stereotyping mode.
III.2 Experiment Overview
This experiment was designed to investigate the hypothesized default 
competence and default morality/warmth assumption (see above) by 
combining methods from the Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) (Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy and Flament, 1971) and a paradigm used in Stereotype Content 
Model (SCM) research on stereotyping (Fiske et al., 1999). Experiments on 
‘minimal* groups, first conducted by Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) and Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971), found evidence indicating that the mere 
categorization of individuals into arbitrary groups can be sufficient to elicit 
social discrimination in favour of the in-group. More recently, it  has been 
found minimal social categorization is also sufficient to activate implicit or
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automatic positive attitudes towards the in-group, and neutral attitudes 
towards the out-group (Otten and Wentura, 1999). The unique 
characteristic of the minimal group paradigm is that the groups represent 
the most basic form of social categorization, based on simply being in one 
group or the other. Unlike real social groups defined by nationality, 
religion, or race, there is no economic imbalance, past interaction, or even 
any meaning ascribed to these groups. Therefore, this paradigm is a 
particularly useful means of testing for a default stereotyping mode. 
Following assignment to minimal groups (or minimal categories) on the 
basis of a perceptual styles test, participants completed a dependent 
measure of stereotyping in the form of a survey in which they were 
required to rate both the in-group (or in-category) and out-group (or out- 
category) on words denoting high and low competence and high and low 
morality/warmth.
Experiment Design:
A 2 (Experimental condition: minimal group, minimal category) X 2 
(Stereotype object: in-group/category, out-group/category) X 4
(Stereotype dimension: High Competence, Low Competence, High
Morality/Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth) experimental design was 
employed. Experimental condition was a between-subjects factor and 
stereotype object and stereotype dimension were within-subjects factors.
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III.3 Method
111.3.1 Participants
The required sample size was calculated using G*Power 3 for Mac (see Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang and Buchner, 2007). Parameters used in the estimate were 
the effect size (set to .30), type I error level (set to .05), and type II error 
level (set to .80). The sample size calculated by the software was 120. A 
total of 155 participants of various nationalities completed the study. The 
data from 26 participants had to be excluded from analyses due to the 
following reasons: (a) six participants used the wrong in-group label while 
answering manipulation check questions; (b) twenty participants were 
excluded due to their awareness of the true purpose of the experiment 
and/or the minimal group paradigm. This left 126 participants, 71 females 
and 55 males. Fifty-two percent of the sample identified themselves as 
British, 24.6% American, 4.8% Australian, 8% European 4% Canadian, 4% 
Chinese, 2.4% Mexican. The remainder identified themselves as Indian, 
Puerto Rican, Brazilian, Belarusian, El-Salvadorian (<1%).
111.3.2 Materials and Procedure
The study appeared online as a web-based ‘Perceptual Styles Study’ . 
Invitations to participate were posted on three online psychological 
research directories (‘Social Psychology Network’ , ‘Online Psychology 
Research UK’ and ‘Psychological Research On The Net’ ). The majority of 
previous research using the Minimal Group Paradigm has been administered 
in classrooms or psychology laboratories where an experimenter was 
physically present. However, in recent years psychologists have come to 
recognize that online research is a viable means of collecting data (Kraut, 
Olson, Banaji, Bruckman, Cohen and Couper, 2004; Reips, 2002a). With the 
ever increasing use of the Internet in industrialized countries, earlier 
assumptions about Internet users having specific personality characteristics 
(e.g., social maladjustment) or particular demographics are less of a
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concern (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava and John, 2004). Gosling et al. (2004) 
conducted an empirical examination of the potential drawbacks of 
Internet-based research by comparing a Web sample (N = 361, 703) to 
traditional samples. They concluded that the negative preconceptions of 
Internet research are unfounded. Similarly, Krantz and Dalai (2000) found 
no difference between lab and Web versions of surveys, scales and 
experimental variables.
An internet data collection process was used for several reasons. Firstly, 
using the Internet allows access to a much wider pool of participants 
(Buchanan and Smith, 1999). Online experiments can collect data from 
thousands of participants, at low cost and minimal intervention on the part 
of experimenters (Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald, 2002). The large and 
diverse samples online are preferable to undergraduate students on whom 
much psychological theory rests (Kraut et al., 2004). In addition to enabling 
the recruitment of a large sample, Internet-based experiments have various 
technological advantages over paper and pen methods. For instance, 
JavaScript allows researchers to randomly assign participants to 
experimental conditions. Furthermore, it  helps to ensure the tasks are 
completed in the intended order. This is especially important for designs in 
which experimental measures or items are counter-balanced (Reips, 
2002b). With conventional paper-based research, transcription of responses 
is error-prone, but online research data is directly written to a database. 
Online research can also result in greater protection of human subjects 
given that it makes it easier for participants to quit from the study. This 
freedom to withdraw is important given strong pressures to continue in 
face-to-face studies (Reips, 2002b). Finally, it was pragmatic given that the 
measures used in this experiment, in particular the perceptual styles test, 
needed to be administered online in any case.
Nonetheless, it  is recognised that there are certain disadvantages in online 
data collection such as the potential lack of experimental control, self­
selection, high drop-out rates, and multiple submissions. Every attempt was
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made to minimize the impact of these disadvantages on the present study. 
Experimental control is of greatest significance for research using 
perceptual measures where visual or auditory stimuli are used. This is not 
of concern in the present study as the perceptual styles test is bogus; 
participants are randomly assigned to a Figure or Ground perceptual style. 
In addition, experimental control is less of a concern for research with a 
between-subjects design as the random assignment of participants to 
experimental conditions means potential errors are randomized as opposed 
to systematic (Reips, 2000). Furthermore, the lack of experimental control 
may have the advantage of reducing possible experimenter effects (ibid).
Specific measures were adopted to minimize the effects of multiple 
submissions by asking participants to complete the experiment only once 
and by deleting multiple submissions from the same IP address. The issue of 
self-selection, may be a greater problem for sociologists or political 
scientists than for psychological research given that it  is pan-human 
cognitive processes as opposed to individual differences that are of primary 
interest. Technical procedures to reduce drop-out rates were adopted and 
consisted of some of the ‘high-hurdle’ techniques suggested by Reips 
(2000). Finally, the experiment was tested to ensure it worked on different 
operating systems (Microsoft Windows and Apple Mac) and different web 
browsers (Internet explorer, Safari and Firefox).
The study’s first page provided information about the general nature of the 
study, stating “You are invited to participate in an on-line study about 
perceptual style and its correlates. This study forms part of a doctoral 
project in Social Psychology” . Participants were informed that the study 
w ill take no longer than 15 minutes to complete and that they would be 
given further instructions if they chose to participate. The remainder of the 
text related to ethical issues: potential benefits and risks and informed 
consent (see Appendix D for a copy of the consent form).
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Part 1:
Minimal Group Assignment (Experimental Condition 1):
Following Otten and Wentura (1999), participants were randomly assigned 
to a ‘Figure Group’ and the other half to a ‘Ground Group’ . Participants 
were told they are required to perform a task ostensibly assessing 
“ perceptual style in perceiving and structuring pictorial information” . They 
were told that the task identifies differences in perception and information 
processing. Typically, two categories can be distinguished: ‘Figure Group’ 
which comprises of people who focus on salient features of a stimulus first, 
and later examine the more global characteristics of the picture. The other 
group, labelled ‘Ground Group’ , comprises of people who focus on global 
impressions, adding in details to the general frame later. This task was 
selected for three reasons: (1) the perceptual style test was successfully 
used to assign individuals to minimal groups in a previous experiment. The 
advantage of using an existing measure is that it is not necessary to design 
and validate the measures again (Ember and Ember, 2001); (2) the two 
categories have no prior meaning to them; (3) participants would have no 
expectations or content attached to it  prior to the group assignment. It is 
vital that participants hold no a priori expectations regarding the 
competence and/or morality/warmth of people with a Figure or Ground 
perceptual style. Therefore a pre-test was conducted in the form of a 
survey and a chi-squared test confirmed that the number of people who 
inferred that there was no difference between the competence of people 
with the two perceptual styles (n = 21) was greater than the number of 
people who believed that there is such a difference (n = 7) and those who 
were uncertain (n = 3). This difference was statistically significant, X2 (2, N 
= 31) = 17.290, p < .001. It was also found that the number of people who 
inferred that there was no difference between the morality/warmth of 
people with the two perceptual styles (n = 20) was greater than the number 
of people who believed that there is such a difference (n = 4) and those 
that were uncertain (n = 7). This difference was also statistically
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significant, X2 (2, N = 31) = 14.00. p < .001 (See Appendix A for the pre-test 
materials).
Perceptual style was measured by a test depicting eight ambiguous pictures 
(To view stimuli see Appendix C). Each picture was shown and followed by 
the presentation of two alternative interpretations. Participants were 
required to indicate which of the two alternatives images they saw first by 
clicking on the relevant button. After the eight judgments were given, the 
computer seemingly processed the data. A blank screen appeared, followed 
by the message: ‘Please wait. Your data are being processed'. After 
1000ms, false feedback about the participant's group membership 
appeared on the screen, together with another written description of the 
perceptual styles. Participants were in fact randomly assigned to either the 
‘Figure Group’ or ‘Ground Group'. Following the presentation of their 
feedback, participants were told to read their test results thoroughly as 
this information will be required in the second part of the study. Upon 
pressing ‘continue', participants were presented with the dependent 
measures.
Minimal Category Assignment (Experimental Condition 2):
Within social psychology there is often a conflation of the terms ‘group' 
and ‘category,' in particular in the literature on the MGP. However, 
categories and groups may not be the same thing. This condition was 
included in order to explore whether there are any differences between 
assignment to a ‘minimal category' as opposed to a ‘minimal group.’ The 
procedure in this condition is identical to that used in experimental 
condition 1, with one crucial difference; participants were designated as 
having a ‘Figure’ or ‘Ground’ perceptual style with no mention of this 
placing them in two distinct ‘groups'. Given that no differences were 
predicted between participants assigned to a Figure or Ground perceptual 
style based on the pre-test and the fact that the perceptual styles test was 
bogus participants were only assigned to a ‘Figure Style’ . Although, of
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course, they believed that other participants taking part in the study were 
assigned to a ‘Ground Style*.
Part 2: Dependent Measure
Following assignment to minimal groups (or categories), participants 
completed a dependent measure of inter-group stereotypes in the form of a 
survey. Participants rated the in-group or in-category (section 1) and the 
out-group or out-category (section 2) on adjectives denoting high and low 
competence and high and low morality /warmth. These words were 
selected in a second pre-test designed to identify adjectives which people 
associate with high and low competence and high and low morality/warmth 
(See Appendix B for the pre-test materials). A one-way independent 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was used to examine the ratings for each 
domain (competence, morality and warmth) for all 144 words. All 
comparisons among means following significant ANOVAS were conducted 
using the Gabriel test as the sample sizes across the groups varied slightly. 
For the domain competence, 12 words were selected (see Tables 3.0 and
3.1 below) which received the highest mean ratings and 12 which received 
the lowest mean ratings. Crucially the differences between the mean 
competence ratings and mean morality and warmth ratings are statistically 
significant for each of the 24 words (12 denoting high competence, 12 
denoting low competence). For the domains morality and warmth 12 words 
were selected which received high morality and high warmth mean ratings 
and 12 words which received low morality and low warmth mean ratings 
(see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below). In this case it was ensured that the 
differences between the mean morality and mean warmth ratings were not 
statistically significant. For most of these words the differences between 
the mean competence and the mean morality and warmth ratings were 
statistically significant. However, for some words the ratings for the three 
domains overlapped. More specifically, four words which received the 
highest ratings for the domain high warmth and morality, also received high 
ratings for the domain high competence. Furthermore, one of the words 
that received the highest ratings for the domain low morality/warmth also
94
received high ratings for the domain low competence. It was impossible to 
avoid this as alternative words which did differ significantly from the 
competence ratings had too low or neutral ratings for morality and warmth.
In order to prevent participant fatigue the 48 words (12 high competence, 
12 low competence, 12 high morality/warmth and 12 low morality/warmth) 
were used to construct two randomized word lists each consisting of 24 
words and they were presented in a between-subjects counter-balanced 
order. Consequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of six 
versions of the study:
1 a) Exp con 2
1 b) Exp con 2
2 a) Exp con 1
2 b) Exp con 1
3 a) Exp con 1 
3 b) Exp con 1
(Figure Style) 
(Figure Style) 
(Figure Group) 
(Figure Group) 
(Ground Group) 
(Ground Group)
- > Part 1 List
- > Part 1 List
- > Part 1 List
- > Part 1 List
- > Part 1 List
- > Part 1 List
1, Part 2: List 2
2, Part 2: List 1
1, Part 2: List 2
2, Part 2: List 1
1, Part 2: List 2
2, Part 2: List 1
Responses to the 24 items in both parts of the survey were made by clicking 
one of five response options (1 = ‘strongly agree1 to 5 = ‘strongly 
disagree*).
In the final section participants were asked to provide some demographic 
information, specifically participants* nationality, first language, fluency in 
English (native speaker, fluent, basic and poor) and sex. Finally participants 
were asked to complete two manipulation check questions; (1) ‘Which 
perceptual style group are you a member of?*, with response categories 
‘Ground Group* and ‘Figure Group*; (2) ‘What do you think the purpose of 
this study is?*, with a box provided for participants to type their response 
into. Clicking a ‘submit study’ button recorded the data and directed 
participants to a debriefing page.
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(Note: All the materials and procedures for experimental condition 2 were 
identical to experimental condition 1 except for one crucial difference: 
there was no mention of the word ‘group' and the term ‘perceptual style' 
was used instead of ‘perceptual style group' and the terms ‘Figure Style' or 
‘Ground Style’ were used instead of ‘Figure Group’ and ‘Ground Group').
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TABLE 3.0: Mean Ratings for Words Denoting High Competence by Domain
High Competence 
Words
Mean Ratings by Domain
Competence Morality Warmth
Competent 1.27. 2.85b 2.97b
(.609) (1.239) (1.311)
Motivated 1.59a 2.52b 2.99b
(.792) (1.235) (1.386)
Capable 1.66a 2.71 b 3.00b
(.833) (1.236) (1.254)
Efficient 1.73a 2.37b 2.55b
(1.119) (1.292) (1.376)
Knowledgeable 1.79a 2.41b 2.90b
(1.154) (1.135) (1.155)
Determined 1.83a 2.73b 2.87b
(1.309) (1.287) (1.240)
Diligent 1.83a 2.51b 2.50b
(.919) (1.226) (1.247)
Intelligent 1.85a 2.88b 3.27b
(.922) (1.295) (1.444)
Skillful 2.02a 3.01b 3.29b
(1.000) (1.153) (1.164)
Persistent 2.06a 3.17b 3.31b
(1.090) (1.342) (1.321)
Proficient 2.15a 2.77b 3.25b
(1.244) (1.235) (1.287)
Confident 2.28a 2.98b 3.19b
(1.010) (1.196) (1.445)
n 95 93 91
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = competent/moral/warm, 7 = 
incompetent/immoral/cold, respectively). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses below means. Means in the same row that do not share sub scripts 
significantly differ at p < .05 in the Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
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TABLE 3.1: Mean Ratings for Words Denoting Low Competence by Domain
Low Competence 
Words
Mean Ratings by Domain
Competence Morality Warmth
Incapable 5.92a 4.40b 4.54b
(1.318) (1.213) (1.350)
Stupid 5.88a 4.13b 4.69b
(1.090) (1.350) (1.541)
Hopeless 5.80a 4.71b 5.03b
(1.419) (1.456) (1.609)
Incompetent 5.76a 4.42b 4.36b
(1.853) (1.346) (1.207)
Idiotic 5.69a 4.74b 4.78b
(1.353) (1.275) (1.364)
Inefficient 5.67a 4.51b 4.61b
(1.567) (1.366) (1.321)
Inadequate 5.60a 4.56b 4.68b
(1.355) (1.387) (1.534)
Unskilled 5.59a 4.27b 4.38b
(1.250) (1.085) (1.268)
Lazy 5.57a 4.75b 4.26b
(1.449) (1.282) (1.511)
Illiterate 5.54a 4.22b 4.29b
(1.590) (1.277) (1.574)
Inept 5.46a 4.35b 4.73b
(1.413) (1.332) (1.405)
Sluggish 5.45a 4.31b 4.64b
(1.577) (1.496) (1.354)
n 95 93 91
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = competent/moral/warm, 7 
=incompetent/immoral/cold, respectively). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses below means. Means in the same row that do not share sub-scripts 
significantly differ at p < .05 in the Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
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TABLE 3.2: Mean Ratings for Words Denoting High Morality/Warmth by Domain
High Morality- 
Warmth Words
Mean Ratings by Domain
Morality Warmth Competence
Trusting 1.47. 1.61 a 2.41 b
(.813) (.932) (1.292)
Kind 1.71 a 1.73a 2.60b
(1.023) (.944) (1.322)
Generous 00 0 01 1.78a 2.91 b
(1.036) (.909) (1.177)
Good-natured 1.87a 1.71. 2.72b
(1.036) (.939) (1.136)
Sympathetic 1.93a 1.94, 2.98b
(1.185) (1.203) (1.158)
Sincere 1.98a 1.98a 2.26a
(1.233) (1.075) (1.226)
Harmonious 2.09a 1.82a 2.59b
(1.184) (.967) (.962)
Happy 2.22a 1.82. 2.37b
(1.334) (1.101) (1.488)
Dependable 2.23a 2.11a 2.03a
(1.278) (1.048) (1.395)
Reliable 1.83a 2.11. 1.65a
(1.208) (1.276) (.796)
Forgiving 1.92. 2.03a 3.11b
(1.299) (1.336) (1.198)
Polite 2.26a 2.21 a 2.48a
(1.406) (1.207) (1.381)
n 91 93 95
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = moral/warm/competent 7 = 
immoral/cold/incompetent, respectively). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses below means. Means in the same row that do not share sub-scripts 
significantly differ at p < .05 in the Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
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TABLE 3.3: Mean Ratings for Words Denoting Low Morality/Warmth by Domain
Low Morality- 
Warmth Words
Mean Ratings by Domain
Morality Warmth Competence
Heartless 6.11a 6.11a 4.87b
(1.352) (1.517) (1.566)
Cruel 5.94a 6.18a 4.60b
(1.607) (1.488) (1.798)
Deceitful 5.82a 5.69a 4.47b
(1.635) (1.756) (1.897)
Greedy 5.76a 5.53a 4.10b
(1.440) (1.629) (1.973)
Corrupt 5.75a 5.41a 4.64b
(1.579) (1.686) (1.871)
Ruthless 5.72a 5.59a 4.40b
(1.485) (1.798) (1.722)
Dishonest 5.55a 5.46a 4.94b
(1.478) (1.587) (1.632)
Wicked 5.55a 5.63a 4.55b
(1.723) (1.510) (1.904)
Rude 5.46a 5.72a 4.79b
(1.523) (1.430) (1.391)
Tyrannical 5.38a 5.57a 4.37b
(1.823) (1.550) (1.833)
Ungenerous 5.12a 5.48a 4.34b
(1.552) (1.409) (1.751)
Vain 5.06a 5.12a 4.15a
(1.731) (1.583) (1.741)
n 95 93 91
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = moral/warm/competent 7 = 
immoral/cold/incompetent, respectively). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses below means. Means in the same row that do not share sub-scripts 
significantly differ at p < .05 in the Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
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III.4 Hypotheses
In order to analyse the data for experiment 1 separate scales were 
constructed for the four stereotype dimensions: high competence, low 
competence, high morality/warmth and low morality/warmth by 
aggregating data across the 12 traits for each of these dimensions. The 
data for the two dimensions high competence and high morality/warmth 
were reversed coded such that 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree 
in order to make these two scales commensurable with the low 
competence and low morality/warmth scales for which 1 = strongly agree 
and 5 = strongly disagree. In other words, following recoding, higher scores 
on all four scales indicated more positive ratings.
Key: IG = In-group/category 
OG = Out-group/category 
IGC = In-group competence 
OGC = Out-group competence 
IGM/W = In-group morality/warmth 
OGM/W = Out-group morality/warmth
x = mean 
Stereotype object:
Based on the premise that people hold default competence and 
morality/warmth assumptions about their in-group:
Hi; A significant main effect of stereotype object (in-group/category, out­
group/category) was predicted: mean ratings for the in-group/category 
were predicted to be higher (i.e. more positive) than the mean ratings for 
the out-group/category across all four stereotype dimensions.
X  IG >  X  OG
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Stereotype dimension:
Previous research has found that humans are more sensitive to the 
dimension morality/warmth in their social judgments. It was argued above 
that the costs of falsely assuming someone is competent may be lower the 
cost of falsely assuming someone is moral/warm. Hence:
H2: A two-way interaction between stereotype object and stereotype 
dimension was predicted: a greater difference in the mean ratings for the 
in-group/category compared to mean ratings for the out-group/category on 
the competence dimensions compared to the morality/warmth dimensions 
was predicted.
 ^ XlGC - j^OGCJ >  ^ x IGMA/V _ j^OGM/WJ
Experimental Condition:
As no previous research has investigated differences in assigning people to 
minimal groups vs. minimal categories, and no differences are predicted 
from a Cognition and Culture perspective, no hypotheses were formulated 
concerning a main effect or interactions involving experimental condition.
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III.5 Results
Preliminary Analysis
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main effects of word list or 
perceptual style group assignment (i.e. Figure Group or Ground Group) thus 
data were pooled across these variables. Similarly no significant main 
effects or interactions involving sex or nationality of participant were 
found. As stated earlier, separate scales were constructed for high 
competence, low competence, high morality/warmth and low 
morality/warmth by aggregating data across the 12 traits for each of these 
dimensions. The data for the two dimensions high competence and high 
morality/warmth were reversed coded such that 1 = strongly disagree and 5 
= strongly agree in order to make these two scales commensurable with the 
low competence and low morality /warmth scales for which 1 = strongly 
agree and 5 = strongly disagree. In other words higher scores on all four 
dimensions indicated more positive ratings. These four scales showed a high 
level of internal reliability: high competence (a = .85), low competence (a 
= .84), high morality/warmth (a = .86) and low morality/warmth (a = .88).
Main Analysis
A 2 (Experimental Condition: Group, Category) X 2 (Stereotype Object: In­
group/category, Out-group/category) X 4 (Stereotype Dimension: High 
Competence, Low Competence, High Morality/Warmth, Low 
Morality /Warmth) mixed design factorial ANOVA was conducted. A mixed 
design factorial ANOVA is used when several independent variables have 
been measured and some variables have been measured with different 
participants (between-subjects) and others used the same participants 
(within-subjects) (Field, 2009). In experiment 1, experimental condition 
was a between-subjects factor and stereotype object and stereotype 
dimension were within-subjects factors. The dependent measures were 
mean ratings on the four stereotype dimension scales (high competence,
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low competence, high morality/warmth and low morality/warmth). 
Planned pairwise comparisons following significant effects were performed 
using the Bonferroni correction. The Bonferroni correction controls the 
family-wise error rate by correcting the level of significance for each test 
such that the overall Type 1 error rate across all comparisons remains at 
.05. The alpha value was set at .05 and partial eta squared (rj 2) was 
calculated as the effect size.
Stereotype Object:
As predicted (H1.0) there was a significant main effect of stereotype object 
(in-group/category, out-group/category), F (1, 57) = 48.006, p < .001, r\ 2 = 
.457. As you can seen from Figure 3.0 pairwise comparisons revealed that 
the mean ratings were significantly higher for the in-group/category (M = 
3.69, SD = 0.54) compared to the out-group/category (M = 3.26, SD = 0.43) 
on all four stereotype dimension scales, p < .001. Since high competence 
and high morality/warmth were coded such that higher scores equal 
greater agreement and low competence and low morality/warmth were 
coded such that higher scores equal greater disagreement these results 
show that the in-group/category was rated more positively than the out­
group/category across all four stereotype dimensions.
The prediction of a two-way stereotype object and stereotype dimension 
(H2) was not supported, F (3, 171) = .356, p = .785. This suggests there 
were no differences between mean ratings on the two competence scales 
compared to the two morality/warmth scales when comparing the in­
group/category to the out-group/category.
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Figure 3.0: Mean Ratings Across all Stereotype Dimensions by Stereotype 
Object (In-group/category vs. out-group/category
Ing roup /ca tego ry  O u tg ro u p /ca te g o ry
Stereotype Object
Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence and High 
Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence 
and Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree.
No predictions were formed regarding a main effect or interactions 
involving experimental condition. However, there was a significant main 
effect of experimental condition, F (1, 57) = .6542, p < .05, rj 2 = .103. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean ratings were slightly higher in 
the group condition (M = 3.57, SD = 0.51) than in the category condition (M 
= 3.39, SD = 0.43), p < .05. There was no significant main effect of 
stereotype dimension, F (3, 171) = 1.006, p = .365. There was no significant 
two-way interaction between stereotype object and experimental 
condition, F (1, 57) = 1.304, p = .258. Finally, there was no significant 
three-way interaction between stereotype object, stereotype dimension 
and experimental condition, F (3, 171) = .603, p = .614.
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111.6 Summary and Discussion
Default Stereotyping?
By combining the Minimal Group Paradigm and a stereotype content 
research paradigm, this study explored whether humans possess a default 
stereotyping mode. That is, whether people rely on a heuristic leading 
them to assume that members of a group to which they belong are 
competent and moral/warm i.e. a default competence and default 
morality/warmth assumption. My analysis generated good results in support 
of the study's main hypothesis. I shall now turn to a more detailed 
summary and discussion of the results of experiment 1.
In-group Stereotypes
The prediction that participants w ill rate members of their in­
group/category more positively on the dimensions high and low 
competence and high and low morality/warmth than the out­
group/category was supported (see Figure 3.0 above). This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesized default competence and default 
morality/warmth assumption outlined in the Introduction. It is also 
consistent with existing social psychological research which shows strong 
evidence for in-group favouritism in both minimal groups and for most 
‘ real-world' groups (except when there are status differences as this often 
elicits out-group favouritism). However, according to the Stereotype 
Content Model (SCM) the contents of social group stereotypes are derived 
from the structure of inter-group relations. Hence, Fiske et al. have not 
entertained or investigated the possibility that rudimentary stereotypes 
may be formed about ‘minimal' groups. This finding was both predicted by, 
and can be accounted for by, the Cognition and Culture perspective.
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Out-group Stereotypes
In relation to the out-group, it  was found that participants* ratings for the 
out-group were close to neutral (i.e. 3 on the 5 point scale) across both 
competence and morality/warmth dimensions (see Figure 3.0). This is 
consistent with recent research on inter-group attitudes in minimal groups 
which has shown that minimal group categorization is sufficient to elicit 
positive attitudes towards the in-group and neutral, as opposed to 
negative, attitudes towards the out-group (Otten and Wentura, 1999). 
These findings are also consonant with current social psychological 
theorizing and research on prejudice and inter-group relations which 
suggests that in-group favouritism must be distinguished both conceptually 
and empirically from out-group derogation (see for example, Brewer, 1979, 
1993).
Competence vs. Morality /Warmth
The prediction that the default competence assumption would be stronger 
than the default morality/warmth assumption was not supported. 
Participants rated their in-group/category more positively than the out­
group/category on the two competence dimensions and the two 
morality/warmth dimensions. Although, SCM research points to the fact 
that the morality/warmth dimension is primary, it does not predict a 
difference in the strength of competence and morality /warmth 
stereotypes.
Minimal Group vs. Minimal Category
No differences were found between the two experimental conditions. This 
suggests that the distinction between ‘groups* and ‘categories* may be 
analytical. However, manipulation checks resulted in more participants 
assigned to the minimal group as opposed to minimal category condition 
being excluded from the analysis as they had accurately predicted the
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study was exploring inter-group attitudes or prejudice. Within the social 
psychology literature the terms ‘group' and ‘category' are often used inter­
changeably. However, as Hamilton, Sherman and Lickel (1998) point out 
although there is an association between them categories and groups are 
not the same thing. Some social categories, for instance, do not lead to a 
sense of ‘groupness.' An oft cited example of this is sex, which while 
recognised as being a relevant social category is not thought of by males 
and females as groups. This is not to say, of course, that sex may not be 
thought of as a group (ibid). There is perhaps a case to be made for future 
research to try and investigate whether this distinction is purely analytical, 
and if not what consequences it has for human social judgments.
Overall, the results of this study supported the hypothesized default 
stereotyping mode. This experiment indirectly lends support to the idea 
that humans have evolved a sensitivity to cues of competence and 
morality/warmth in their social judgments. This study also strengthens the 
case for applying the Cognition and Culture perspective to the 
understanding and investigation of social group stereotypes. More 
specifically, it  provides some empirical evidence to support the proposition 
that evolved cognitive predispositions may, in part, shape the contents of 
social group stereotypes. As noted above, the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter I has led to predictions and research findings which 
cannot easily be accommodated by existing social psychological theories 
about stereotypes such as SCM.
\
In conclusion, although the findings of this research are consistent with a 
default stereotyping mode, one is hesitant to draw strong conclusions from 
a single study. The present study does not enable us to understand what 
leads to the formation of stereotypic judgments concerning the 
competence and morality/warmth of the out-group, given that the ratings 
were neutral. Existing social psychological research suggests that such an 
understanding comes from a consideration of the structure of inter-group 
relations such as the existence of status differences between the groups.
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For instance, Fiske et al. (1999) found that attitudes towards groups 
varying in social status cluster into two types: members of high status 
groups are perceived to be highly competent but not very moral/warm, 
while members of low status groups are perceived to be highly moral/warm 
but not very competent. However, social status is not experimentally 
manipulated in these studies and they only demonstrate a correlation 
between status and perceived competence and morality/warmth. 
Additionally, it was argued in Chapter II that we might have evolved a 
cognitive predisposition sensitive to cues of social status in the form of a 
status detector which leads, in turn, to a sensitivity to cues of competence 
and morality/warmth. It is plausible that humans may have also evolved a 
heuristic leading people to assume members of high status groups are 
competent but immoral/cold and that members of low status groups are 
incompetent but moral/warm i.e. a default group status stereotyping 
mode. This hypothesis is tested in experiment 2 in the next chapter.
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Chapter IV - Exploring the Role of Cognitive Predispositions in 
Shaping Stereotype Content Part 2a: An Investigation of 
Default Group Status Stereotyping using the Minimal Group 
Paradigm
IV. 1 Introduction
Experiment 1, by combining the Minimal Croup Paradigm (MGP) and an 
experimental paradigm from the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), provided 
evidence for a default stereotyping mode (see Chapter III). It was found 
that people form rudimentary stereotypes along the two dimensions of 
competence and morality/warmth even in minimal groups, and assume that 
members of a group to which they belong are competent and moral/warm. 
However, experiment 1 does not allow us to shed light upon what leads to 
the formation of stereotypic judgments concerning the competence and 
morality/warmth of the out-group. The SCM suggests that such an 
understanding comes from a consideration of the structure of inter-group 
relations. More specifically, the SCM proposes that appraisals of inter-group 
competition predicts morality/warmth stereotypes, and inter-group status 
predicts competence stereotypes. It was argued in Chapter II that the 
domain of a Folk Sociology can be expanded to include a status detector 
which produces a sensitivity to inter-group status differentials. It was 
posited that given the association between status and perceptions of 
competence found in numerous studies (c/. Berger et a l., 1985; Jemmott 
and Gonzalez, 1989; Ridgeway, 1982), humans may have also evolved a 
heuristic leading people to assume members of high status groups are 
competent but members of low status groups are incompetent i.e. a 
default group status stereotyping mode. In other words, we use group 
status as a heuristic to infer the competence of all members of a high 
status or low status group.
110
According to the SCM inter-group competition predicts stereotypes based 
on the morality/warmth dimension such that groups who cooperate with us 
are seen as moral/warm, while groups who compete with us are seen as 
immoral/cold. Nonetheless, Fiske et o/. (1999) have found that the 
dimensions of competence and morality /warmth are often negatively 
correlated and cluster into two types based on group status; high status 
group members are perceived as competent but immoral/cold, while low 
status group members are perceived as incompetent but moral/warm. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter II, Cummins (1998) proposed that 
humans have evolved a sensitivity to social norms, specifically cheating and 
deception, involving status hierarchies. Therefore, it  is plausible that the 
default group status stereotyping mode includes stereotypes of 
morality/warmth such that high status groups are perceived to be 
immoral/cold and low status groups are perceived to be moral/warm. The 
second empirical study of this thesis has been designed to provide a test of 
this hypothesized default group status stereotyping mode.
The original MGP studies and experiment 1 provided evidence for in-group 
favouritism in minimal groups taking the form of discrimination in favour 
of, positive evaluations of, and positive stereotypes of one's in-group. 
However, as seen in Chapter I, there is considerable evidence suggesting 
that this form of in-group favouritism is modulated by the status of one's 
group within society. This often results in weaker in-group favouritism 
among members of low status groups, and stronger in-group favouritism 
among members of high status groups (see Jost, Pelham, and Carvallo, 
2002; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Status differentials between groups can 
also result in out-group favouritism by members of low status groups. Using 
a variant of the MGP, Sachdev and Bourhis (1987) formed ad hoc high, low 
and equal status groups. Results showed that members of high and equal 
status group were more discriminatory against the out-group, and more 
positive about their own group membership than were members of the low 
status group. Members of the low status group engaged in significant 
amounts of out-group favouritism by distributing more resources to
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members of the high status out-group. Status differentials also manifest in 
more positive attitudes towards members of high status groups by members 
of low status groups (see Dunham, Baron and Banaji, 2007, 2008). It is 
important to note that in experiment 2 in-group favouritism, and the 
associated default stereotyping (in-group is perceived as competent and 
moral/warm) competes with default group status stereotyping (high status 
group is perceived as competent but immoral/cold and low status group is 
seen as incompetent but moral/warm). The implications of this w ill be 
discussed later in the hypotheses section.
IV.2 Experiment Overview
This experiment was designed to investigate the hypothesized default 
group status stereotyping mode (see above) by adapting the experimental 
paradigm used in experiment 1 (see Chapter III). Experiment 2 used a very 
similar procedure to that used in experiment 1 except that a status 
manipulation was introduced. Adapting the status manipulation used by 
Sachdev and Bourhis (1987), it was impressed upon the participants that 
membership in the Figure Group has been found to correlate significantly 
and positively with social status as opposed to membership in the Ground 
Group. The dependent measures were the same as Experiment 1; following 
assignment to minimal groups varying in social status, participants 
completed a dependent measure of stereotyping in the form of a survey in 
which they were required to rate both the in-group and out-group on words 
denoting high and low competence and high and low morality/warmth.
Experiment Design:
A 2 (Group status: high status group, low status group) X 2 (Stereotype 
object: in-group, out-group) X 4 (Stereotype dimension: High Competence, 
Low Competence, High Morality/Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth) 
experimental design was employed. Group status was a between-subjects
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factor and stereotype object and stereotype dimension were within- 
subjects factors.
IV. 3 Method
IV. 3.1 Participants
The required sample size estimated using G*Power 3 for Mac was 120. A 
total of 144 participants completed the study. The data from 20 
participants had to be excluded from analyses due to the following reasons: 
(a) four participants used the wrong in-group label while answering 
manipulation check questions and (b) sixteen participants were excluded 
due to their awareness of the true purpose of the experiment and/or the 
minimal group paradigm. This left 124 participants, 73 females and 51 
males. Fifty-one percent of the sample identified themselves as British, 
25% American, 12% Australian, 10 % European 1% Canadian, 1 % Chinese. 
The remainder identified themselves as Indian, Puerto Rican, Brazilian, 
Belarusian, El-Salvadorian (<1%).
IV.3.2 Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were virtually identical to those used in 
experiment 1 (see Chapter III). The study appeared online as a web-based 
‘Perceptual Styles Study'. Invitations to participate were posted on three 
online psychological research directories (Social Psychology Network, 
Online Psychology Research UK and Psychological Research On The Net). 
After reading and signing the consent form participants were directed to 
the first page of the study.
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Part 1
Minimal Status Group Assignment:
As in experiment 1 participants completed a bogus perceptual styles test. 
All materials in the perceptual styles test were identical to those used in 
experiment 1, except that the feedback page not only assigned participants 
to a ‘Figure Group’ or ‘Ground Group’ but also informed participants that 
the two perceptual style groups varied in social status. Thus, participants 
assigned to the ‘Figure Group’ were informed that “ psychologists have 
found that members of the Figure Group have higher social and 
occupational status compared to members of the Ground Group.”  Similarly 
participants assigned to the ‘Ground Group’ were informed that 
“ psychologists have found that members of the Ground Group have lower 
social and occupational status compared to members of the Figure Group.” 
To reinforce this status manipulation participants were presented with a 
bogus article in which they were informed that this perceptual styles test is 
an important new predictor of an individual’s social and occupational status 
(see Appendix E to read the article). Upon pressing ‘continue’ participants 
were presented with the dependent measures (see below).
Part 2: Dependent Measure
As in experiment 1, following assignment to minimal groups participants 
completed a dependent measure of inter-group stereotypes in the form of a 
survey. Participants rated the in-group (section 1) and the out-group 
(section 2) on adjectives denoting high and low competence and high and 
low morality/warmth (these are the same adjectives used in experiment 1, 
see Chapter III). In order to impress the status manipulation upon the 
participants, the groups were always referred to as the ‘High Status Figure 
Group’ and the ‘Low Status Ground Group.’ To prevent participant fatigue 
the 48 words (12 high competence, 12 low competence, 12 high 
morality/warmth and 12 low morality/warmth) were divided into two
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randomised word lists each containing 24 words and they were presented in 
a between-subjects counter-balanced order. Consequently, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four versions of the study:
Responses to the 24 items in both sections were made by clicking one of 
five response options (1 = ‘strongly agree' to 5 = ‘strongly disagree').
At the end of the study participants were asked to provide some 
demographic characteristics: nationality, first language, fluency in English 
(native speaker, fluent, basic and poor) and sex. Finally, participants were 
asked to complete four manipulation check questions; (1) ‘Which 
perceptual style group are you a member of...?', with response categories 
‘Ground Group' and ‘Figure Group'; (3) Is the Figure Group a ...’ with 
response categories ‘High Status Group, ‘Low Status Group' or ‘don't know; 
(4) ‘ Is the Ground Group a...’ with response categories ‘High Status Group', 
‘Low Status Group' or ‘don't know'; (5) ‘What do you think the purpose of 
this study is?', with a box provided for participants to type their response 
into. Clicking a ‘submit study' button recorded the data and directed 
participants to a debriefing page.
1 a) Exp con 1 (Figure Group)
1 b) Exp con 1 (Figure Group)
2 a) Exp con 1 (Ground Group) 
2 b) Exp con 1 (Ground Group)
- > Part 1: List 1, Part 2: List 2
- > Part 1: List 2, Part 2: List 1
- > Part 1: List 1, Part 2: List 2
- > Part 1: List 2, Part 2: List 1
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1V.4 Hypotheses
In order to analyse the data for experiment 2 separate scales were 
constructed for the four stereotype dimensions: high competence, low 
competence, high morality/warmth and low morality/warmth by 
aggregating data across the 12 traits for each of these dimensions. The 
data for the two dimensions high competence and high morality/warmth 
were reversed coded such that 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree 
in order to make these two scales commensurable with the low 
competence and low morality/warmth scales for which 1 = strongly agree 
and 5 = strongly disagree. In other words higher scores on all four scales 
indicated more positive ratings.
Key: IG = In-group 
OG = Out-group 
HSIG = High status in-group 
LSIG = Low status in-group 
HSOG = High status out-group 
LSOG = Low status out-group 
-HC = High Competence 
-LC = Low Competence 
-HM/W = High Morality/Warmth 
-LM/W = Low Morality/Warmth
x = mean 
Stereotype Object:
Based on the premise that people hold default competence and 
morality/warmth assumptions about their in-group and the findings of 
experiment 1 :
H1.0: A significant main effect of stereotype object was predicted: mean 
ratings for the in-group were predicted to be higher (i.e. more positive)
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than the mean ratings for the out-group across all four stereotype
dimensions.
X  I0  >  X  OG
Group Status and Stereotype Object:
Previous research has indicated that group status modulates in-group 
favouritism. There is evidence that members of high status groups display 
higher levels of in-group favouritism than members of low status groups 
who often display out-group favouritism towards high status groups. 
However, it  is important to note that members of low status groups do not 
fail to show in-group favouritism therefore:
H2.0 : An interaction effect between group status and stereotype object was 
predicted.
H2.1: High status group: mean ratings were predicted to be higher for 
the high status in-group compared to the low status out-group on all 
four stereotype dimensions.
X HSIG > x  LSOG
H2.2: Low status group: no significant difference in the mean ratings 
for the low status in-group compared to the mean ratings for the 
high status out-group on all four stereotype dimensions was 
predicted.
X LSIG — x  HSOG
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Group Status, Stereotype Object and Stereotype Dimension:
Previous research has indicated that high status groups are perceived as 
highly competent and low status groups are perceived as lacking 
competence. Fiske and colleagues have argued that stereotypes of 
morality/warmth stem from appraisals of inter-group competition which 
was not manipulated in the present study. However, Fiske et al. (1999) did 
find some evidence that high status groups are pereived as lacking 
morality/warmth while low status groups are perceived as highly 
moral/warm. Hence:
H3.0: A three-way interaction effect between group status, stereotype 
object and stereotype dimension was predicted. This interaction was 
hypothesized to take the following form:
High Status Group: High and Low Competence:
H3.1; Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the high status in­
group compared to mean ratings for the low status out-group on the 
high competence dimension.
X HSIG-HC > x  LSOG-HC
H3.2: Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the high status in­
group compared to mean ratings for the low status out-group on the 
low competence dimension.
X HSIG-LC > x  LSOG-LC
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Low Status Group: High and Low Competence:
H3.3; Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the high status 
out-group compared to the low status in-group on the high 
competence dimension.
X HSOG-HC > x  LSIG-HC
H3.4: Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the high status 
out-group compared to the low status in-group on the low 
competence dimension.
X HSOG-LC > x  LSIG-LC
High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth:
H3.5: Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the low status out­
group compared to the high status in-group on the high
morality/warmth dimension.
X LSOG-HM/W > x  HSIG-HM/W
H3.6: Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the low status out­
group compared to the high status in-group on the low
morality/warmth dimension.
X LSOG-LM/W > x  HSIG-LM/W
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Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth:
H3.7; Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the low status in­
group compared to the high status out-group on the high 
morality/warmth dimension.
X LSIG-HM/W > x  HSOG-HM/W
H3.8: Mean ratings were predicted to be higher for the low status in­
group compared to the high status out-group on the low 
morality/warmth dimension.
X LSIG-LM/W > x  HSOG-LM/W
1 2 0
IV. 5 Results
Preliminary Analysis
There was no significant main effect of word list thus data were pooled 
across this variable. Similarly no significant main effects or interactions 
involving sex or nationality of participant were found. Separate scales were 
constructed for high competence, low competence, high morality/warmth 
and low morality/warmth by aggregating data across the 1 2  traits for each 
of these dimensions. The data for the two dimensions low competence and 
low morality/warmth were reversed coded such that 1 = strongly disagree 
and 5 = strongly agree in order to make these two scales commensurable 
with the high competence and high morality/warmth scales for which 1 = 
strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. These four scales showed a high 
level of internal reliability: high competence (cr = .81), low competence (cr 
= .82), high morality/warmth (cr = .8 6 ) and low morality/warmth (cr = .8 8 ).
Main Analysis
A 2 (Group Status: High Status, Low Status) X 2 (Stereotype Object: In­
group, Out-group) X 4 (Stereotype Dimension: High Competence, Low 
Competence, High Morality/Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth) mixed design 
factorial ANOVA was conducted. Group status was a between-subjects 
factor and stereotype object and stereotype dimension were within- 
subjects factors. The dependent measures were mean ratings on the four 
stereotype dimensions (high competence, low competence, high 
morality/warmth and low morality/warmth). Pairwise comparisons 
following significant effects were performed using the Bonferroni 
correction. The alpha value was set at .05 and partial eta squared (n 2) 
was calculated as the effect size.
Stereotype Object:
As predicted (H1.0) there was a significant main effect of stereotype object 
(in-group, out-group), F (1, 55) = 244.476, p < .001, f\ 2 -  .816. As
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predicted, and as you can see from Figure 4.0, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that mean ratings were higher for the in-group (M = 3.72 , SD = 
0.59) compared to the out-group {M = 3.15, SD = 0.71), p < .001. Since high 
competence and high morality/warmth were coded such that higher scores 
equal greater agreement and low competence and low morality/warmth 
were coded such that higher scores equal greater disagreement these 
results show that participants rated the in-group more positively than the 
out-group.
Figure 4.0: Mean Ratings across all Stereotype Dimensions by Stereotype 
Object (In-group vs. out-group)
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Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence and High 
Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence 
and Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree.
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Group Status and Stereotype Object:
As predicted (H2.0) there was a significant two-way interaction between 
group status and stereotype object, F (1, 55) = 291.840, p < .001, n 2 = 
.841. As hypothesized (H2.1), planned comparisons revealed that the mean 
ratings of the participants assigned to the high status group for the high 
status in-group were significantly higher than the mean ratings for the low 
status out-group. In other words, as Table 4.0 and Figure 4.1 illustrate, 
participants assigned to the high status group rated their in-group more 
positively than the low status out-group. Furthermore, as predicted (H2.2) 
for the low status group there was no significant difference in the mean 
ratings for the low status in-group compared to the high status out-group.
Table 4.0: Mean Ratings by Stereotype Object and Group Status
Group Status
Stereotype Object
In-Group Out-group
High Status 4.03*** 2.83***
(n = 30) (0.33) (0.31)
Low Status 3.41 3.46
(n = 32) (0.39) (0.41)
Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence and High 
Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence 
and Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree. 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to compare 
means across rows. *** = p < .001. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
below means.
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Figure 4.1: Mean Ratings across all Stereotype Dimensions by Stereotype 
Object and Group Status
Ingroup
Outgroup
High Status Low Status
Group Status
Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence and High 
Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence 
and Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree.
Group Status, Stereotype Object and Stereotype Dimension:
As predicted (H3.0) there was a significant three-way interaction between 
group status, stereotype object, and stereotype dimension, F (3, 165) = 
298.698, p < .001, n 2 = .845. To break down this interaction, follow-up 
one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were run to analyse the main effect of 
stereotype object separately for each level of group status (high status and 
low status) and for each level of stereotype dimension (high competence, 
low competence, high morality/warmth, low morality/warmth). 
(Traditional simple contrasts were also conducted to explore this 
interaction and are reported in Appendix F as they don’t allow for a direct 
test of the hypotheses).
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High Status Group: High and Low Competence:
There was a significant main effect of stereotype object (high status in­
group, low status out-group) on the high competence scale for the high 
status group, F (1, 29) = 977.522, p < .001, r) 2= .974. Pairwise comparisons 
using the Bonferroni method revealed that, as hypothesized (H3.1), high 
status group mean ratings were higher for the high status in-group than the 
low status out-group on the high competence scale (see Table 4.1). In other 
words participants assigned to the high status group rated the high status 
in-group more positively on the high competence dimension than the low 
status out-group.
Table 4.1: High Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Ratings 
by Stereotype Object
Stereotype
Dimension
Stereotype Object
High Status 
In-group
Low Status 
Out-group
High Competence 4 .4 4 *** 2  <1 9***
(.05) (.07)
Low Competence 4.53*** 2.34***
(.06) (.07)
n 30 30
Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 
= strongly disagree. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were 
performed to compare means across rows. * = p < .05, *** = p < .001. Standard 
errors appear in parentheses below means.
There was also a significant main effect of stereotype object on the low 
competence scale for the high status group, F (1, 29) = 1243.786, p < .001, 
rj 2 = .980. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, as hypothesized (H3.2), high 
status group mean ratings were higher for the high status in-group than the 
low status out-group on the low competence scale (see Table 4.1). In other 
words participants assigned to the high status group rated the high status
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in-group more positively on the low competence dimension than the low 
status out-group.
Low Status Group: High and Low Competence:
There was a significant main effect of stereotype object (low status in­
group, high status out-group) on the high competence scale for the low 
status group, F (1, 31) = 122.497, p < .001, n 2= .809. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as hypothesized (H3.3), low status group mean ratings were 
higher for the high status out-group compared to the low status in-group on 
the high competence scale (See Table 4.2). In other words participants 
assigned to the low status group rated the high status out-group more 
positively on the high competence dimension than the low status in-group.
Table 4.2: Low Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Ratings by 
Stereotype Object
Stereotype
Dimension
Stereotype Object
Low Status 
In-group
High Status 
Out-group
High Competence 3.16*** 3.99***
(0.25) (0.40)
Low Competence 3.10*** 4.05***
(0.38) (0.45)
n 32 32
Note. Judgments were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Competence Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 
= strongly disagree. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were 
performed to compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses below means.
There was also a significant main effect of stereotype object on the low 
competence scale for the low status group, F (1, 31) = 103.405, p < .001, n 
2 -  .781. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, as hypothesized (H3.4), low 
status group mean ratings were higher for the high status out-group
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compared to the low status in-group on the low competence scale (See 
Table 4.2). In other words participants assigned to the low status group 
rated the high status out-group more positively on the low competence 
dimension than the low status in-group.
High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth:
There was a significant main effect of stereotype object (high status in­
group, low status out-group) on the high morality/warmth scale for the 
high status group, F (1, 29) = 4.573, p < .05, rj 2 = .150. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that, contrary to expectations (H3.5), high status 
group mean ratings were higher for the high status in-group compared to 
the low status out-group on the high morality/warmth scale (See Table 
4.3). This suggests, that the high status group rated their in-group more 
positively than the low status out-group on the high morality/warmth scale.
Table 4.3: High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean 
Ratings by Stereotype Object
Stereotype Stereotype Object
Dimension High Status Low Status
In-group Out-group
High Morality/Warmth 3.58* 3.36*
(0.42) (0.38)
Low Morality/Warmth 3.57 3.47
(0.42) (0.36)
n 30 30
Note .Judgements were made on a 5 point-scale: High Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly 
agree, 5 = strongly disagree. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction 
were performed to compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses below means.
The main effect of stereotype object failed to reach statistical significance 
for low morality/warmth scale for the high status group. Hence, contrary to
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expectations (H3.6), there was no significant difference in the mean ratings 
for the high status in-group compared to the low status out-group on the 
low morality/warmth scale (see Table 4.3).
Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth:
There was a significant main effect of stereotype object (low status in­
group, high status out-group) on the high morality/warmth scale for the 
low status group, F (1, 31) = 59.762, p < .001, rj 2 = .673. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that, as predicted (H3.7), low status group mean 
ratings were higher for the low status in-group compared to the high status 
out-group on the high morality/warmth scale (see Table 4.4). This suggests, 
as predicted that participants assigned to the low status group rated the 
low status in-group more positively on the high morality/warmth dimension 
than the high status out-group.
Table 4.4: Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean 
Ratings by Stereotype Object_____________________________________
Stereotype
Dimension
Stereotype Object
Low Status 
In-group
High Status 
Out-group
High Morality/Warmth 3.73*** 2.93***
(0.45) (0.36)
Low Morality/Warmth 3.66*** 2.89***
(0.49) (0.43)
n 32 32
Note. Judgements were made on a 5 point-scale: High Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly 
agree, 5 = strongly disagree. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction 
were performed to compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses below means.
There was also a significant main effect of stereotype object (low status in­
group, high status out-group) on the low morality/warmth scale for the low
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status group, F (1, 31) = 51.755, p < .001, q 2= .641. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as predicted (H3.8), low status group mean ratings were 
higher for the low status in-group compared to the high status out-group on 
the low morality/warmth scale (see Table 4.4). This suggests, as predicted 
that participants assigned to the low status group rated the low status in­
group more positively on the low morality/warmth dimension than the high 
status out-group.
An analysis of results involving main effects or interactions that were not of 
primary interest and for which no predictions were formulated can be seen 
in Appendix F.
129
IV.6 Summary and Discussion
Default Group Status Stereotyping?
Experiment 2 explored whether humans possess a default group status 
stereotyping mode by combining the Minimal Group Paradigm and a 
stereotype content research paradigm. That is, whether people rely on a 
heuristic leading them to assume that members of a high status group are 
competent and immoral/cold, while members of a low status group are 
incompetent and moral/warm. My analysis generated good results in 
support of the study’s main hypotheses. I shall now turn to a summary and 
discussion of the main findings of experiment 2 .
In-group vs. Out-group Stereotypes:
The finding that participants rated their in-group more positively than the 
out-group irrespective of group status supports the findings of experiment 1 
and is consistent with the hypothesized default stereotyping mode (see 
Chapter III). This finding contributes to existing social psychological 
research which shows strong evidence for in-group favouritism in both 
minimal groups and most ‘real-world’ groups. However, the introduction of 
an inter-group status difference modulated default stereotyping as 
predicted. Members of the high status group rated their in-group more 
positively than the low status out-group on both the competence and 
morality/warmth dimensions. For members of the low status group there 
was no significant difference in the ratings of the low-status in-group and 
the high status out-group. This finding is consonant with Sidanius and 
Pratto’s (1999) ‘asymmetrical in-group bias hypothesis’ which states that 
in-group favouritism is easier and more valuable to high status groups 
therefore in-group bias w ill be stronger among members of high status 
groups.
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Competence Stereotypes:
The prediction that members of the high status group would rate the high 
status in-group more positively than the low status out-group on the two 
competence dimensions was supported. Furthermore, it was found that 
members of the low status group rated the high status out-group more 
positively than the low status in-group on the two competence dimensions. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesized default group status 
stereotyping mode outlined in the Introduction. These findings also add to 
the ever-increasing body of literature which shows a strong association 
between social status and perceptions of competence (cf. Berger et a/., 
1985; Jemmott and Gonzalez, 1989; Ridgeway, 1982). Unlike in experiment 
1 where out-group ratings were neutral, the status differential between the 
groups resulted in negative stereotypes o f the low status out-group along 
the two competence dimensions by members of the high status group. This 
finding provides strong support to the hypothesized default group status 
stereotyping mode. This finding is consistent with previous social 
psychological research showing members of high status groups are often 
highly discriminatory and hold negative attitudes about low status out­
groups.
Furthermore, participants assigned to the low status group conferred highly 
positive stereotypes of competence on the high status out-group. This 
finding also provides support to the default group status stereotyping 
mode. It additionally contributes to previous research which has shown that 
members of low status groups often engage in out-group favouritism; 
judging the high status out-group more positively and discriminating in 
their favour. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) describe such out-group favouritism 
as an extreme form of the asymmetrical in-group bias whereby not only do 
members of low status groups display less in-group favouritism than 
members of high status groups but they may also show a preference for the 
out-group over the in-group. However, it is important to note that the low 
status in-group ratings for high competence and low competence were
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neutral (i.e. 3 on the 5 point scale). This finding is consistent with existing 
social psychological research noted above showing that members of low 
status groups display less in-group favouritism than members of high status 
groups but they do not necessarily hold negative attitudes towards their in­
group (Jost, Pelham, and Carvallo, 2002).
MoralitytWarmth Stereotypes
Contrary to predictions, the high status group rated the high status in-group 
more positively on the high morality/warmth dimension than the low status 
out-group. Furthermore, no differences were found for low 
morality/warmth ratings between the high status in-group and low status 
out-group for the high status group. However, as predicted, members of 
the low status group rated the low status in-group more positively than the 
high status out-group on both the high and low morality/warmth 
dimensions. The fact that members of the low status group rated members 
of the high status group positively on the competence dimensions but 
negatively on the morality/warmth dimensions suggests that out-group 
favouritism or asymmetrical in-group bias is quite nuanced, and does not 
result in a generalized positive evaluation of the high status group. Fiske et 
al. ’s (1999) research suggested that members of high status groups are 
stereotyped as lacking morality/warmth and members of low status groups 
are stereotyped as highly moral/warm. However in the present study 
members of the high status group judged their in-group favourably on the 
two morality/warmth dimensions. Hence, the findings of experiment 2 
highlight an important point, namely that members of high and low status 
groups do not necessarily share the same stereotypes of their respective 
groups.
Overall, the results of this study are consistent with the hypothesis that 
humans may have evolved a heuristic leading them to assume that 
members of high status groups are competent while members of low status 
groups are incompetent. This heuristic was described as a default group
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status stereotyping mode. The results of this experiment also lends support 
to the explanatory potential of the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter II. More specifically, the fact that minimal status groups elicit 
competence and morality/warmth based stereotypes provides some 
empirical support to the proposition that humans have evolved a cognitive 
predisposition sensitive to status differentials between groups. This in turn 
lends additional support for the proposal of expanding the domain of a Folk 
Sociology to include the proposed status detector.
This is the first study to find evidence for the formation of stereotypes 
based on the dimensions of competence and morality/warmth in minimal 
groups varying in status. Social status is not experimentally manipulated in 
the SCM studies and they only demonstrate a correlation between group 
status and perceived competence. The present study provides evidence for 
a causal relationship between inter-group status differences and 
stereotypes of competence. According to SCM the contents of stereotypes 
are derived from the structure of inter-group relations. While not denying 
that, I have argued that we may have evolved a cognitive predisposition 
sensitive to inter-group status differences. This proposition is supported by 
the fact that competence based stereotypes can be elicited in minimal 
status groups. Hence cognitive and structural factors appear to act in 
concert to shape stereotype contents.
In conclusion, the findings of this research are consistent with a default 
group status stereotyping mode. In order to provide stronger support for 
the existence of a default group status stereotyping a follow-up study was 
conducted. This study, reported in the next chapter, is similar to the 
present study, however, instead of using an explicit dependent measure for 
stereotyping, an implicit measure was used.
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Chapter V - Exploring the Role of Cognitive Predispositions in 
Shaping Stereotype Content Part 2b: An Investigation of 
Default Group Status Stereotyping using an Implicit Measure of 
Default Stereotyping
V.1 Introduction
Experiment 2 found evidence for default group status stereotyping (see 
Chapter IV). However, this study made use of an explicit measure of 
stereotyping. In recent years the use of implicit measures has become 
popular within social psychology. One of the reasons for using implicit 
measures is that explicit methods (e.g. self-report measures) are based on 
the assumption that individuals can introspect on their attitudes. More 
recently, social psychologists have suggested that many constructs 
including self-esteem, stereotypes and attitudes are more implicit and not 
necessarily available to introspective access (Devine, 1989; Greenwald and 
Banaji, 1995). Studies of implicit cognition can reveal information that 
people might explicitly reject because their expression may have negative 
social consequences. There are also methodological reasons for utilising a 
measure of implicit cognition as it addresses objections that evidence of 
stereotyping and prejudice from studies using explicit measures are not 
genuine, but rather a function of public conformity or demand 
characteristics (see Mullen et al. 1992). Furthermore, following Haselton 
and Funder (2006) it  was argued in Chapter II that default stereotyping is 
an implicit cognitive heuristic, therefore it  is important to find evidence 
for default stereotyping using an implicit measure. Hence, in order to 
provide stronger evidence for a default group status stereotyping mode, 
the third empirical study of this thesis investigated whether evidence for 
the hypothesized default group status stereotyping mode can be found 
using an implicit measure.
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V.2 Experiment Overview
The experimental paradigm was similar to that used in experiment 2. 
However, instead of using an explicit measure of stereotyping an implicit 
one was used. More specifically, following assignment to the minimal 
groups varying in status, participants completed a word recognition speed 
test (Sassenberg and Wieber, 2005) supposedly related to the general issue 
of ‘perception and information processing'. This was in fact a semantic 
priming task used to measure participants' implicit inter-group stereotypes. 
Participants were asked to make word/non-word judgements to trait 
attributes reflecting high and low competence and high and low
morality/warmth preceded by a subliminally presented high status group 
prime (FIGURE), a low status group prime (GROUND) and a subliminally 
presented neutral prime (XXXXXX). Of primary interest was the facilitation
or speed with which word/non-word judgments can be made for trait
adjectives denoting high and low competence and high and low
morality/warmth following the group primes and the neutral prime. The 
dependent variables in all analyses were mean response times for a trait 
following the group primes and the neutral prime.
Experiment Design:
A 2 (Group status: high status group, low status group) X 3 (Prime: High 
Status Group Prime: FIGURE, Low Status Group Prime: GROUND, and 
Neutral Prime: XXXXXX) X 4 (Stereotype dimension: High Competence, Low 
Competence, High Morality/Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth) experimental 
design was employed. Group status was a between-subjects factor and 
prime and stereotype dimension were within-subjects factors.
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V.3 Method
V.3.1 Participants
The required sample size was calculated using G*Power 3 for Mac (see Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang and Buchner, 2007). Parameters used in the estimate were 
the effect size (set to .30), type I error level (set to .05), type II error level 
(set to .80) and the number of groups (2). The sample size calculated by 
the software was 1 0 0 .
A total of 150 participants of various nationalities completed the study. The 
sample was restricted to participants whose first language is English as the 
success of the semantic priming task relies upon the recognition and 
categorization of English words denoting high and low competence and high 
and low morality /warmth. The data from 14 participants had to be 
excluded from analyses as these participants used the wrong in-group label 
while answering manipulation check questions. This left 136 participants, 
70 females and 6 6  males. Sixty-two percent of the sample identified 
themselves as British, 25% American, 14% European and 4% Canadian.
V.3.2 Materials and Procedure
The study appeared online as a web-based ‘Perception Study. 1 Invitations 
to participate were posted on three online psychological research 
directories (‘Social Psychology Network’ , ‘Online Psychology Research UK’ 
and ‘Psychological Research On The Net’ ). Participants were also recruited 
via Maximiles UK. Maximiles run a online loyalty reward scheme whereby 
they provide participants for research and the participants earn points 
which can be exchanged for gifts ranging from CDs, books to flights.
After reading and signing the consent form participants were directed to 
the first page of the study.
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Part 1: Minimal Group Assignment
The materials and procedure in the first part of the study were virtually 
identical to those in experiment 2 (see Chapter IV). After reading and 
signing the consent form, participants completed the bogus perceptual 
styles test and were assigned to the ‘Figure Group* or the ‘Ground Group*. 
Furthermore, participants assigned to the ‘Figure Group* were informed 
that “ psychologists have found that members of the Figure Group have 
higher social and occupational status compared to members of the Ground 
Group”  Similarly participants assigned to the ‘Ground Group* were 
informed that “ psychologists have found that members of the Ground 
Group have lower social and occupational status compared to members of 
the Figure Group.”  Participants were then asked to read the same bogus 
article as in experiment 2 .
Part 2: Dependent Measure
Following assignment to the minimal groups, participants were asked to 
complete a word recognition speed test (Sassenberg and Wieber, 2005) 
which they were informed tested ‘perception and information processing*. 
This was in fact a semantic priming task used to measure participants* 
implicit default stereotypes. An adaptation of Wittenbrink, Judd and Park*s 
(1997) semantic priming task was used. In Wittenbrink et al.'s experiment 
African American and White group primes were paired with tra it attributes 
known to be part of the cultural stereotype of each group. In this design, 
facilitation observed for the various combinations of primes and types of 
targets offered estimates for the degree to which a group prime activated 
the group stereotype. This task is a variation on Meyer and Schvanevedt*s 
(1971) classic procedure demonstrating semantic priming effects. In the 
Meyer and Schvanevedt procedure, participants first saw a single word, the 
prime (e.g. BREAD) and were then presented with a letter string, the target 
(e.g. BUTTER), to which participants had to respond with a word/non-word 
judgment. Response latencies are facilitated by semantic associations
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between the prime and the target stimulus. In the current experiment, a 
semantic priming task was administered in which participants were asked 
to make word/non-word judgements to trait attributes reflecting high and 
low competence and high and low morality/warmth which were preceded 
by either a subliminally presented group prime (High Status Group Prime: 
FIGURE or Low Status Group Prime: GROUND) or a subliminally presented 
neutral prime (XXXXXX).
Instructions for the test were given on screen. Participants completed a 
reaction time procedure in which they were asked whether various target 
sequences of letters on a computer screen constituted a word or a non­
word. Each trial on this lexical-decision task (LDT) was preceded by a prime 
that referred to one of the two minimal groups (FIGURE or GROUND), a foil 
prime (e.g. TABLE), or a neutral non-word prime (e.g. XXXXX). These 
primes were presented for 15ms and were immediately followed by a mask 
for 2-s interval before the lexical decision trial. Target stimuli during the 
LDT were adjectives denoting high and low competence and high and low 
morality/warmth, target adjectives that cannot be used to refer to persons 
(e.g. Polluted, Sunny) and non-words. All target stimuli appeared with both 
of the two group primes and with the neutral prime. To conceal the actual 
purpose of the LDT, the priming stimuli were presented outside of 
participants* conscious awareness. Differences in response times were 
examined as a function of whether the target attributes followed the high 
status group prime (FIGURE), low status group prime (GROUND) or a neutral 
prime (XXXXXX). Differences in response times were taken as evidence of 
the associative strength between group labels and target attributes, which 
in turn reflects the likelihood with which a given attribute is activated 
spontaneously by a group reference.
For this task, participants were told to sit at a distance of approximately 
50cm from the computer screen and were asked, on each trial, to focus on 
a fixation point (+), which was presented in the centre of the computer 
screen in 18-point Times New Roman font in uppercase letters (as were all
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other stimuli). This fixation point appeared for 1000ms and was 
immediately followed by the prime. After 15ms, the prime was followed by 
a masking stimulus (XXXXX), which remained on the screen for 2,000ms. 
The masking stimulus was then replaced by one of the target letter 
sequences, and participants were required to indicate whether the target 
stimulus formed a word or non-word in the English language. The target 
sequence was erased from the screen after 250ms, with the computer 
pausing until the participant had responded by pressing one of two keys, 
‘A’ for yes (i.e. if they thought the letter sequence was a word) and ‘5’ for 
no (i.e. if  they thought the letter sequence was not a word). The ‘5’ they 
were asked to use was from the right hand-side number-pad on their 
keyboard.
Each trial on this lexical decision task (LDT) was preceded by a prime that 
referred to one minimal group or the other (FIGURE or GROUND), a foil 
prime (e.g. TABLE) or a neutral non-word prime (e.g. XXXXXX). The target 
set was comprised of 48 adjectives, 12 denoting high competence, 12 
denoting low competence, 1 2  adjectives denoting high morality/warmth 
and 12 denoting low morality/warmth These are the same adjectives used 
in experiments 1 and 2 (see Chapter III) except that three words were 
changed as their word frequencies were exceptionally higher than the other 
target words and therefore would have biased the interpretation of the 
results. It was very important to ensure that the word frequencies for all 
the words used in the priming task were similar. A large body of research in 
psycholinguistics has demonstrated that the magnitude of semantic priming 
in lexical decision is larger for low-frequency words compared to high 
frequency words (e.g., Becker, 1979). Word frequencies represent how 
often a word is used in spoken and/or written language. For this 
experiment word frequencies for these words were obtained using a 
software, WordGen, which calculates frequencies for English words using 
the CELEX and Lexique lexical databases. For high competence 
‘knowledgeable’ was replaced with ‘ imaginative’ and for high
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morality/warmth ‘kind' was replaced with 'honest' and 'happy' was 
replaced with 'loving.'
In addition to these the target stimuli included 24 filler targets comprised 
of 11 adjectives which cannot be used to describe humans (‘dilapidated’ , 
'rickety', 'deserted', ‘secluded', ‘winding’ , 'narrow', ‘thorny’ , ‘juicy’ , 
‘sour’ , ‘humid’ and ‘sturdy’ ) and 13 neutral nouns (‘butter’ , ‘crown’ , 
‘custom’ , ‘frog’ , ‘glacier’ , ‘ rattle’ , ‘accommodation’ , ‘fireplace’ , 
‘notebook’ , ‘apple’ , ‘contents’ , ‘errand’ and ‘prairie’ . The adjectives were 
the same as those used by Wittenbrink et al. (1997), the first six neutral 
nouns were selected from Bellezza, Greenwald and Banaji’s (1986) word 
norms and the final seven were derived from neutral nouns used by Lepore 
and Brown (2002). Although the filler items were not part of the final 
analysis, it  was important to use words which are unrelated to the central 
domains of competence and morality/warmth to prevent participants being 
suspect about the true purpose of the word recognition task. It was also 
ensured that the mean word frequencies of the target words (M = 13.98, SD 
= 12.88) and filler words (M = 13.58, SD = 13.47) were similar. Finally, 18 
non-words were used (‘aunny’ , ‘blosed’ , ‘unstructive’ , ‘toll'd’ , ‘maluable’ , 
‘grafty’ , ‘fappy’ , ‘shirsty’ , ‘joaked’ , ‘nerfect’ , ‘ettentive’ , ‘grestigious’ , 
‘misible’ , ‘hiberal’ , ‘tovely’ , ‘ lecent’ , ‘gamous’ and ‘ictive’ ). These non­
words were also derived from Wittenbrink et a/.’s (1997) study.
Each prime (i.e. FIGURE, GROUND, neutral or filler prime) occurred on 58 
different trials. Of these, on 10 trials, the target sequence of letters 
following the prime constituted a non-word. The remaining 48 trials for 
each prime type were followed by the targets that were, in fact, words. 
For the first three types of primes (High Status Group Prime: FIGURE, Low 
Status Group Prime: GROUND and Neutral Prime: XXXXXX), the target words 
were 48 adjectives denoting high and low competence and high and low 
morality/warmth. For the 58 trials that involved filler primes, 10 were 
followed by non-words and the remaining 48 trials involved neutral filler 
words. The full set of four prime types by trials (232 trials) were presented
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in an order which was individually randomized for each participant. 
Additionally, 10 practice trials were presented initially, involving both filler 
and neutral primes. Presentation of experimental stimuli and data 
collection was controlled by Inquisit based on the Millisecond software 
package (Inquisit 3 Web, 2009). See Figure 5.0.
Figure 5.0: The Lexical Decision Task Design
Prime Target Words Response
FIGURE
GROUND
NEUTRAL
A
Target Adjectives 
(48 words/48 trials)
B
Non-Words 
(18 words/10 trials)
Word
Non-Word
FILLER C
Filler Items 
(24 words/48 trials)
Pre-test
To conceal the true purpose of the LDT the priming stimuli was presented 
outside of participants’ conscious awareness. To obtain a “ subliminal” 
stimulus exposure, the priming stimuli were presented for a very brief 
period (15ms) and followed immediately by a visual mask (XXXXXX). Results 
from previous semantic priming studies indicate that subliminal stimuli are 
more effective when the stimuli remains detectable but unidentifiable (cf.
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Holender, 1986). Although the prime presentation period (15ms) had been 
used successfully by Wittenbrink et al. (1997), a pre-test was conducted to 
ensure that the primes at this presentation duration could not be identified 
by participants.
Twelve participants were recruited for this pre-test. They first completed 
the perceptual styles test, just as participants would in the actual 
experiment. Each participant then completed 126 trials from the LDT, using 
the same primes and target letter sequences that would be used in the 
actual experiment. The prime was presented for 15ms. Unlike the 
instructions given to participants in the experiment, these pre-test 
participants were informed that words would be briefly flashed on the 
screen before the sequence of Xs appeared and that they should try to 
identify these words. On one sixth of the trials, the prime was FIGURE; on 
one sixth of the trials the prime was GROUND; filler primes were used on 
the remaining two-thirds of the trials. Each LDT trial in this pre-test was 
followed by a prime-identification query. In total, across the 12 
participants, there were 1512 trials with prime-identification queries given 
on each trial. Of these 504 identification queries followed each of the two 
group primes. In response, these participants identified the prime as the 
word FIGURE 3 times. They identified the word GROUND two times. Thus 
out of 504 trials, correct prime identification for each of the two group 
primes occurred 5 times out of 504, or on 0.1% of the trials. This suggests 
that even when explicitly told that words would be briefly flashed before 
the masking sequence and asked to identify those words, participants were 
unable to do so at this prime-presentation duration of 15ms. In the 
experiment, participants are neither informed about the primes, nor asked 
to identify the primes, which means it is highly unlikely that they could 
identify the primes spontaneously.
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V.4 Hypotheses
In Experiment 2 the dependent variables were mean ratings on the high and 
low competence and high and low morality/warmth scales. In experiment 3 
a semantic priming task was used therefore the dependent variables were 
mean response times in recognizing the traits denoting high and low 
competence and high and low morality/warmth. In semantic priming tasks 
mean response times offer estimates for the degree to which a group prime 
activates the group stereotype. If a tra it is associated with a particular 
group participants should be quicker at recognising it when primed by the 
name of that group. In the case of the present study, if  participants 
stereotype a group as highly competent they should be quicker at 
recognising high competence traits when primed by the name of that group 
but slower at recognising low competence traits when primed by the name 
of that group.
Key: HSIG = High status in-group 
LSIG = Low status in-group 
HSOG = High status out-group 
LSOG = Low status out-group 
NP = Neutral prime 
HC = High Competence 
LC = Low Competence 
HM/W = High Morality/Warmth 
LM/W = Low Morality/Warmth
x = Mean
Group Status, Prime and Stereotype Dimension:
Based on the hypothesized default group status stereotyping mode and the 
findings of experiment 2 :
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Hi.o: A significant three-way interaction between group status, prime and 
stereotype dimension was predicted. The interaction was predicted to take 
the following form:
High Status Group: High Competence:
H1.1: Mean response times were predicted to be lower (or faster) 
when high competence traits are preceded by the high status in­
group prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND).
X HSIG-HC < x  LSOG-HC
H1.2: Mean response times were predicted to be lower (or faster) 
when high competence traits are preceded by the high status in­
group prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X HSIG-HC < x  NP-HC
High Status Group: Low Competence:
H1.3: Mean response times were predicted to be higher (or slower) 
when low competence traits are preceded by the high status in­
group prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND).
X HSIG-LC > x  LSOG-LC
Hi.4: Mean response times were predicted to be higher (or slower) 
when low competence traits are preceded by the high status in­
group prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
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X HSIG-LC > x NP-LC
Low Status Group: High Competence:
Hi.5; Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
competence traits are preceded by the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND).
X HSOG-HC < x  LSIG-HC
H1.6: Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
competence traits are preceded by the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X HSOG-HC < x  NP-HC
Hi .7: No significant difference between mean response times when 
high competence traits are preceded by the low status in-group 
prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) was 
predicted.
X LSIG-HC -  x  NP-HC
Low Status Group: Low Competence:
H1.8: Mean response times were predicted to be higher when low 
competence traits are preceded by the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND).
X HSOG-LC > x  LSIG-LC
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Hi.9: Mean response times were predicted to be higher when low 
competence traits are preceded by the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X HSOG-LC > j( NP-LC
H2.0: No significant difference between mean response times when 
low competence traits are preceded by the low status in-group prime 
(GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) was predicted.
X LSIG-LC = x  NP-LC
High Status Group: High Morality /Warmth:
H2.1: Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the high status in-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND).
X HSIG-HM/W < x  LSOG-HM/W
H2.2: Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the high status in-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X HSIG-HM/W < x  NP-HM/W
High Status Group: Low Morality/Warmth:
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H2.3: No significant difference in the mean response times when low 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the high status in-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND) was predicted.
X HSIG-LM/W = x  LSOG-LM/W
H2.4: No significant difference in the mean response times when low 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the high status in-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) was 
predicted.
X HSIG-LM/W -  x  NP-LM/W
Low Status Group: High Morality/Warmth:
H2.5: Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the low status in-group 
prime (GROUND) compared to the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE).
X LSIG-HM/W < x  HSOG-HM/W
H2.6: Mean response times were predicted to be lower when high 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the low status in-group 
prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X LSIG-HM/W < x  NP-HM/W
Low Status Group: Low Morality /Warmth
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H2.7: Mean response times were predicted to be higher when low 
morality/warmth traits are preceded by the low status in-group 
prime (GROUND) compared to the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE).
X LSIG-LM/W > x  HSOG-LM/W
H2.8: Mean response times were predicted to be higher when low 
morality /warmth traits are preceded by the low status in-group 
prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX).
X LSIG-LM/W > x  NP-LM/W
148
V.5 Results
Preliminary Analysis
The response latencies in milliseconds for each trial formed the semantic 
priming data. Response latencies are naturally characterized by the 
prevalence of outliers (Ratcliff, 1993). These outliers result from 
momentary inattention or responses made prior to perception of stimuli, 
and lead to distortions in mean response times and inflate variances. 
Therefore, following Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998) response 
times slower than 300ms and faster than 3,000ms were recoded as missing 
values. The mean response times were aggregated across the 12 traits for 
each stereotype dimension: high competence, low competence, high 
morality/warmth and low morality/warmth. Preliminary analyses revealed 
no significant main effects or interactions involving sex or nationality of 
participant.
Main Analysis
A 2 (Group Status: High Status, Low Status) X 3 (Prime: High Status Group 
Prime: FIGURE, Low Status Group Prime: GROUND, Neutral Prime) X 4 
(Stereotype Dimension: High Competence, Low Competence, High 
Morality /Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth) mixed design factorial ANOVA was 
conducted. Group status was a between-subjects factor and prime and 
stereotype dimension were within-subjects factors. The dependent 
variables in all analyses were aggregated mean response times for the traits 
for all four stereotype dimensions (high competence, low competence, high 
morality/warmth and low morality/warmth). Pairwise comparisons 
following significant effects were performed using the Bonferroni 
correction. The alpha value was set at .05 and partial eta squared (r j2) was 
calculated as the effect size.
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Group Status, Stereotype Object and Stereotype Dimension:
As predicted (H1.0) there was a significant three-way interaction between 
group status, prime, and stereotype dimension, F (6 , 804) = 36.003, p < 
.001, n 2 = .212. To break down this interaction, follow-up one-way 
repeated measure ANOVAs were run to analyse the main effect of prime 
(High Status Group Prime: FIGURE, Low Status Group Prime: GROUND, and 
Neutral Prime: XXXXXX) separately for each level of group status (high 
status and low status) and stereotype dimension (high competence, low 
competence, high morality/warmth, low morality/warmth). (Traditional 
simple contrasts were also conducted for this interaction and are presented 
in Appendix G)
High Status Group: High Competence
There was a significant main effect of prime (high status in-group prime: 
FIGURE, low status out-group prime: GROUND, Neutral: XXXXXX) on high 
competence traits for the high status group, F (2, 130) = 526.587, p < .001, 
n 2= .890. A polynomial trend analysis revealed that there was a significant 
linear trend, F (1, 65) = 806.112, p < .001, r\ 2 -  .925. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as hypothesized (H1.1), mean response times were 
significantly lower when high competence traits were preceded by the the 
high status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group 
prime (GROUND) (see Table 5.0 below). Furthermore, as predicted (H1.2), 
mean response times were significantly lower when high competence traits 
were preceded by the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the 
neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see Table 5.1 below). In other words, participants 
assigned to the high status group associated the high status in-group with 
high competence traits. No predictions were made regarding differences 
between the low status out-group prime and neutral prime, and pairwise 
comparisons revealed that there were no significant differences (see Table 
5.2 below).
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Table 5.0: High Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response
Times Comparing the High Status In-Group Prime and Low Status Out-
Group Prime._______________________________________________________
Stereotype
Dimension
Prime
H.S In-group 
(FIGURE)
L.S. Out-Group 
(GROUND)
High Competence 611.87*** 952.18***
(59.67) (72.18)
Low Competence 1260.36*** 940.94***
(78.35) (86.04)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
Table 5.1: High Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response 
Times Comparing the High Status In-Group Prime and Neutral Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension H.S In-group (FIGURE) Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Competence 611.87*** 941.23***
(59.67) (67.76)
Low Competence 1260.36*** 1000.05***
(78.35) (68.56)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
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Table 5.2: High Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response
Times Comparing the Low Status Out-Group Prime and Neutral Prime.
Stereotype
Dimension
Prime
L.S. Out-Group 
(GROUND)
Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Competence 952.18 941.23
(72.18) (67.76)
Low Competence 940.94*** 1000.05***
(86.04) (68.56)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
High Status Group: Low Competence
There was a significant main effect of prime (high status in-group prime: 
FIGURE, low status out-group prime: GROUND, Neutral: XXXXXX) on low 
competence traits for the high status group, F (2, 130) = 441.385, p < .001, 
rj 2= .872. A polynomial trend analysis revealed a significant linear trend, F 
(1, 65) = 658.155, p < .001, r\ 2= .910. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, 
as hypothesized (Hi.3) mean response times were significantly higher when 
low competence traits were preceded by the high status in-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime (GROUND) (see Table 
5.0 above). Furthermore, as predicted (H1.4), mean response times were 
significantly higher when low competence traits were preceded by the high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) 
(see Table 5.1 above). In other words, participants assigned to the high 
status group do not associate the high status in-group with low competence 
traits. No predictions were formulated regarding differences between the 
low status out-group prime and neutral prime, and pairwise comparisons 
revealed mean response times were slightly lower when low competence 
traits were preceded by the low status out-group prime (GROUND) 
compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see Table 5.2 above). This
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suggests that members of the high status group associate the low status
group with low competence traits.
Low Status Group: High Competence
There was a significant main effect of prime (low status in-group prime: 
GROUND, high status out-group prime: FIGURE, Neutral: XXXXXX) on high 
competence traits for the low status group, F (2, 134) = 324.260, p < .001, 
r\ 2= .825. A polynomial trend analysis revealed that there was a significant 
linear trend, F (1, 69) = 671.675, p < .001, n 2= .907. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as hypothesized (H1.5), mean response times were lower 
when high competence traits were preceded by the high status out-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND) (see 
Table 5.3 below). Furthermore, as predicted (Hi.6), mean response times 
were lower when high competence traits were preceded by the high status 
out-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see 
Table 5.4 below). These results suggest that participants assigned to the 
low status group associate the high status out-group with high competence 
traits. Finally, contrary to expectations (H1.7) that there will be no 
differences pairwise comparisons revealed that mean response times were 
slightly higher when high competence traits were preceded by the low 
status in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) 
(see Table 5.5 below). This suggests that the low status group does not 
associate their in-group with high competence traits.
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Table 5.3: Low Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response 
Times Comparing the Low Status In-Group Prime and High Status Out- 
Group Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension L.S. In-Group H.S Out-group
(GROUND) (FIGURE)
High Competence 970.36*** 646.58***
(60.42) (62.37)
Low Competence 1114.54*** 1323.89***
(112.64) (103.79)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
Table 5.4: Low Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response 
Times Comparing the High Status Out-Group Prime and Neutral Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension H.S. Out-Group Neutral
(FIGURE) (XXXXXX)
High Competence 646.58*** 931.48***
(62.37) (65.07)
Low Competence 1323.89*** 983.48***
(103.79) (98.56)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. * = p < .05, *** = p < .001. Means are in 
milliseconds. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S 
= High Status, L.S = Low Status.
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Table 5.5: Low Status Group: High and Low Competence Mean Response
Times Comparing the Low Status In-Group Prime and Neutral Prime.
Stereotype
Dimension
Prime
L.S. In-Group 
(GROUND)
Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Competence 970.36* 931.48*
(60.42) (65.07)
Low Competence 1114.54*** 983.48***
(112.64) (98.56)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. * = p < .05, *** = p < .001. Means are in 
milliseconds. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S 
= High Status, L.S = Low Status.
Low Status Group: Low Competence
There was a significant main effect of prime (low status in-group prime: 
GROUND, high status out-group prime: FIGURE, Neutral: XXXXXX) on low 
competence traits for the low status group, F (2, 134) = 196.066, p < .001, 
q 2 = .740. A polynomial trend analysis revealed that there was a significant 
linear trend, F (1, 69) = 340.218, p < .001, rj 2= .831. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as hypothesized (Hi.s), mean response times were higher 
when low competence traits were preceded by the high status out-group 
prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND) (see 
Table 5.3 above). Furthermore, as predicted (H1.9), mean response times 
were higher when low competence traits were preceded by the high status 
out-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see 
Table 5.4 above). In other words, participants assigned to the low status 
group do not associate the high status out-group with low competence 
traits. However, contrary to expectations (H2.0:) that there will be no 
significant differences pairwise comparisons revealed that mean response 
times were higher when low competence traits were preceded by the low 
status in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (see Table
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5.5 above). This suggests that participants assigned to the low status group
do not associate their in-group with low competence traits.
High Status Group: High Morality/Warmth
There was a significant main effect of prime (high status in-group prime: 
FIGURE, low status out-group prime: GROUND, Neutral: XXXXXX) on high 
morality/warmth traits for the high status group, F (2, 130) = 159.962, p < 
.001, n 2 -  .711. A polynomial trend analysis revealed that there was a 
significant linear trend, F (1, 65) = 369.746, p < .001, r\ 2 -  .850. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that, as predicted (H2.1), mean response times were 
lower when high morality/warmth traits were preceded by the high status 
in-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND) (see Table 5.6 below). Furthermore, as predicted (H2.2), mean 
response times were lower when high morality/warmth traits were 
preceded by the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared to the 
neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see Table 5.7 below). In other words participants 
assigned to the high status group associate the high status in-group with 
high morality/warmth traits. Finally, no predictions were formulated 
regarding differences between the low status out-group and neutral prime. 
However, pairwise comparisons revealed that mean response times were 
lower when high morality/warmth traits were preceded by the low status 
out-group prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see 
Table 5.8 below). This suggests that participants assigned to the high status 
group also associate the low status out-group with high morality/warmth 
traits.
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Table 5.6: High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean
Response Times Comparing the High Status In-Group Prime and Low
Status Out-Group Prime.________________________________________
Stereotype
Dimension
Prime
H.S In-group 
(FIGURE)
L.S. Out-Group 
(GROUND)
High Morality/Warmth 694.53*** 778.46***
(79.75) (78.10)
Low 1043.48*** 937.79***
Morality/Warmth (105.19) (100.43)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
Table 5.7: High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean 
Response Times Comparing the High Status In-Group Prime and Neutral 
Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension H.S In-group Neutral
(FIGURE) (XXXXXX)
High Morality/Warmth 694.53*** 896.90***
(79.75) (85.31)
Low 1043.48*** 9 5 4 .4 4 ***
Morality/Warmth (105.19) (99.22)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
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Table 5.8: High Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean
Response Times Comparing the Low Status Out-Group Prime and Neutral
Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension L.S. Out-Group 
(GROUND)
Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Morality/Warmth 778.46*** 896.90***
(78.10) (75.50)
Low 937.79 954.44
Morality/Warmth (100.43) (99.23)
n 6 6 6 6
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
High Status Group: Low Morality/Warmth
There was a significant main effect of prime (high status in-group prime: 
FIGURE, low status out-group prime: GROUND, Neutral: XXXXXX) on low 
morality/warmth traits for the high status group, F (2, 130) = 26.935, p < 
.001, n 2 = .239. A polynomial trend analysis revealed that there was a 
significant linear trend, F (1, 65) = 38.935, p < .001, n 2 = .375. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that, contrary to expectations (H2.3) that there will 
be no differences, mean response times were higher when low 
morality/warmth traits were preceded by the high status in-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the low status out-group prime (GROUND) (see Table 
5.6 above). Furthermore, contrary to expectations (H2.4) that there will be 
no differences, mean response times were higher when low 
morality/warmth traits were preceded by the high status in-group prime 
(FIGURE) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see Table 5.7 above). In 
other words participants assigned to the high status group do not associate 
the high status in-group with low morality/warmth traits. No predictions 
were formulated regarding differences between the low status out-group 
prime (GROUND) and the neutral prime (XXXXXX). Pairwise comparisons
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revealed that there was no significant difference in mean response times 
for these primes (see Table 5.8 above).
Low Status Group: High Morality /Warmth
There was a significant main effect of prime (low status in-group prime: 
GROUND, low status out-group prime: FIGURE, Neutral: XXXXXX) on high 
morality/warmth traits for the low status group, F (2, 134) = , p < .001, r j 2 
= .711. A polynomial trend analysis revealed no significant linear trend, F 
(1, 69) = .015, p = .903. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, as 
hypothesized (H2.5), mean response times were lower when high 
morality/warmth traits were preceded by the low status in-group prime 
(GROUND) compared to the high status out-group prime (FIGURE) (see 
Table 5.9 below). Furthermore, as predicted (H2.6), mean response times 
were lower when high morality/warmth traits were preceded by the low 
status in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the neutral prime (XXXXXX) 
(see Table 6.0 below). This suggests that participants assigned to the low 
status group associate the low status in-group with high morality/warmth 
traits. Finally, no predictions were made regarding differences between 
the high status out-group prime (FIGURE) and the neutral prime (XXXXXX). 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that there were no differences in mean 
response times for these two primes (see Table 6.1 below).
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Table 5.9: Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean
Response Times Comparing the Low Status In-Group Prime and High
Status Out-Group Prime_____________________________________________
Stereotype Prime
Dimension L.S. In-Group 
(GROUND)
H.S Out-group 
(FIGURE)
High Morality/Warmth 867.74*** 936.50***
(106.36) (93.03)
Low 1088.71*** 970.36****
Morality/Warmth (115.73) (106.43)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
Table 6.0: Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean 
Response Times Comparing the Low Status In-Group Prime and Neutral 
Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension L.S. In-Group Neutral
(GROUND) (XXXXXX)
High Morality/Warmth 867.74*** 938.44***
(106.36) (99.48)
Low 1088.71*** 978.50***
Morality/Warmth (115.73) (104.83)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. *** = p < .001. Means are in milliseconds. 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, 
L.S = Low Status.
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Table 6.1: Low Status Group: High and Low Morality/Warmth Mean
Response Times Comparing the High Status Out-Group Prime and Neutral
Prime.
Stereotype Prime
Dimension H.S. Out-Group 
(FIGURE)
Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Morality/Warmth 936.50 938.44
(93.03) (99.48)
Low 970.36 978.50
Morality/Warmth (106.43) (104.83)
n 70 70
Note. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction were performed to 
compare means across rows. Means are in milliseconds. Standard deviations 
appear in parentheses below means. H.S = High Status, L.S = Low Status.
Low Status Group: Low Morality/Warmth
There was also a significant main effect of prime (low status in-group 
prime: GROUND, low status out-group prime: FIGURE, Neutral: XXXXXX) on 
low morality/warmth traits for the low status group, F (2, 134) = 31.288, p 
< .001, n 2-  .312. A polynomial trend analysis revealed no significant linear 
trend, F (1, 69) = .264, p = .609. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni 
method revealed that, as hypothesized (H2.7), mean response times were 
higher when low morality/warmth traits were preceded by the low status 
in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) (see Table 5.9 above). Furthermore, as predicted (H2,9>, mean 
response times were higher when low morality /warmth traits were 
preceded by the low status in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the 
neutral prime (XXXXXX) (see Table 6.0 above). This suggests that 
participants assigned to the low status group do not associate the low 
status in-group with low morality/warmth traits. Finally, no predictions 
were made regarding differences between the high status out-group prime 
(FIGURE) and the neutral prime (XXXXXX). Pairwise comparisons revealed 
there were no differences in mean response times for these two primes 
(see Table 6.1 above).
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Table 6.2 Summary of High Status Group Results
Prediction Results
High Competence 
Traits
Hi.1: lower mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to low status out-group prime (GROUND). 
Hi.2: lower mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
Prediction
supported.
Prediction
supported.
Low Competence 
Traits
Hi.3: higher mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to low status out-group prime (GROUND). 
H1,4; higher mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
Prediction
supported.
Prediction
supported.
High
Morality/Warmth
Traits
H2.i; lower mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to low status out-group prime (GROUND). 
H2.2: lower mean response times for high 
status in-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
Prediction
supported.
Prediction
supported.
Low
Morality/Warmth
Traits
H2.3; no difference in mean response times 
for high status in-group prime (FIGURE) 
compared to low status out-group prime 
(GROUND).
H2.3; no difference in mean response times 
for high status in-group prime (FIGURE) 
compared to neutral prime (XXXXXX)
Prediction not 
supported.
Prediction not 
supported.
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Table 6.3 Summary of Low Status Group Results
Prediction Results
High Competence Hi.5; lower mean response times for high Prediction
Traits status out-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to low status in-group prime (GROUND).
supported.
H^: lower mean response times for high Prediction
status out-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
supported.
H1i7: no difference in mean response Prediction not
between low status in-group prime 
(GROUND) compared to neutral prime 
(XXXXXX).
supported.
Low Competence Hi.8: higher mean response times for high Prediction
Traits status out-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to low status in-group prime (GROUND).
supported.
Hi.9: higher mean response times for high Prediction
status out-group prime (FIGURE) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
supported.
H 2.o: no difference in mean response Prediction not
between low status in-group prime 
(GROUND) compared to neutral prime 
(XXXXXX).
supported.
High H2.5; lower mean response times for low Prediction
Morality/Warmth status in-group prime (GROUND) compared supported.
Traits to high status out-group prime (FIGURE).
H2i6: lower mean response times for low Prediction
status in-group prime (GROUND) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX).
supported.
Low H2.7; higher mean response times for low Prediction
Morality/Warmth status in-group prime (GROUND) compared supported.
Traits to high status out-group prime (FIGURE).
H2.8: higher mean response times for low Prediction
status in-group prime (GROUND) compared 
to neutral prime (XXXXXX)
supported.
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An analysis of results involving main effects or interactions that were not of 
primary interest and for which no predictions were formulated can be seen 
in Appendix G.
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V.6 Summary and Discussion
Implicit Default Group Status Stereotyping
In order to provide stronger evidence for a default group status 
stereotyping mode, experiment 3 investigated whether the results of 
experiment 2  could be replicated using an implicit measure of stereotyping. 
The findings of this experiment are consistent with the findings of 
experiment 2. A detailed summary and discussion of the main findings of 
experiment 3 are presented below.
High Competence Stereotypes:
In semantic priming tasks mean response times offer estimates for the 
degree to which a group prime activates the group stereotype. The 
hypothesis that participants assigned to the high status group would be 
significantly quicker at associating the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) 
with high competence compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND) and the neutral prime was supported. Similarly, as predicted 
participants assigned to the low status group were significantly quicker at 
associating the high status out-group prime (FIGURE) with high competence 
compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND) and the neutral 
prime. Furthermore, participants assigned to the low status group were 
slower at associating the low status in-group with high competence 
compared to the neutral prime. These findings are consistent with those of 
experiment 2  and the hypothesized default group status stereotyping 
mode.
Low Competence Stereotypes:
The hypothesis that participants assigned to the high status group would be 
significantly slower at associating the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) 
with low competence compared to the low status out-group prime
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(GROUND) and the neutral prime was supported. Similarly, as predicted 
participants assigned to the low status group were significantly slower at 
associating the high status out-group prime (FIGURE) with low competence 
compared to the low status in-group prime (GROUND). These findings are 
also wholly consistent with those of experiment 2  and the hypothesized 
default group status stereotyping mode. Furthermore these findings add to 
the growing body of research which shows that low status groups often 
show out-group favouritism in favour of high status groups even when 
implicit measures are used (Dunham, Baron and Banaji, 2007, 2008). 
Furthermore, participants assigned to the low status group were slower at 
associating the low status in-group prime (GROUND) with low competence 
compared to the neutral prime. This suggests that although members of the 
low status group do not associate their in-group with high competence they 
also do not associate their in-group with low competence. This finding is 
consonant with social psychological research showing that members of low 
status groups do display in-group favouritism albeit weaker than that shown 
by members of high status groups (cf. Jost, Pelham and Carvallo, 2002).
High Morality/Warmth Stereotypes:
As predicted it was found that members of the high status group were 
quicker at associating their high status in-group prime (FIGURE) with high 
morality/warmth compared to the low status out-group prime GROUND) 
and the neutral prime. These findings are consistent with those of 
experiment 2  and suggest that high status groups do not consider 
themselves to be lacking in morality/warmth. Furthermore, as expected 
members of the low status group were quicker at associating their low 
status in-group prime with high morality/warmth compared to the high 
status out-group prime and the neutral prime. These findings are also 
consistent with the findings of experiment 2. Although previous research by 
Fiske et al. (2002) has found that low status groups are perceived as highly 
moral/warm while high status groups are perceived as immoral/cold, they 
did not consider whether such stereotypes vary depending upon whether
1 6 6
participants are rating ah in-group or an out-group. The findings of 
experiments 2 and 3 suggest members of high status and low status groups 
do not share the same stereotype of their respective groups.
Low Morality /Warmth Stereotypes:
Based on the results of experiment 2 it was predicted that there would be 
no significant difference in mean response times for low morality/warmth 
for the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) and the low status out-group 
prime (GROUND) for members of the high status group. However, contrary 
to this prediction it was found that participants assigned to the high status 
group were slower at associating the high status in-group prime (FIGURE) 
with low morality/warmth compared to the low status out-group prime 
(GROUND) and the neutral prime. In other words, they did not associate the 
high status in-group with low morality/warmth traits. This was the only 
difference between the results of experiments 2 and 3 and suggest it  might 
be fruitful for researchers to consider differences between results obtained 
using implicit versus explicit measures of stereotyping. As predicted 
members of the low status group were slower at associating low 
morality/warmth the low status in-group prime (GROUND) compared to the 
high status out-group prime (FIGURE) and the neutral prime. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of experiment 2 and previous research by Fiske 
et al. (2 0 0 2 ) showing that low status groups are perceived as highly 
moral/warm while high status groups are perceived as immoral/cold. 
Nonetheless, once again these results show that members of high and low 
status groups do not share the same stereotypes across all stereotype 
domains.
In summary, the results of this experiment support the main findings of 
experiment 2. Consonant with default group status stereotyping, the high 
status group was judged as more competent than the low status group by 
both members of the high status group and low status group. Furthermore, 
consistent with default morality/warmth stereotyping (see Chapter III),
167
members of both the high and low status groups judged their in-groups as 
highly moral/warm.
Overall, the results of this experiment provide additional support to the 
hypothesized default group stereotyping mode. These findings also 
strengthen the case that humans have evolved a sensitivity to cues of 
competence and morality/warmth and cues of group-based social status in 
their social judgements. This is the first study to show the formation of 
stereotypes based on the two dimensions of competence and 
morality/warmth in minimal groups varying in status using an implicit 
measure of stereotyping. The fact that these stereotypes can be elicited 
using an implicit measure adds additional weight to the theoretical claim 
made in Chapter II that cognitive predispositions might play a role in 
shaping the contents of social group stereotypes.
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Chapter VI -The Ideological Functions of Stereotypes Part 1: 
Do Social Status Differences Trigger Essentialist Thinking?
VI. 1 Introduction
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 have addressed the first part of the research 
question that this thesis seeks to address and explored how evolved 
cognitive predispositions may shape the contents of social group 
stereotypes. Now I shall move onto addressing the second part of the 
research question, namely, to what extent do evolved cognitive 
predispositions facilitate the ability of stereotypes to naturalise social 
status differences between groups. It was seen in Chapter I that social 
psychologists have argued that stereotypes can serve ideological functions. 
More specifically, they can, be used to justify and naturalise social status 
differences between groups (Jost and Banaji, 1994). It was also noted that 
the three approaches put forward to account for how stereotypes may 
serve ideological functions are based on a study of individual differences, 
and therefore can only explain why such stereotypes are more likely to be 
endorsed by some people more than others. Furthermore, while social 
psychologists focus on the ideological functions of stereotype contents they 
have neglected to consider the role of the conceptual structure of social 
group concepts. In Chapter II, by drawing on the Cognition and Culture 
approach, I suggested that the ability of stereotypes to function as 
ideological representations may be facilitated by the recruitment of an 
evolved cognitive predisposition, namely, psychological essentialism. 2
It was seen in Chapter I that social cognition theorists have put forward 
different theories to account for the mental representations of social 
categories. The social psychology of stereotyping literature explicitly or 
implicitly understands categories to be attribute lists, associated with 
prototype or exemplar based accounts of concepts. However, Cognition and
2 The research reported in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Professor 
Deborah Prentice at the Department of Psychology, at Princeton University while I was a 
visiting researcher there in 2008.
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Culture scholars have shown how concepts are embedded in theories as 
opposed to simply being a collection of covarying attributes (Murphy and 
Medin, 1985), and that these theories are often specific to particular 
conceptual domains (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994). In recent years there 
has been considerable interest in so-called ‘theory-based’ approaches to 
category representation. One such approach put forward by Cognition and 
Culture theorists is psychological essentialism. Medin and Ortony (1989) 
coined the term ‘psychological essentialism’ to refer to a theory of 
category representation which leads to people believing that members of a 
category share a deep underlying causal essence which confers their 
identity, and is responsible for many of their observable features, both 
perceptual and behavioural. Critical social theorists argue that essentialism 
emerges from certain philosophical and scientific traditions. In contrast, 
Cognition and Culture scholars argue that essentialism is a cognitive 
predisposition that emerges early in childhood. There is significant 
evidence showing that humans essentialise many social categories (Gil- 
White, 2001; Haslam et al., 2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Rothbart and Taylor, 
1992; Taylor, 1996). As proposed in Chapter II, psychological essentialism 
as an account of the conceptual structure of social categories may help to 
shed light on the ability of stereotypes to function as ideological 
representations. Gelman (2003) has argued that essentialism motivates and 
underpins stereotyping. Furthermore, Yzerbyt et al. (1997) have argued 
that essentialist beliefs serve to rationalize existing social divisions 
between groups as large and unalterable. Therefore, it  was argued that it 
is plausible that the ability of stereotypes to naturalise status differences 
between groups is facilitated by the recruitment of psychological 
essentialism from the domain of a Folk Sociology.
Although essentialist thinking about social categories is common, the 
specific categories that evoke this mode of representation vary across 
individuals, groups, and cultures (Astuti, Solomon, and Carey, 2004). 
According to Hirschfeld essentialism activates curiosity about the social 
world leading children (and adults) to seek out information about which
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social aggregates are salient in their cultural environment. It was argued in 
Chapter II that one of the ways in which psychological essentialism may 
facilitate the ideological functions of stereotypes is by social status 
differences triggering essentialist beliefs about associated social groups. 
Experiments 2 and 3 provided evidence that status differences trigger the 
formation of stereotypes about social groups. It is possible that social 
status differences increase the salience of a social group, and thereby 
trigger essentialist beliefs. Therefore, the present research examined the 
possibility that status differences trigger essentialist beliefs about social 
groups. There is some previous research which has explored the 
relationship between essentialist beliefs and social status. For example, 
Mahalingham (2001) found that members of a high status caste (Brahmins) 
were more likely to hold essentialist beliefs about caste group membership 
than members of the low status caste (Dalits) in India. Haslam, Rothschild 
and Ersnt (2000) have shown a correlation between social categories that 
are essentialized and their social status ratings. However, no research has 
attempted to experimentally manipulate social status. Therefore, the 
causal nature of this relationship remains unclear. Experiment 4 explored 
the causal impact of social status on essentialist beliefs about social 
groups. More specifically, it  tested the claim that encountering a 
difference between someone with high social status and someone with low 
social status who are members of different groups triggers essentialist 
beliefs about those social groups.
VI.2 Experiment Overview
This experiment was designed to investigate whether status differences 
trigger essentialist thinking about social groups. The methods used by 
Prentice and Miller (2006) and Haslam et al. (2000) were adapted for the 
purposes of the present research and therefore w ill be described in detail. 
Prentice and Miller (2006) tested the claim that cross-category differences 
are what trigger essentialist thinking. More specifically, they explored 
whether encountering a difference between a woman and a man gives rise
171
to essentialist thinking about gender categories. Participants completed a 
test purportedly designed to measure a psychological attribute: dot- 
estimation. Following the test participants were told that they were either 
over-estimators or under-estimators (this feedback was in fact 
predetermined). Finally, they completed measures of the inferences they 
made about the attribute. The test was administered under 3 different 
experimental conditions and participants learned that (a) that they were 
similar to a member of the opposite gender on a novel attribute (same- 
style condition); (b) that they were different from a member of the 
opposite gender on a novel attribute (different-style condition), or (c) just 
their own standing on a novel attribute (alone condition). Results showed 
that participants essentialized the attribute in question in the different 
style condition when they learned it  distinguished them from a member of 
the other gender but not in the other two conditions.
In the literature essentialist beliefs are described and measured in many 
different ways. Hirschfeld (1996) emphasized the element of inherence, 
discreteness, and naturalization in his studies of racial categorization. 
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) list the elements of necessary features, immutability, 
inductive potential, coherence and exclusivity. Haslam et al. (2000) 
designed a study to explore the structure of essentialist beliefs about social 
categories to find out if  these distinct conceptualizations are tapping a 
single syndrome. They asked participants to rate 40 social categories 
(including age groups, ethnic groups, gender groups) on nine elements of 
essentialism proposed by social scientists, philosophers and psychologists 
(discreteness, uniformity, informativeness, naturalness, immutability, 
stability, inherence, necessity and exclusivity). A factor analysis supported 
a two-dimensional understanding of essentialist beliefs about social 
categories. The first dimension, naturalness, encompassed judged 
naturalness, necessary characteristics, immutability, discreteness and 
stability. The second dimension, entitativity, encompassed 
informativeness, uniformity, inherence, and exclusivity. They found 
categories such as gender, ethnicity and racial groups were rated as highly
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natural, while categories such as political groups, homosexuals and 
religious groups were rated as highly entitative. They also asked 
participants to rate the categories on their evaluative status (i.e. how 
favourably this category is viewed in society) and found an interaction 
between status and essentialist beliefs. More specifically, they found that 
categories essentialised on both dimensions were especially likely to have 
low social status, for example ethnic groups and women.
Experiment 4 adapted a paradigm utilized in Prentice and Miller's (2006) 
study of gender and essentialism described above. This experiment was 
designed to investigate whether social status differences would function in 
the same way as gender - i.e. whether participants would essentialize a 
group when they learned it distinguished between members of two groups 
along status lines. Participants completed a dot-estimation test that 
purportedly measured an unfamiliar psychological attribute: their 
perceptual style. Based on this they were assigned to one of two 
perceptual style groups: over-estimators or under-estimators. After 
receiving predetermined feedback about their group membership they were 
assigned to either the high-status role of a boss or the low-status role of 
asubordinate for an upcoming task. Finally, they completed a measure of 
essentialist beliefs about their perceptual style category based on the two- 
dimensions of essentialism found by Haslam et al. (2000) as noted above. 
This test was administered under three different experimental conditions. 
In the critical condition, two participants completed the test in the same 
experimental session and learned that they were members of two different 
perceptual style groups. Subsequently one participant was assigned to the 
role of a boss and the other to the role of a subordinate. In another 
condition, participants completed the same procedure, but alone rather 
than in pairs. This condition was included to provide a baseline indication 
of people's tendency to link their status assignment to their perceptual 
style group on the basis of a single observation. In a third condition, two 
participants completed the test in the same experimental session and 
learned that they were members of the same perceptual style group. This
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condition was included to test whether cross-group differences trigger 
essentialist thinking.
VI. 3 Method
VI. 3.1 Participants
The required sample size was calculated using G*Power 3 for Mac (see Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang and Buchner, 2007). Parameters used in the estimate were 
the effect size (set to .30), type I error level (set to .05), type li error level 
(set to .80) and the number of groups (2). The sample size calculated by 
the software was 128. One hundred and thirty-eight Princeton 
undergraduates participated in this experiment in exchange for course 
credit. For the two paired conditions, participants were run in same-sex 
pairs. Seven participants were removed after failing to pass manipulation 
checks. This left 131 participants (69 females, 62 males).
VI.3.2 Materials and Procedure
Participants took part in the experiment either alone or in same-sex pairs 
of previously unacquainted individuals. Same-sex pairs were used in order 
to ensure sex as a social category varying in social status did not confound 
the results of the experiment. The experimenter introduced the research as 
‘a study of perceptual style and its correlates’ . Participants were told the 
study would take 30 minutes to complete and were given a consent form to 
read and sign.
Part 1: Perceptual Style Test
Following Prentice and Miller (2006), participants were told they are 
required to complete a test ostensibly measuring their perceptual style: a 
dot-estimation test. This test was selected because for the purposes of the 
present research, the basis on which participants are assigned to a group
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needed to be novel, evaluatively neutral, and one on which participants 
held no a priori expectations of a status difference. A perceptual styles test 
meets these conditions (see Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland, 1988; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy and Flament, 1971). Pilot testing has indicated that people do 
not view one of these styles as more positive than the other (Prentice and 
Miller, 2006).
The participants were shown a series of ten slides using a slide projector 
onto a screen (see Figure 6.0 for an example of the dot slides used and 
Figure 6.1 for the layout of the research laboratory during the experiment). 
Each slide was presented for about half a second, and participants were 
required to write down their estimate of the number of dots on each one as 
accurately as possible. After leaving the room to score responses, the 
experimenter returned to deliver the feedback. Participants were told that 
previous research has suggested that in trying to estimate the number of 
dots on a slide, which are presented too quickly to count, people are rarely 
accurate and their test results place them in one of two groups: over­
estimators (i.e. they consistently over-estimated the number of dots on the 
slides) or under-estimators (i.e. they consistently under-estimated the 
number of dots on the slides). They were also informed that research has 
shown dot-estimation reflects a consistent way of perceiving the world.
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Figure 6.0: Example of Dot-test Slide
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The test was administered under three different experimental conditions:
(1) Different Style Condition: In this condition, two participants completed 
the test in the same experimental session. The experimenter told one 
participant they were a member of the group over-estimator and the other 
participant was told they were a member of the group under-estimator. 
This is the critical condition designed to test whether status differences 
trigger essentialist thinking about associated social groups.
(2) Same Style Condition: In this condition, two participants completed the 
test in the same experimental session. The experimenter told both 
participants that they were members of the same group, i.e. that they 
were both over-estimators or that they were both under-estimators. This 
condition served as a control condition to verify that it  is indeed cross­
group status differences which trigger essentialist thinking.
(3) Alone Condition: In this condition, participants completed the same 
procedure, but alone rather than in pairs. This condition was included to 
provide a baseline indication of people’s tendency to link their status 
assignment to their perceptual style group on the basis of a single 
observation.
Status Manipulation
In the two paired conditions, one participant was informed that for an 
upcoming task he or she has been assigned to the high status role of a boss, 
and the other participant was told that he or she was assigned to the low 
status role of a subordinate. The participant assigned to the high status 
role was given a red folder containing an envelope labeled ‘boss’ which 
they were informed contained the specification of their role and the task 
instructions, while the low status participant received a blue folder with an 
envelope labeled ‘subordinate. Each of the folders also contained a 
corresponding red or blue sticker which the participant was told to place on
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their shirt for purposes of identification. This procedure was slightly 
altered for the alone condition, the participants were informed that for an 
upcoming task they would be working with another Princeton 
undergraduate and were assigned to the high or low status role in the same 
way as above. The high status participant was informed that the other 
participant was assigned to the low status role and given a blue folder and 
sticker or vice versa for the low status participant. Assignment to 
experimental condition, perceptual style group and status were determined 
at random prior to each experimental session.
The procedure for reinforcing the status assignment was adapted from a 
behavioural economics study which explored the impact of status on 
voluntary monetary contributions by Kumru and Vesterlund (2005). In 
Kumru and Vesterlund’s study after assigning participants to a high and low 
status group, high status participants were assigned to a star-group, and 
they were given a black folder with a gold star with their instructions for 
the task inside and a star ribbon to wear, while low-status participants 
were assigned to the no-star group and given a yellow folder with their 
instructions for the task and no ribbon to wear. In the present study the 
colours red and blue were used in order to reinforce the status differences 
between the participants. These colours were chosen as previous research 
has indicated that wearing the colour red as opposed to blue confers an 
advantage in many sports (see Attrill, Gresty, Hill and Barton, 2008). For 
example, Hill and Barton (2005) found when red and blue uniforms were 
randomly assigned to contestants in various sports (boxing, wrestling), the 
frequency of winners wearing red was significantly higher than those 
wearing blue. The authors concluded that wearing red might reflect an 
innate response to red as a signal of dominance.
Part 2: Dependent Measure
Following assignment to a perceptual style group and status category the 
participants completed a dependent measure of essentialist beliefs in the
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form of a survey. Participants were asked to rate their own perceptual 
style group (i.e. over-estimator or under-estimator) on eight elements 
reflecting the two dimensions of essentialism uncovered by Haslam et al. 
(2000): (1) naturalness (encompassing ‘discreteness', ‘ naturalness’ ,
‘ immutability’ , ‘stability’ ); (2) entitativity (encompassing ‘uniformity’ , 
‘ informativeness’ , ‘ inherence’ and ‘exclusivity’ ) on a 5-point scale where 1 
= strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. The element ‘necessity’ was 
excluded as in the context of the current experiment asking participants 
whether there are necessary features required to be a member of the 
group over-estimator or under-estimator was largely redundant. The items 
were written as follows:
Discreteness: “ People are either an under-estimator or they are not: those 
who are under-estimators are a distinct type of person”
Naturalness: “To what extent is being an under-estimator based on 
biological or genetic-make-up? Please circle your answer”
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Immutability: “ It is easy to change being an under-estimator: it is not a 
fixed attribute of person”
Stability: “The group under-estimator has always existed and it  is stable 
over time”
Uniformity: “ People who are under-estimators are very similar to one 
another; they have many things in common”
Informativeness: “ Knowing that a person belongs to the group under­
estimator tells us a lot about that person”
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Inherence: “ Being an under-estimator is a deeply-rooted part of a person: 
it  lies deep within the person and underlies the person's behaviour”
Exclusivity: “ Belonging to the group under-estimator excludes a person 
from belonging to other groups”
After collecting the surveys, the experimenter informed the participants 
that time had run out for the joint task. Finally, participants were asked to 
complete three manipulation check questions: (1) Which perceptual style 
group are you a member of; (2) Were you assigned to a high status or low 
status role; and (3) 'What do you think the purpose of this experiment was? 
Following the experiment the participants were fully debriefed and were 
given an opportunity to express any concerns or queries regarding the study 
with the experimenter. Participants were given a copy of the debriefing 
document and of their experiment consent form.
VI.4 Hypotheses
Essentialist Beliefs:
It was predicted that participants would hold more essentialist beliefs in 
the critical different style condition, where differences in perceptual style 
group were correlated with status assignment than in the same-style or 
alone conditions in which status and perceptual style group are 
uncorrelated.
Naturalness vs. Entitativity:
Given that no previous research has explored the causal impact of social 
status on essentialist beliefs about social groups, no predictions were made 
concerning whether any differences in essentialist beliefs between the 
experiment conditions will emerge on the naturalness dimension, the 
entitativity dimension, or both.
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VI. 5 Results
Previous research by Haslam et al. (2000) has indicated that the eight 
elements of essentialist beliefs used as a dependent measure in this study 
do not compose a unitary set. Therefore a principal components analysis 
(PCA) was conducted on the eight essentialism items using Oblimin rotation 
(Varimax). An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each 
component in the data. A two-factor solution was clearly superior as two 
components had eigenvalues over Mineigen's criterion of 1 and in 
combination explained 60% of the variance. Additional factors had 
eigenvalues < .75. Table 6.0 shows the varimax factor loadings after 
rotation.
Table 6.0: Varimax-rotated Loadings of the Essentialism Items (decimal 
omitted)______________________________________________________
1
Component
2
Discreteness 81 32
Naturalness 79 36
Immutability 81 25
Stability 69 29
Uniformity 32 74
Informativeness 21 86
Inherence 43 78
Exclusivity 55 58
% variance 46.2 13.7
The two factors revealed by the PCA correspond closely to Haslam et a l.’s
(2000) two dimensions of essentialism. The items that clustered on 
component 1 were ‘discreteness*, ‘stability*, ‘naturalness* and 
‘ immutability*. This component is identical to Haslam et al.*s naturalness 
dimension. The items that clustered on component 2 were ‘uniformity*, 
‘ informativeness* and ‘ inherence*. This component is identical to Haslam
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et a l.’s entitativity factor, except for the item exclusivity which loaded 
equally onto both components. These two components were used to 
construct two scales for essentialist beliefs: a naturalness scale and an 
entitativity scale.
The two scales (naturalness and entitativity) were analysed using separate 
2 (sex: male, female) X 3 (condition: alone, same-style, different-style) X 2 
(perceptual style group: overestimator, underestimator) X 2 (status: boss, 
subordinate) ANOVAs. One planned contrast testing the difference between 
the different style condition and the same-style and alone conditions was 
used. The naturalness scale was reliable (a = .74). The main effect of 
experimental condition was statistically significant, F (2, 119) = 2.53. p < 
.05, n 2 = 0.35. None of the other main effects or interactions reached 
statistical significance. The planned contrast revealed a statistically 
significant difference between the naturalness scores in the different style 
condition compared to the same-style and alone conditions, F (1, 119) = 
4.71, p < .05, n 2 = 0.32. As Figure 6.2 illustrates participants in the 
different style condition rated the group perceptual style significantly 
higher on the naturalness scale than participants in the same-style and 
alone conditions.
The entitativity scale was also reliable (a = .78). The main effect of 
experimental condition failed to reach statistical significance, F (2, 119) = 
0.40. p = .67. None of the other main effects or interactions reached 
statistical significance. The planned contrast revealed no significant 
differences between the entitativity scores across all experimental 
conditions, F(1, 119) = 0.26, p = 0.61.
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VI.6 Summary and Discussion
Psychological essentialism is bad metaphysics...[but] may prove to be good 
epistemology
- Douglas Medin (1989: 1476)
Psychological essentialism entails a belief that social groups have an inner 
essence that is responsible for the observable (and indeed unobservable) 
properties of group members. By combining two paradigms used to study 
essentialist beliefs about social groups, experiment 4 explored whether 
social status differences trigger essentialist beliefs about social group 
membership. More specifically, it  explored whether encountering a 
difference between someone with high social status and someone with low 
social status triggers essentialist beliefs about social groups.
The results supported the prediction that participants were more likely to 
essentialize social group membership in the different style condition where 
differences in perceptual style group assignment were correlated with the 
social status assignment (if you recall in this condition participants were 
assigned to different perceptual style groups and different status roles) as 
compared to the same-style or alone conditions where social status 
assignment and perceptual style group assignment were uncorrelated. It is 
important to remember that participants came to the experiment with no 
knowledge about perceptual styles and certainly no knowledge of a link 
between perceptual style groups and social status. Although previous 
studies have hinted at a relationship, or shown they are correlated, this is 
the first study, to my knowledge, to demonstrate the causal impact of 
social status on essentialist beliefs about social groups. This study also 
supports Prentice and Miller's (2006) claim that differences that cross 
group boundaries can trigger essentialist thinking. The fact that status 
differences trigger essentialist thinking about social groups may help to 
explain the findings of Astuti, Solomon and Carey's (2004) study of folk 
sociological knowledge among Vezo children in Madagascar. They found
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that children essentialized the contrast between Karany and Vezo group 
identities but did not essentialize the contrast between Vezo and Masikoro 
group identities. Perhaps these findings can be explained by the fact that 
whereas the former groups vary considerably in socio-economic status, the 
latter groups are both of equal status.
This experiment also sheds light upon the structure of essentialist beliefs. A 
key finding was that the eight elements of essentialist beliefs used as a 
dependent measure in this study did not compose a unitary set. Supporting 
the work of Haslam et a l. (2000) it  was found that the items constitute two 
independent dimensions. The first dimension, identical to Haslam et al. ’s 
naturalness dimension, consisted of beliefs in the discreteness, stability, 
naturalness and immutability of a social group. The second dimension, 
virtually identical to Haslam et al. ’s entitativity dimension, consisted of 
beliefs in the uniformity, informativeness, and inherence of a social group. 
The item for exclusivity of social group membership loaded equally on both 
factors and therefore was excluded from further analysis. This is the first 
study to corroborate Haslam et al. ’s findings that there are two dimensions 
of essentialist beliefs, at least for the social domain. These two dimensions 
were used to construct separate scales and it was found that social status 
only triggered beliefs about the naturalness of social groups. There were no 
differences in the entitativity scale scores across the three experimental 
conditions.
Overall, the results of this experiment suggest that people hold essentialist 
beliefs about group differences that are associated with status differences. 
This lends empirical support to the theoretical claim that psychological 
essentialism might help to account for the ability of stereotypes to 
naturalise social status differences between groups. In order to provide 
stronger evidence for this claim a follow up study is currently underway 
which explores whether people hold more essentialist beliefs about group 
differences that are associated with status differences than about group 
differences that are associated with status similarities. In this follow-up
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study participants are assigned to different perceptual style groups and are 
then assigned to equal status roles. I predict that there will be little  or no 
essentialization of social group membership in this follow-up study. Future 
research also needs to investigate what triggers beliefs in the entitativity 
of social groups. The present study also provides indirect evidence that 
people are sensitive to cues of social status and that group membership 
takes on a heightened significance if groups vary in social status.
In conclusion, the results of this study support the theoretical claim that 
social status differences lead to people naturalizing membership in 
associated social groups. It was argued in Chapter II that another potential 
way in which psychological essentialism may facilitate the essentialization 
of group-based status differences is by social status itself being construed 
as an attribute of an essentialized social group. This would, of course, 
provide stronger evidence that the naturalization of social status 
differences between groups is facilitated by the recruitment of 
psychological essentialism. This is the goal of the experiments reported in 
the next chapter.
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Chapter VII - The Ideological Functions of Stereotypes Part 2: 
An Investigation of Essentialist Beliefs about Group-based 
Social Status
VII. 1 Introduction
Psychological essentialism leads people to treat groups as homogeneous, 
mutually exclusive and unalterable and therefore appears to be one of the 
central cognitive biases underlying stereotyping (Gelman, 2003). It was 
seen in Chapter VI that groups distinguished by status are perceived to be 
more natural (although not more entitative). It was concluded that status 
differences may well trigger beliefs about the naturalness of associated 
social groups. However if, as postulated in Chapter II, the naturalization of 
status differences is facilitated by the recruitment of psychological 
essentialism from the domain of a Folk Sociology, it  is plausible that people 
also essentialise social status as an attribute of social group membership. 
Psychological essentialism as a theory of category representation leads us 
to assume a causal relationship between membership in a social group (i.e. 
its essence) and the various attributes (both perceptual and behavioural) of 
group members. It is highly plausible that the social status of a group is 
conceived of as an attribute which is causally linked to the group essence. 
Previous research has shown a correlation between social categories that 
are essentialized and their social status ratings (Haslam et al., 2000), but 
no previous research has explored whether people consider the social 
status of a social group as an essentialized attribute of an essentialized 
social group. This was the aim of experiment 5.
VI1.2 Experiment 5 Overview
Psychological essentialism is an intuitive heuristic therefore it is difficult to 
acquire direct evidence for it. Hence, in order to examine whether people 
hold essentialist beliefs about social status a thought experiment was 
designed as this research method may be more conducive to uncovering
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people's implicit mental representations, than more explicit methods such 
as surveys or interviews (Gelman, 2003). Thought experiments, employed 
for several thousands of years by philosophers, have been used successfully 
by Cognition and Culture scholars to evoke people's intuitions about various 
phenomena including social categories (see, for example, Mahlingham and 
Rodriguez, 2003; Taylor, 1996; Hirschfeld, 1996).
There were three experimental conditions, two of which contained a 
thought experiment based on a pre-existing paradigm and designed to 
provide evidence for different aspects of essentialism, and a control 
condition. One of the manifestations of essentialism is a belief that 
properties of category members are immutable and impervious to 
environmental influences (Gelman and Wellman, 1991). In order to obtain 
evidence for this the Adoption Paradigm (Hirschfeld, 1996) was adapted 
and forms the basis for the Adoption condition. In this condition, 
participants read a story about two individuals; one born to a high status 
group and the other born to a low status group who were accidently 
switched at the hospital. Another manifestation of essentialism is a belief 
in nativism; the assumption that properties of category members are the 
result of an innate potential. Therefore Mahalingham and Rodriguez's
(2001) Brain Transplant Paradigm was used as a more direct test of 
essentialist beliefs. In this condition, participants read that the brain of the 
individual born into a high status group had been switched with that of the 
individual born into the low status group. Finally, in the control condition 
participants were required to make inferences on the basis of group status 
alone. This condition also provided a baseline level of responses to ensure 
that the attributes used were ones that participants found to be 
stereotypically associated with high and low status. If participants are 
prepared to make inferences about status attributes based on group 
membership this may also provide evidence of essentialism given that one 
of its manifestations is that social groups are infused with inductive 
potential.
188
A 3 (experimental condition: adoption, transplant and control) x 2 (status 
of social $ roup: high status or low status) design was employed. 
Experimental condition was a between-subjects factor and group status was 
a within-subjects factor. In all conditions, after reading a short story 
participants completed dependent measures designed to elicit whether 
participants held essentialist beliefs about group-based social status in the 
form of a survey.
VII.3 Method
VII.3.1 Participants
The required sample size was calculated using G*Power 3 for Mac. The 
sample size calculated by the software was 133. A total of 151 participants 
of various nationalities completed the study, with 71 males and 80 
females. Sixty-two percent of the sample identified themselves as British, 
17.6% American, 9% European, 3.8% Australian, 4% Canadian and 2% 
Chinese. The remainder identified themselves as Indian, Japanese and 
Mexican (<1%).
VII.3.2 Materials and Procedure
The study appeared online as a web-based study ‘Beliefs about Social 
Status’ . Invitations to participate were posted on three online psychology 
research directories (‘Social Psychology Network’ , ‘Online Psychology 
Research UK’ and ‘Psychological Research On The Net’ ). The survey’s first 
page provided information about the general nature of the study, stating 
“You are invited to participate in an on-line study about social status. This 
study forms part of a doctoral project in Social Psychology” . Participants 
were informed that the survey would take no longer than 15 minutes to 
complete and that they would be given further instructions if they chose to 
participate. The remainder of the text related to ethical issues: potential
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benefits and risks and informed consent. After reading and signing the 
consent form participants were directed to the first page of the study.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental 
conditions: adoption, transplant, control. In each condition, participants 
read a short story about a member of a high status group (Orinthians) 
called Damorin and a member of a low status group (Ackmians) called 
Dolack (see Tables 7.0, 7.1, 7.2). In order for the status manipulation to 
work it was vital that participants did not hold any a priori associations 
between the names of the groups or characters and high or low social 
status. Hence, the names of the characters and the social groups in the 
present research were selected from a study by Hoffman and Hurst (1990) 
which explored how certain traits can become stereotypically linked to 
categories using fictional groups. Hoffman and Hurst (1990) conducted a 
pre-test to confirm that participants did not hold any pre-existing 
impressions of these groups and names.
TABLE 7.0: Story used in Adoption Condition________________________
Imagine a society in which there are 2 different groups. There is a group 
called the Orinthians and a group called the Ackmians. The Orinthians are a 
group who have high social status, while the Ackmians are a group who 
have low social status. Now suppose, a child named Damorin born into the 
high status Orinthian group was accidently switched at birth at the hospital 
with a child named Dolack born into the low status Ackmian group. So 
Damorin was brought up by Ackmians and Dolack was brought up by 
Orinthians.
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TABLE 7.1: Story used in Transplant Condition
Imagine a society in which there are 2 different groups. There is a group 
called the Orinthians and a group called the Ackmians. The Orinthians are a 
group who have high social status, while the Ackmians are a group who 
have low social status. Damorin is a member of the group Orinthians and 
Dolack is a member of the group Ackmians. Now suppose, that someone 
takes the brain of Damorin, and puts it  in the head of Dolack, and takes the 
brain of Dolack and puts it  in the head of Damorin.
TABLE 7.2: Story used in Control Condition_________________________
Imagine a society in which there are 2 different groups. There is a group 
called the Orinthians and a group called the Ackmians. The Orinthians are a 
group who have high social status, while the Ackmians are a group who 
have low social status. Damorin is a member of the group Orinthians and 
Dolack is a member of the group Ackmians.
After reading the story, participants completed dependent measures 
designed to elicit whether they held essentialist beliefs about social status, 
in the form of a survey. The perceived social status of the two characters, 
Damorin (section 1) and Dolack (section 2) were assessed with four items. 
The first item consisted of the following question: ‘do you think Dolack (or 
Damorin) has high or low social status now?', response options were as 
follows: ‘high social status', ‘ low social status, ‘other'. Participants were 
provided with a small box to explain their choice. The final three items 
derived from Fiske and Oldmeadow (2008) asked participants to rate Dolack 
and Damorin on 3 indicators of social status. The questions were as follows: 
‘How prestigious do you think the job held by Dolack is likely to be?', ‘How 
economically successful do you think Dolack is? and ‘How prestigious a car 
do you think that Dolack drives?'. Seven response options ranged from 1 = 
‘not at all' to 7 = ‘extremely'.
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At the end of the study, participants were also asked to complete four 
manipulation check questions; (1) ‘Are the Orinthians a . . /  with response 
categories ‘High status group’ , ‘Low status group’ or ‘Don’t know; (2) ‘Are 
the Ackmians a ...’ with response categories ‘High status group’ , ‘Low 
status group’ or ‘Don’t know; (3) ‘What was Dolack’s social status at birth?;
(4) ‘What was Damorin’s social status at birth?’ with response categories 
‘High social status’ and ‘Low social status.’ Clicking a ‘submit study’ button 
recorded the data and directed participants to a debriefing page.
V1L4 Results
Dependent Measure 1:
The participants’ answers were analysed by response type. For instance, 
for the high group status target character for the adoption paradigm, the 
response that Damorin (who is born into the Orinthians a high status social 
group but brought up by the Ackmians a low group status social group) is 
going to be high status as an adult was counted as a “ no change in status” 
response, because the adoption did not affect Damorin’s status. The 
response that Damorin is going to be low status was counted as a “ change 
in status” response, because the adoption did affect Damorin’s status. The 
coding for the low group status target character for the adoption paradigm 
followed a similar logic. If the target person, Dolack (who was born into the 
Ackmians but brought up by Orinthians), the response that Dolack is high 
status as an adult was counted as a “ change in status”  response because 
the adoption affected Dolack’s status. If Dolack is designated low status as 
an adult, the response was counted as a “ no change in status” response.
For the control condition, for the high group status target character the 
response that Damorin (who was born into a high status social group) has 
high status as an adult was counted as a “ no change in status” response. 
The response that Damorin has low status was counted as a “ change in 
status” response. The coding for the low group status target character for 
the control condition followed a similar logic. If the low group status target
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character, Dolack (who was born into a low status social group) the 
response that Dolack has high status as an adult was counted as a “ change 
in status” response. If Dolack was designated low status as an adult, the 
response was counted as a “ no change in status” response.
Finally, for the transplant condition, for the high group status target 
character the response that Damorin (whose brain was switched with 
Dolack born into a low status social group) has high status following the 
transplant was counted as a “ no change in status” response. The response 
that Damorin has low status was counted as a “ change in status” response. 
The coding for the low group status target character for the control 
condition followed a similar logic. If the low group status target character, 
Dolack (whose brain was switched with Damorin born into a high group 
status family) the response that Dolack has high status following the 
transplant was counted as a “ change in status” response. If Dolack was 
designated low status, the response was counted as a “ no change in status” 
response.
Chi-square analyses were run on the “ no change in status” , “ change in 
status” and “ don’t know” responses separately for the high and low status 
target characters. If participants hold essentialist beliefs about social 
status they would predict that there would be a change in status in the 
transplant condition but no change in the control and adoption conditions. 
For the high status group target character when the three patterns of 
responses were crossed with the three conditions in a chi-square analysis, 
there was a significant difference in the pattern of responses across the 
three conditions with more “ change in status” responses associated with 
the adoption condition and more “ no change in status” responses 
associated with the control and transplant conditions, X2 (4, N = 181) = 
131.614, p < .001. See Table 7.3. For the low status group target character 
when the three patterns of responses were crossed with the three 
conditions in a chi-square analysis, there was a significant difference in the 
pattern of responses across the three conditions with more “ change in
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status” responses associated with the adoption condition and more “ no 
change in status” responses associated with the control and transplant 
conditions, X2 (4, N = 181) = 161.301, p < .001. See Table 7.4. This suggests 
that participants do not essentialise group-based social status.
TABLE 7.3: Frequency of Responses for High Status Group Target 
Character by Experimental Condition______________________________
Response Type
Experimental Condition
Control Transplant Adoption
No Change 57 40 4
(96.6%) (65.6%) (6.6%)
Change 0 16 50
(.0%) (26.2%) (82.0%)
Don’t Know 2 5 7
(3.4%) (8.2%) (11.5%)
Total 59 61 61
TABLE 7.4: Frequency of Responses for Low 
Character by Experimental Condition
Status Group Target
Experimental Condition
Response Type Control Transplant Adoption
No Change 57 40 0
(96.6%) (65.6%) (.0%)
Change 0 17 52
(.0%) (27.9%) (85.2%)
Don’t Know 2 4 9
(3.4%) (6.6%) (14.8%)
Total 59 61 61
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Dependent Measure 2:
Preliminary MANOVAs revealed no significant main effect or interactions 
involving sex or nationality of participant, and thus data were pooled 
across this variable. For all subsequent analyses one-way independent 
ANOVAs were used. All comparisons among means following significant 
ANOVAS were conducted using the Gabriel test and r  was calculated as the 
effect size.
High Status Group Character Social Status Attribute Ratings:
If participants hold essentialist beliefs about social status they should rate 
the likelihood that the high status group target character has high social 
status attributes as being lower in the transplant condition compared to 
the adoption and control condition. The three items derived from Fiske and 
Oldmeadow (2008) used as status indicators formed a reliable scale (a = 
.94). A one-way AAANOVA was performed to test the main effect of 
experimental condition on the ratings of status attributes for the high 
status group character for the control, transplant and adoption conditions. 
The multivariate test of differences between groups using the Wilks’ Lamda 
criteria was statistically significant, A = 0.50, F (6, 352) = 24.530, p < .001, 
n 2 = .295. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs revealed significant main effect of 
experimental condition on the following 3 status indicators: Prestigious job 
(F (2, 178) = 72.421, p < .001, n 2= .449); economic success (F (2, 178) = 
57.138, p < .001, n 2= .391) and prestigious car (F (2, 178) = 72.266, p < 
.001, n 2 = .448). The results of post-hoc tests conducted following 
significant ANOVAs results are presented in Table 7.5. For all three status 
attributes the high group status character in the adoption condition 
received statistically significantly lower social status attribute ratings than 
the high group status character in the transplant and control conditions.
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TABLE 7.5: High Group Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings 
by Experimental Condition_______________________________________
Status Indicator
Experimental Condition
Control Transplant Adoption
Prestigious job 5.66a 4.90a 3.05b
(.863) (1.480) (1.642)
Economic success 5.64a 5.07a 3.25b
(.943) (1.548) (1.287)
Prestigious car 5.51a 5.15a 2.82b
(1.006) (1.504) (1.432)
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = not all, 7 = extremely). 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Means in the same 
row that do not share sub-scripts significantly differ at p < .05 in the 
Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
Low Group Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings:
If participants hold essentialist beliefs about social status they should rate 
the likelihood that the low group status target character has high social 
status attributes as being higher in the transplant condition compared to 
the adoption and control condition.
The three items derived from Fiske and Oldmeadow (2008) used as status 
indicators formed a reliable scale (a = .97). A one-way MANOVA was 
performed to test the main effect of experimental condition on the ratings 
of status attributes for the low status character for the control, transplant 
and adoption conditions. The multivariate test of differences between 
groups using the Wilks' Lamda criteria was statistically significant, A -  
0.53, F (6, 352) = 21.955, p < .001, rj 2= .271. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs 
revealed significant main effect of experimental condition on the following 
three status indicators: Prestigious job (F (2, 178) = 56.205, p < .001, n 2 =
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.387); economic success (F (2, 178) = 50.506, p < .001, ij 2 = .362) and 
prestisious car (F (2, 178) = 72.525, p < .001, r\ 2 = .449). The results of 
post-hoc tests conducted following significant ANOVAs results are presented 
in Table 7.6. Of the three status attributes the low group status character 
in the adoption condition received statistically significantly higher social 
status attribute ratings than the low group status character in the control 
and transplant condition.
TABLE 7.6: Low Group Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings 
by Experimental Condition_______________________________________
Status Indicator
Experimental Condition
Control Transplant Adoption
Prestigious job 2.80a 3.56a 5.25b
(.924) (1.587) (1.287)
Economic success 3.02a 3.46a 5.30b
(.938) (1.618) (1.308)
Prestigious car 2.66a 3.26a 5.39b
(.921) (1.515) (1.718)
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = not all, 7 = extremely). 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Means in the same 
row that do not share sub-scripts significantly differ at p < .05 in the 
Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
Justifications fo r Damorin’s Status: AH Conditions
Participants were given the opportunity to justify their status judgments. In 
almost all cases they did so (see Appendix H). A content analysis was 
performed on these justifications. Justifications were coded according to 
the coding framework shown in Table 7.7. Essentialist justifications were 
those that mentioned status being fixed, innate, having an essence, located 
in the brain etc. Nurture justifications were those responses that
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mentioned upbringing or environment as determining social status. Group 
status justifications were those that mentioned group social status as a 
sufficient explanation. Group justifications were those that mentioned 
membership in a group as a sufficient explanation. Individual intrinsic 
justifications were those where the participants denied that status is the 
result of one's upbringing or membership in a group. All other justifications 
were coded as Other.
Table 7.7: Criteria for Coding Justifications
Code Criteria
Essentialist Invoke ideas about status being fixed, innate, the result 
of an inner essence ("social status is inherited” )
Nurture Invoke upbringing or social environment as determining 
social status (e.g. “ status is a product of your 
environment” )
Group Status Refer to group status as a sufficient explanation for the 
status of the character (e.g. “ Damorin is a member of 
the Orinthians who have high social status” )
Group Refer to membership in a group as sufficient explanation 
for the status of the character (e.g. Damorin is an 
Orinthian)
Individual Deny that social status is acquired through inheritance,
Intrinsic upbringing or membership in a group (e.g. “ just because 
someone is a member of a high status group doesn’t 
mean they have high status” )
Other All other justifications
Note. Coding criteria adapted from Astuti et al., 2004.
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There were a total of 140 justifications across experimental conditions. In 
the control condition, Group Status justifications were the most common, 
accounting for 76.3% of all justifications, followed by Group justifications, 
accounting for 11.9% of the total. Essentialist justifications were the next 
most common, accounting for 3%, followed by 2% Individual Intrinsic and 2% 
Other justifications. None of the participants provided Nurture 
justifications. In the transplant condition, Essentialist justifications were 
the most common, accounting for 41.4% of all justifications, followed by 
Other justifications, accounting for 29.3% of the total. Group status 
justifications were the next most common, accounting for 20.7%, followed 
by 5.2% Group justifications, 1.7% Nurture justifications and 1% Individual 
Intrinsic justifications. In the adoption condition, Nurture justifications 
were the most common, accounting for 60% of all justifications, followed 
by Group justifications, accounting for 11.6% of the total. Group status 
justifications were the next most common, accounting for 10%, followed by 
8.3% Other justifications, 5% Essentialist justifications and 5% Individual 
Intrinsic justifications.
Justifications fo r Dolack’s Status: All Conditions
There were a total of 125 justifications across experimental conditions. In 
the control condition, Group Status justifications were the most common, 
accounting for 81.1% of all justifications, followed by Group justifications, 
accounting for 9.4% of the total. Essentialist justifications were the next 
most common, accounting for 7.5%, followed by 3.8% Nurture and 3.8% 
Other justifications. None of the participants provided Individual Intrinsic 
justifications. In the transplant condition, Essentialist justifications were 
the most common, accounting for 45% of all justifications, followed by 
Other justifications, accounting for 26.6% of the total. Group status 
justifications were the next most common, accounting for 11.6%, followed 
by 8 .3% Group justifications, 6.6% Nurture justifications and 1.6% Individual 
Intrinsic justifications. In the adoption condition, Nurture justifications 
were the most common, accounting for 71.7% of all justifications, followed
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by Group justifications, accounting for 8.3% of the total. Group status 
justifications were the next most common, accounting for 5%, followed by 
6.6% Other justifications, 3.3% Essentialist justifications and 5% Individual 
Intrinsic justifications.
VII.5 Summary and Discussion
By combining two thought experiment paradigms, this study explored 
whether psychological essentialism as a mode of category 
representation applies to human mental representations of group 
status. As this was an exploratory study, and the first experimental 
study to investigate the essentialism of group-based social status no 
ad hoc hypotheses were formulated. My analysis of the experiment 
results appear to suggest that people do not hold essentialist beliefs 
about group-based social status. For instance, the results from the 
first dependent measure showed that participants predicted that 
following a brain transplant from a member of a low status group, 
there was less likely to be a change in the social status of a member 
of a high status group, as compared to member of a high status 
group brought up by members of a low status group (adoption 
condition), or someone born into and brought up by members of a 
high status group (control condition). Similarly, participants 
predicted that following a brain transplant from a member of a high 
status group, there was less likely to be a change in the status of a 
member of a low status group than if they were brought up by 
members of a high status group (adoption condition), or someone 
born into and brought up by members of a low status group (control 
condition).
There was further support for the lack of essentialist beliefs about 
group-based social status from the results from the second 
dependent measure. Participants rated the likelihood of a member 
of the high status group possessing indicators of high status as
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greater in the control condition than in both the transplant and 
adoption conditions. While, participants rated the likelihood of a 
member of a low status group possessing indicators of high status as 
higher in the adoption condition than in the transplant and control 
conditions. These results appear to suggest that people do not view 
a group's social status as being innate or having a biological basis in 
the brain, but rather social status is perceived as open to and 
strongly influenced by environmental factors.
At first glance the results of experiment 5 show that humans do not 
essentialise group-based social status. However, an analysis of 
participants' justifications for their responses in the brain transplant 
paradigm suggest that many participants did not perceive the brain 
to be central to social status. For example, participant 24 states ‘by 
changing brains some things would change but not their social 
status'. Similarly, participant 2 claimed ‘Although Dolack has a 
different brain, Dolack is still an Ackmian.' As the analysis of 
participants' qualitative responses for the brain transplant paradigm 
revealed participants did not always give justifications that were 
consistent with the reasoning implicit in their judgment. In many 
cases participants gave essentialist justifications for a no-change in 
status judgment as opposed to a nurture justification. For instance, 
participant 100 said ‘because once high social status is obtained it is 
retained and doesn't change.' Another participant (33) claimed that 
‘the brain is not the essence of a person, Damorin still has the same 
soul and therefore is still an Orinthian.' In fact 41.4% of the 
justifications for the high status group character Damorin and 45% of 
the justifications for the low status group character Dolack were 
classified as essentialist. In their articulation of psychological 
essentialism, Medin and Ortony (1989) argue that essentialism is a 
placeholder notion, i.e., people do not necessarily know what the 
essence of a particular natural or social category is. A direct 
implication of this for the brain transplant paradigm used in this
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experiment is that it  is plausible that the participants do essentialise 
group status but they do not perceive the brain to be central to the 
identity of a group nor to the attributes of a group including the 
group's status.
Furthermore, in his study of essentialist beliefs about caste groups in 
India, Mahalingham (2001) coded a no change in caste related 
behaviour following a brain transplant from a high or low caste 
individual as an indication of essentialist beliefs, and a change in 
caste related behaviour as lack of evidence for essentialist beliefs. 
The reverse coding criteria was used in the present experiment (i.e. 
change in status following a brain transplant was counted as 
evidence for essentialism of group status and lack of change was 
counted as lack of evidence for essentialism) in keeping with 
previous essentialism studies in which a change in identity of a 
category member following a removal or exchange of internal parts 
(i.e. blood, bones, organs etc) was counted as evidence for 
essentialism, while a change in identity of a category member 
following a removal or exchange of external parts (i.e. fur, skin etc) 
is counted as lack of evidence for essentialism (cf. Keil, 1989; 
Gelman and Wellman, 1991).
Overall, given that the brain transplant paradigm may not provide a 
good test of essentialist beliefs, I was cautious in concluding from a 
single study that people do not essentialise group-based social 
status. Therefore, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the 
brain transplant paradigm, experiment 6  re-examines essentialist 
beliefs about group-based social status by using two alternative 
thought experiment paradigms.
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VI1.6 Experiment 6 Overview
At first glance, the results of experiment 5 suggest that people do not hold 
essentialist beliefs about group-based social status. However, an 
examination of the justifications for the responses to the brain transplant 
paradigm suggest that many participants did not perceive the brain to be 
central to group or status identity. Therefore, to investigate this possibility 
and overcome the shortcomings of using the brain transplant paradigm, a 
follow-up experiment re-examines essentialist beliefs about group-based 
social status using two alternative paradigms.
There were two experimental conditions, each based on a different thought 
experiment. Soul and personality exchanges were selected as there is 
evidence from previous research that they are part of people’s folk beliefs 
about identity. For instance, in a study exploring whether American 
children differentiate the soul from the brain, Richert and Harris (2006) 
found 6 - 1 2  year old children believed the brain changes and grows while 
they believed the soul is something which remains constant. Haslam, 
Bastian and Bissett (2004) found evidence for essentialist beliefs about 
personality characteristics. In the soul exchange condition a paradigm used 
by Johnson and Wellman (1982) and Richert and Harris (2006) was adapted. 
In this condition, participants read a story about two individuals; Damorin 
(born to the high status Orinthians group) and Dolack (born to the low 
status Ackmians group). They were told to imagine someone switched 
Damorin’s soul with Dolack’s soul. In the personality exchange condition 
participants read a story about two individuals; Damorin (born to the high 
status Orinthians group) and Dolack (born to the low status Ackmians 
group). They were told to imagine someone switched Damorin’s personality 
with Dolack’s personality.
A 2 (experimental condition: soul exchange, personality exchange) x 2 
(status o f social group: high status or low status) design was employed. 
Experimental condition was a between-subjects factor and group status was
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a within subjects factor. In all conditions, after reading one of the two 
stories, participants completed the same dependent measures used in 
experiment 5 designed to elicit whether participants hold essentialist 
beliefs about group-based social status in the form of a survey.
VII. 7 Method
VII. 7.1 Participants
The required sample size was calculated using G*Power 3 for Mac. The 
sample size calculated by the software was 102. A total of 121 participants 
of various nationalities completed the study, with 52 males and 69 females. 
Fifty-eight percent of the sample identified themselves as British, 20% 
American, 12% European, 5% Australian, 2% Canadian, 2% Chinese. The 
remainder identified themselves as Indian, Cuban, Japanese and Pakistani 
(<1%).
VII.7.2 Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were virtually identical to those used in 
experiment 5 (see above). The study appeared online as a web-based study 
‘Social Thought Experiment’ . Invitations to participate were posted on 
three online psychology research directories (‘Social Psychology Network’ , 
‘Online Psychology Research UK’ and ‘Psychological Research On The Net’ ). 
After reading and signing the consent form participants were directed to 
the first page of the study.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions: soul exchange, personality exchange. In each condition, 
participants read a short story about a member of a high status group 
(Orinthians) called Damorin and a member of a low status group (Ackmians) 
called Dolack (see Tables 7.8 and 7.9). After reading the story participants 
completed the same dependent measures used in experiment 5.
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TABLE 7.8: Story used in Soul Exchange Condition
Imagine a society in which there are 2 different groups. There is a group 
called the Orinthians and a group called the Ackmians. The Orinthians are a 
group who have high social status, while the Ackmians are a group who 
have low social status. Damorin is a member of the group Orinthians and 
Dolack is a member of the group Ackmians. Now suppose, that someone 
takes Damorin’s soul and replaces it with Dolack’s soul and takes Dolack’s 
soul and replaces it with Damorin’s soul.
TABLE 7.9: Story used in Personality Exchange Condition
Imagine a society in which there are 2 different groups. There is a group 
called the Orinthians and a group called the Ackmians. The Orinthians are a 
group who have high social status, while the Ackmians are a group who 
have low social status. Damorin is a member of the group Orinthians and 
Dolack is a member of the group Ackmians. Now suppose, that someone 
switches Damorin’s personality with Dolack’s personality.
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VII.8 Results
Dependent Measure 1:
The participants' answers were analysed by response type. For the soul 
exchange condition, for the high status social group target character the 
response that Damorin (whose soul was switched with Dolack born into a 
low status social group) has high status following the exchange was counted 
as a “ no change in status” response. The response that Damorin has low 
status was counted as a “ change in status”  response. The coding for the 
low status group target character for the control condition followed a 
similar logic. If the low status group target character, Dolack (whose soul 
was switched with Damorin born into a high status social group) the 
response that Dolack has high status following the exchange was counted as 
a “ change in status”  response. If Dolack was designated low status, the 
response was counted as a “ no change in status” response.
Similarly, for the personality exchange condition, for the high status social 
group target character the response that Damorin (whose personality was 
switched with Dolack born into a low status social group) has high status 
following the exchange was counted as a “ no change in status”  response. 
The response that Damorin has low status was counted as a “ change in 
status” response. The coding for the low group status target character for 
the control condition followed a similar logic. If the low status group target 
character, Dolack (whose personality was switched with Damorin born into 
a high status social group) the response that Dolack has high status 
following the exchange was counted as a “ change in status” response. If 
Dolack was designated low status, the response was counted as a “ no 
change in status” response.
Chi-square analyses were run on the “ no change in status” , “ change in 
status” and “ don’t know” responses separately for the high and low status 
target characters. For the high status group target character when the 
three patterns of responses were crossed with the two conditions in a chi-
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square analysis, there was a significant difference in the pattern of 
responses across the two conditions with more “change in status” responses 
associated with the soul exchange condition and more “ no change in 
status” responses associated with the personality exchange condition, X2 
(2, N = 121) = 34.828, p < .001. For the low status group target character 
when the three patterns of responses were crossed with the two conditions 
in a chi-square analysis, there was a significant difference in the pattern of 
responses across the three conditions with more “ change in status” 
responses associated with the soul exchange condition and more “ no 
change in status” responses associated with the personality exchange 
condition, X2 (2, N = 121) = 29.002, p < .001. See Tables 7.10 and 7.11. This 
suggests that participants do essentialise group-based social status as an 
attribute of a group, and that they believe the soul constitutes the essence 
of a group.
TABLE 7.10: Frequency of Responses for High Group Status Target 
Character by Experimental Condition______________________________
Response Type
Experimental Condition
Soul Exchange Personality Exchange
No Change 14 44
(23.0%) (73.3%)
Change 43 1 2
(70.5%) (2 0 .0 %)
Don't Know 4 4
(6 .6 %) (6.7%)
Total 61 60
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TABLE 7.11: Frequency of Responses for Low Group Status Target 
Character by Experimental Condition______________________________
Response Type
Experimental Condition
Soul Exchange Personality Exchange
No Change 14 42
(23.0%) (70.0%)
Change 45 16
(73.8%) (26.7%)
Don’t Know 2 2
(3.3%) (3.3%)
Total 61 60
Dependent Measure 2:
Preliminary AAANOVAs revealed no significant main effects or interactions 
involving sex or nationality of participant, and thus data were pooled 
across this variable. For all subsequent analyses one-way independent 
ANOVAs were used. All comparisons among means following significant 
ANOVAS, independent sample t-tests were conducted and r  was calculated 
as the effect size.
High Group Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings:
The three items derived from Fiske and Oldmeadow (2008) used as status 
indicators formed a reliable scale (a = .97). A one-way MANOVA was 
performed to test the main effect of experimental condition on the ratings 
of status attributes for the high status character for the soul exchange and 
personality exchange conditions. The multivariate test of differences 
between groups using the Wilks' Lamda criteria was statistically significant, 
A -  0.72, F (3, 117) = 15.011, p < .001, n 2 = .278. Follow-up one-way 
ANOVAs revealed significant main effect of experimental condition on the 
following 3 status indicators: Prestigious job (F (1, 119) = 38.264, p < .001, 
n 2= .243); economic success (F (1, 119) = 44.834, p < .001, n 2 = .274) and 
prestigious car (F (1, 119) = 32.961, p < .001, n 2= .217). An independent^
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samples t-test revealed statistically significant differences between the 
two experimental condition for all three status indicators: Prestigious job , 
t (119) = 6.186, p < .001, r  = 0.49; economic success, t (119) = 6.696, p < 
.001, r  = 0.52 and prestigious carf t (119) = 5.741, p < .001, r  = 0.47. The 
means are presented in Table 7.12. For all three status attributes the high 
group status character in the soul exchange condition received statistically 
significantly lower social status attribute ratings than the high group status 
character in the personality exchange condition.
TABLE 7.12: High Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings by 
Experimental Condition__________________________________________
Status Indicator
Experimental Condition
Soul Exchange Personality Exchange
Prestigious job 3.56a 5.57b
(1.962) (1.588)
Economic success 3.38a 5.60b
(1.942) (1.699)
Prestigious car 3.44a 5.33b
(2.054) (1.526)
Total 61 60
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = not all, 7 = extremely). 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Means in the same 
row that do not share sub-scripts significantly differ at p < .05 in the 
Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
Low Group Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings:
The three items derived from Fiske and Oldmeadow (2008) used as status 
indicators formed a reliable scale (a = .99). A one-way AAANOVA was 
performed to test the main effect of experimental condition on the ratings 
of status attributes for the low status character for the soul exchange and 
personality exchange conditions. The multivariate test of differences 
between groups using the Wilks’ Lamda criteria was statistically significant, 
A = 0.77, F (3, 117) = 11.734, p < .001, n 2= .231. Follow-up one-way 
ANOVAs revealed significant main effect of experimental condition on the
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following three status indicators: Prestigious job (F (1, 119) = 35.126, p < 
.001, n 2= .228); economic success (F (1, 119) = 34.215, p < .001, n 2= .209) 
and prestigious car (F (1, 119) = 31.537, p < .001, n 2 = .223). An 
independent-samples t-test revealed statistically significant differences 
between the two experimental condition for all three status indicators: 
Prestigious job , t (119) = 5.927, p < .001, r  = 0.48; economic success, t 
(119) = 5.849, p < .001, r  = 0.47 and prestigious car, t (119) = 5.616, p < 
.001, r  = 0.46.
The means are presented in Table 7.13. Of the three status attributes the 
low group status character in the soul exchange condition received 
statistically significantly higher social status attribute ratings than the low 
group status character in the personality exchange condition.
TABLE 7.13: Low Status Character Social Status Attribute Ratings by 
Experimental Condition
Status Indicator
Experimental Condition
Soul Exchange Personality Exchange
Prestigious job 5.25a 2.95b
(2.055) (2.205)
Economic success 5.30a 3.07b
(2.076) (2.114)
Prestigious car 5.20a 3.12b
(2.076) (2.051)
Tota l' 61 60
Note. Ratings were made on 7 point scales (1 = not all, 7 = extremely). 
Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Means in the same 
row that do not share sub-scripts significantly differ at p < .05 in the 
Gabriel test of pairwise differences.
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Justifications fo r Damorin’s Status: All Conditions
Justifications were coded according to the criteria shown in Table 7.7 
above (see Appendix I). Essentialist justifications were those that 
mentioned status being fixed, innate, having an essence, located in the 
brain etc. Nurture justifications were those responses that mentioned 
upbringing or environment as determining social status. Group status 
justifications were those that mentioned group social status as a sufficient 
explanation. Group justifications were those that mentioned membership 
in a group as a sufficient explanation. Individual intrinsic justifications 
were those where the participants denied that status is the result of one's 
upbringing or membership in a group. All other justifications were coded as 
Other.
There were a total of 100 justifications across experimental conditions. In 
the soul exchange condition, Essentialist justifications were the most 
common, accounting for 68.3% of all justifications, followed by Group 
justifications, accounting for 21.2% of the total. Group status justifications 
were the next most common, accounting for 5%, followed 3% Nurture 
justifications and 2.5% Individual Intrinsic justifications. In the personality 
exchange condition, Group status justifications were the most common, 
accounting for 41.2% of all justifications, followed by Essentialist 
justifications, accounting for 23.2% of the total. Group justifications were 
the next most common, accounting for 18.6%, followed by 10% Other 
justifications, 5% Nurture justifications and 2% Individual Intrinsic 
justifications.
Justifications fo r Dolack’s Status: All Conditions
There were a total of 85 justifications across experimental conditions. In 
the soul exchange condition, Essentialist justifications were the most 
common, accounting for 70% of all justifications, followed by Other 
justifications, accounting for 18.2% of the total. Group status justifications
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were the next most common, accounting for 4.2%, followed 3.5% Group 
status justifications, 3.1% Nurture justifications and 1% Individual Intrinsic 
justifications. In the personality exchange condition, Group status 
justifications were the most common, accounting for 45.2% of all 
justifications, followed by Essentialist justifications, accounting for 25.4% 
of the total. Group justifications were the next most common, accounting 
for 18.2%, followed by 18% Other justifications, 2.2% Nurture justifications 
and 1% Individual Intrinsic justifications.
VII.9 Summary and Discussion
Experiment 6  examined essentialist beliefs about group-based social status 
by using two thought experiment paradigms: personality exchange and soul 
exchange. The results of this experiment suggest that people do hold 
essentialist beliefs about group membership and about group-based social 
status. Furthermore, they believe that the essence of a group resides in the 
soul of members of a social group. For instance, the results from the first 
dependent measure showed that participants predicted that following a 
soul exchange from a member of a low status group, the member of the 
high status group would lose their high status and gain the status of the 
member of the low status group. In comparison, very few participants 
predicted a change in social status following an exchange of personalities 
between a member of a high status group and a member of a low status 
group. These findings are corroborated by participants' qualitative 
responses; 68.3% of participants in the soul exchange condition provided 
essentialist justifications compared to 23.2% in the personality exchange 
condition.
There was further support for essentialist beliefs about group-based social 
status in the soul exchange paradigm from the results of the second 
dependent measure. Participants rated the likelihood of the member of the 
low status group possessing indicators of high status as high following a soul 
exchange with member of a high status group. Conversely, participants
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rated the likelihood of the member of the high status group possessing 
indicators of high status as low following the soul exchange. In the 
personality exchange condition, participants rated the likelihood of the 
member of the low status group possessing indicators of high status as low 
and the likelihood of the member of the high status group possessing such 
indicators as high following an exchange of personalities. In other words, 
participants did not believe that exchanging personalities would lead to a 
change in group-based social status.
This experiment highlights the need for future research exploring 
essentialist beliefs to adopt more than one experimental paradigm. The 
fact that participants believe the soul as opposed to a more tangible 
biological entity such as the brain constitutes the essence of a group is a 
reminder that essentialist beliefs need not be biological and, even if they 
are biological, that we may not have a firm grasp on what common sense 
takes to be biological - it  could as easily be blood, the soul, as genes. 
Indeed assuming that essences map onto genes or the brain may be 
imposing a scientific structure on a commonsense that is in reality more 
intangible. Hence, the causal theory that underpins psychological 
essentialism need not be biological but simply naturalistic (Prentice and 
Miller, 2007).
In light of this it  is useful to re-consider the findings from the adoption 
condition in experiment 5 above. This experiment appears to show that 
people do not essentialise group status as they believe a member of a high 
status group brought up by members of a low status group would drop down 
the ranks and vice versa. However, it  could be argued that a truly non- 
essentialist representation of group status would deny that an individual's 
status can be determined by the status of a group they belong to, or indeed 
be determined by a change in the brain, soul or environment as 
represented by the individual intrinsic code for participants' qualitative 
justifications for their responses. However, there was very little  evidence 
in either of these experiments of participants providing such a justification.
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For example, no more than 5% of the justifications across all experimental 
conditions in both experiments were coded as ‘individual intrinsic.’ 
Furthermore, it could be argued that psychological essentialism as a theory 
of category representation leads people to believe there is a causal 
mechanism or essence linking a category with its attributes and nothing 
precludes this causal mechanism from being environmental. In other words, 
the essence could reside in the environment. Indeed, as the anthropologist 
Ann Stoler’s extensive work analysing the Dutch archives of Colonial 
Indonesia shows colonial masters were worried whites would become 
Javanese if  they were exposed to Javanese culture for too long (Stoler, 
1995).
A final methodological issue that needs to be addressed concerns the use of 
thought experiments as a way of uncovering essentialist representations. 
There is some evidence to suggest certain participants over-interpreted the 
task, for instance participant 1 2  mentioned that a brain transplant is not 
possible. Psychological essentialism is an intuitive heuristic and therefore 
perhaps there is a need for future research to utilise a more sensitive 
measure of essentialism. One possibility is using a more implicit measure 
such as measuring response times.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that psychological 
essentialism as a mode of category representation is applied to group-based 
social status. Indeed, this is the first study to provide direct evidence for 
this. The findings of this experiment lend empirical support to the 
theoretical claim that the ability of stereotypes to help naturalise social 
status differences between groups may be facilitated by the recruitment of 
psychological essentialism from a Folk Sociology. Not only do status 
differences trigger beliefs about the naturalness of associated social groups 
as found in experiment 4 (see Chapter VI), but as these results show the 
group’s status itself is construed as being part of this essence. Finally, 
given that psychological essentialism is the cognitive predisposition 
underpinning our representations of social groups, and given that
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stereotypes are about social groups, I would argue that it  is not stereotypes 
in and of themselves that naturalise social status differences between 
groups but rather the conceptual underpinnings of stereotypes. The 
research presented here illustrates how research on conceptual structure 
can help to shed light on stereotypes and that these two areas of 
investigation are complementary. This w ill be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter.
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Chapter VIII - Stereotypes: Made to Stick? Discussion and 
Implications
Rarely is the mind a blank slate on which a fresh stereotype can be 
inscribed.Jts surface is marked with many well-known grooves that make 
certain stereotypes more likely to appear
- McGarty, Yzerbyt and Spears (2002:3)
VIII.1 Summary
The study of stereotypes is one of the oldest and central subjects of 
investigation in social psychology. A review of the social psychology of 
stereotyping literature in Chapter I highlighted how stereotypes have been, 
broadly speaking, studied using two different approaches. It was seen that 
early research adopted a descriptive approach which focused on the 
contents of stereotypes, and how they are shaped by the social context. 
Later, following the cognitive revolution, the social cognition approach 
came to predominate. This approach focuses on the cognitive processes 
underpinning stereotyping, and the nature of the cognitive structure of 
social group concepts. Finally, it  was noted that in recent years there has 
been a revival of interest in the contents of stereotypes, and specifically 
the ideological functions of stereotype contents, i.e. how stereotypes can 
naturalise group-based status inequalities. However, as noted in Chapter I, 
these approaches only offer a partial account of stereotypes and what has 
been missing is a conceptual framework which allows for an integrated 
study of both the contents of stereotypes and the cognitive 
processes/structures underpinning stereotyping.
In this thesis, in an attempt to fill this theoretical and empirical gap, I have 
argued that the ‘Cognition and Culture' approach is best suited to facilitate 
an integration of the study of the contents of stereotypes and the cognitive 
processes/structures underpinning them. The Cognition and Culture 
approach takes as its starting point a view of the mind as comprising a set
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of domain-specific cognitive competences, each of which predisposes 
humans to particular kinds of conceptual representations (with particular 
structures and contents). In order to become stabilized within a cultural 
population, cultural representations need to trigger or exploit these 
domain-specific competences. Therefore, in some domains, domain- 
specific competences strongly influence the contents and structure of 
cultural representations. Applying this approach to social group 
stereotypes, I argued that evolved cognitive predispositions which are a 
part of a domain-specific competence underpinning social group cognition, 
a Folk Sociology, may influence the contents and functions of stereotypes. 
More specifically, it  was argued that as stereotypes fall under the domain 
of a Folk Sociology, cognitive predispositions which are a part of a Folk 
Sociology place a strong constraint on the contents and structure of 
representations of social groups, including stereotypes. In other words, a 
Folk Sociology provides the ‘well-known grooves' which make certain 
stereotypes easier to think, communicate, and ultimately achieve cultural 
success i.e. to stick. Hence, the central question addressed in this thesis 
was ‘to what extent and in what ways do evolved cognitive predispositions 
shape the contents of stereotypes and facilitate the naturalization of status 
differences between groups?'
To provide empirical support for this theoretical framework, six 
experiments were conducted utilizing measures adapted from social 
psychology and cognitive psychology; three experiments explored how 
cognitive predispositions may shape the contents of social group 
stereotypes, and three experiments explored how cognitive predispositions 
may facilitate the naturalization of status differences between social 
groups. The first three experiments investigated whether cognitive 
predispositions shape the contents of social group stereotypes by adapting 
the Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) and a research paradigm from the 
Stereotype Content Model (SCM). The MGP paradigm was originally 
designed to explore whether there is a cognitive component to prejudice, 
beyond any economic, political or historical factor (cf. Crisp, 2006). The
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MGP was judged to be optimal for exploring whether cognitive factors 
shape stereotype content given that minimal groups represent the most 
basic form of social categorization, and unlike ‘ real world' social groups 
(for example, ‘ race', gender etc) participants did not have preconceived 
views about these groups prior to the experiments. The first experiment 
was designed to investigate whether humans have evolved a default 
stereotyping mode based on two dimensions found to capture social group 
stereotypes universally: competence and morality/warmth. The results of 
this experiment supported this prediction as participants rated members of 
their own group as being competent and moral/warm. However, 
experiment 1 did not allow us to shed light upon what leads to the 
formation of stereotypic judgments concerning the competence and 
morality/warmth of the out-group, given that the ratings were neutral. The 
SCM suggests that such an understanding comes from a consideration of the 
structure of inter-group relations, for example status differentials. It was 
argued in Chapter II that sensitivity to inter-group status differentials may 
also be strongly motivated by evolved cognitive predispositions which are a 
part of a Folk Sociology. The second experiment was designed to test for a 
default group status stereotyping mode leading people to assume that 
members of high status groups are competent and possibly immoral/cold, 
and members of low status groups are incompetent, and possibly 
moral/warm. Consistent with this hypothesized default group status 
stereotyping mode, it  was found that members of both the high status and 
low groups rated the high status group as competent and the low status 
group as incompetent. Furthermore, as predicted, members of the low 
status group rated their low status in-group more positively than the high 
status out-group on both the high and low morality/warmth dimensions. 
Although, contrary to expectations, members of the high status group rated 
their in-group more positively on the high morality/warmth dimension than 
the low status out-group. For the low morality/warmth dimension there 
were no significant differences between the high status in-group and low 
status-out group ratings.
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While the first two experiments utilised an explicit measure of 
stereotyping, in order to rule out the possibility that these results are due 
to demand characteristics or experimenter effects, a third experiment was 
conducted which made use of an implicit measure of stereotyping. 
Experiment 3 used the same experimental paradigm as experiment 2 but 
instead of using explicit dependent measures of stereotyping, participants 
completed a semantic priming task in which the two group names were 
used as primes. Experiment 3 replicated the main findings of experiment 2; 
it  was found that members of both the high status and low status group 
were quicker at identifying traits denoting high competence and slower at 
identifying traits denoting low competence when primed by the high status 
group name as compared to the low status group name. Furthermore, it 
was found that members of both the high and low status groups were 
quicker at identifying high morality/warmth traits, and slower at 
identifying low morality/warmth traits when primed by their respective in­
groups. These are the first experiments, to my knowledge, to provide 
evidence for stereotypes based on the dimensions competence and 
morality/warmth in minimal groups.
Social psychologists have focused on the ideological functions of the 
contents of stereotypes, and have neglected the potential role of cognitive 
structures in supporting these functions. The final three experiments 
explored whether the ability of stereotypes to function as ideological 
representations is facilitated by the recruitment of an evolved cognitive 
predisposition arising from the domain of a Folk Sociology, psychological 
essentialism. Experiment 4 examined the possibility that status differences 
trigger essentialist beliefs about social groups. This experiment adapted a 
paradigm utilized in Prentice and Miller’s (2006) study of gender and 
essentialism. Participants were assigned to one of two groups (‘over­
estimators’ or ‘under-estimators’ ) following a test that purportedly 
measured an unfamiliar psychological attribute: their perceptual style. 
After receiving predetermined feedback about their group membership, 
they were assigned to either the high-status role of boss or the low-status
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role of subordinate for an upcoming task. Finally, they completed a 
measure of essentialist beliefs about their group based on the two- 
dimensions of essentialism found by Haslam et al. (2000). It was found that 
in the critical experimental condition where social group membership was 
correlated with status assignment, participants expressed stronger 
essentialist beliefs about group membership than in the two conditions in 
which status and social group membership were uncorrelated.
However if, as postulated in Chapter II, the naturalization of status 
differences is facilitated by the recruitment of psychological essentialism 
from the domain of a Folk Sociology, it  is plausible that people also 
essentialise social status as an attribute of social group membership. 
Therefore, experiment 5 was designed to investigate whether people 
essentialise group status as an attribute of an essentialized social group. 
There were two main experimental conditions; each containing a story 
experiment based on a pre-existing essentialism paradigm (adoption and 
brain-transplant) and designed to provide evidence for different aspects of 
essentialism. Results from the experiment suggested that people do not 
hold essentialist beliefs about group-based social status. However, there 
was an indication from participants’ qualitative responses that the 
experimental paradigms used were not optimal. Therefore, a final follow- 
up experiment was conducted utilizing two alternative paradigms to tap 
into essentialist beliefs: soul exchange paradigm and personality exchange 
paradigm. Experiment 6  found evidence for essentialist beliefs about 
group-based social status in the soul exchange condition. Participants 
believed that a member of a high status group whose soul had been 
exchanged with the soul of a member of a low status group would lose their 
high status and vice versa. These are the first experiments to investigate 
the causal impact of social status on essentialist beliefs, and the 
essentialization of group-based social status.
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Overall, the empirical research reported in this thesis provides support to 
the theoretical framework presented in Chapter II. The research findings 
serve to substantiate the proposition that cognitive predispositions may 
well influence both the contents and functions of social group stereotypes. 
I shall now move onto a detailed discussion of the theoretical implications 
of this research.
VIII.2 Theoretical Implications
This thesis set out to f ill a gap in the social psychology of stereotyping 
literature; to explore the potentials of the Cognition and Culture approach 
to serve as an overarching theoretical framework allowing us to bring 
together a study of the contents and functions of stereotypes and the 
cognitive processes/structures underpinning stereotyping. I believe I have 
been successful in this undertaking by demonstrating both theoretically and 
empirically how the Cognition and Culture approach facilitates an 
exploration of how cognitive predispositions which are a part of a Folk 
Sociology, may influence both the contents and functions of social group 
stereotypes. I shall now move onto a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of this thesis, both for the social psychology of stereotyping 
field and the Cognition and Culture approach.
VIII.2.1 The Social Psychology of Stereotyping
For social psychologists studying stereotyping, the theoretical framework 
and the empirical findings of this thesis provided both affirmations and 
challenges. Experiments 1 -3 lend support to the Stereotype Content Model, 
specifically the idea that humans are sensitive to the two dimensions of 
competence and morality/warmth in their social judgements. Furthermore, 
the lack of stereotypes for the out-group in experiment 1 backs up recent 
social psychological research utilizing the minimal group paradigm which 
shows that participants form neutral attitudes towards the out-group (as 
opposed to negative as originally believed). These three studies also
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illustrate that it  is possible, and indeed worthwhile, to combine two 
hitherto distinct research domains in social psychology, namely research on 
stereotype contents and Minimal Group Paradigm research.
The theoretical framework articulated in Chapter II led to predictions and 
research findings which cannot easily be accommodated by existing social 
psychological theories such as SIT or SCM. SIT theorists, for example, would 
predict that in experiment 1 participants would attribute all the positive 
qualities to the in-group, and the negative qualities to the out-group. 
However, the ratings of the out-group were not negative but neutral. 
Indeed, according to social psychologists stereotypes derive their contents 
from the social context of inter-group relations, and cognitive processes or 
structures do not shape or influence such contents but merely process or 
represent them. This is a result of, as discussed in Chapter II, the fact that 
much social psychology rests upon the assumption that the human mind is 
domain-general and composed of content-free faculties. While not denying 
that the social context plays an important role in shaping stereotype 
contents, I have shown in experiments 1-3 that there is also a potential role 
for evolved cognitive predispositions which are a part of a Folk Sociology in 
shaping such contents. The very fact that people form, albeit rudimentary, 
stereotypes in minimal groups would seem to be counter-intuitive to social 
psychologists who suggest that the contents of stereotypes are derived 
wholly from the immediate social context. According to the SCM the 
contents of stereotypes are derived from the structure of inter-group 
relations. It is conventional in the social sciences to locate social status as 
being external to mental representations - in social structures and 
discourses. And whilst not denying that it does exist there, I have proposed 
that humans may have evolved a cognitive predisposition sensitive to inter­
group status differences. This proposition is supported by the fact that in 
experiments 2 and 3 competence based stereotypes were elicited in 
minimal status groups. These are the first studies to find evidence for the 
formation of stereotypes at both an explicit and implicit level in minimal
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groups varying in status. This research suggests that cognitive and 
structural factors may act in concert to shape the contents of stereotypes.
The findings of these experiments also have important implications for 
understanding the maintenance and justification of status hierarchies. They 
suggest that one might gain an understanding of the formation and stability 
of such hierarchies in the absence of the endorsement of specific ideologies 
(system justification, social dominance orientation). More specifically, it 
appears as though the mere existence of groups varying in status itself has 
effects such as default stereotyping of high status groups as competent and 
low status groups as incompetent which would help to sustain and justify 
the hierarchy and unequal relations. However, default group status 
stereotyping would almost certainly be bolstered by hierarchy-enhancing 
ideologies. Therefore, future research could explore whether such default 
stereotyping is stronger amongst those high in social dominance orientation 
or system justifying motives.
The SCM research focuses almost wholly on stereotypes of out-groups. In 
relation to the in-group it  is claimed that due to in-group favouritism 
people may perceive their in-group to be high in both competence and 
warmth. In two studies they explicitly included in-group ratings and found 
that participants rated their in-groups (e.g., Americans, students, middle- 
class and Whites) as highly competent and highly warm (Cuddy et al., 2007, 
Study 1; Fiske et a l., 2002, Study 2). However, these groups were all high- 
status groups and the results may be due to the status of the groups rather 
than in-group favouritism per se. So far, to my knowledge, there has been 
no investigation of ratings of other in-groups (e.g., women, men, Hispanics, 
Asians and Blacks). Experiment 1 explicitly investigated the ratings of in­
group vs. out-groups on these two dimensions and found that in-groups are 
rated high in competence and morality/warmth. While out-groups were 
rated neutral on the competence dimensions and the morality/warmth 
dimensions. In experiment 2 it was found that while members of the high 
status group and low status group rated the high status group as being
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highly competent, only members of the high status group rated the low 
status group as being highly incompetent. Members of the low status group 
rated their in-group as relatively high to neutral on the competence 
dimensions. Furthermore, in Experiment 3 members of the low status group 
were slower at associating their in-group prime with low competence traits 
compared to the neutral prime. These findings highlight the importance of 
considering whether the effects of structural factors such as status 
differences on stereotype contents are moderated by group membership.
SCM researchers, thus far, have only used explicit measures (i.e. ratings of 
groups on a list of traits). The findings of experiment 3 demonstrate how 
stereotypes based on the dimensions of competence and morality/warmth 
can also be elicited using an implicit measure. The semantic priming task 
used in experiment 3 could easily be adapted to explore whether the 
stereotypes found in SCM research can be replicated using implicit 
measures. As noted in Chapter I, social psychologists are increasingly 
making use of implicit measures to overcome biases arising from political 
correctness or indeed demand characteristics. While the results of 
experiments 2 and 3 were highly similar there was one notable difference. 
More specifically, in experiment 2 for members of the high status group 
there was no difference in the mean ratings for the high status in-group 
compared to the low status out-group on the low morality/warmth 
dimension. However, in experiment 3 a significant difference was found 
and members of the high status group did not associate their high status in­
group prime with low morality/warmth traits compared to the low status 
out-group prime and the neutral prime. Therefore, it  would be interesting 
and fruitful for future research to investigate whether or not explicit and 
implicit measures produce similar results for ‘ real world* social groups.
I shall now move onto addressing the implications of the second part of the 
empirical investigation in the thesis, namely, to what extent do evolved 
cognitive predispositions facilitate the ability of stereotypes to naturalise 
social status differences between groups. It was seen in Chapter I that
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social psychologists have argued that stereotypes can serve ideological 
functions. More specifically, they can justify and naturalise social status 
differences between groups (Jost and Banaji, 1994). It was also noted that 
the three approaches put forward to account for how stereotypes may 
serve ideological functions are based on a study of individual differences, 
and therefore can only explain why such stereotypes are more likely to be 
endorsed by some people more than others. Furthermore, these approaches 
focus on the ideological functions of stereotype contents and have ignored 
the potential role of cognitive structures.
An analysis of the process of social categorization is fundamental to a study 
of stereotyping given that we cannot form impressions of groups unless we 
can categorize people into one group or another. However, extant social 
psychological theories of category representation do not provide an 
adequate account of the process of social categorization as they, like most 
social scientific theories, assume that human cognitive abilities are 
domain-general. Cognition and Culture scholars have argued that a domain- 
specific competence, a Folk Sociology, underpins social categorization and 
our social group concepts are grounded in a folk theory of category 
representation, psychological essentialism. In Chapter II, by drawing on the 
Cognition and Culture approach, I suggested that the ability of stereotypes 
to function as ideological representations may be facilitated by the 
recruitment of an evolved heuristic, namely, psychological essentialism. In 
social scientific accounts essentialism is described as external to mental 
representations, and conceived of as a by-product of philosophical and 
cultural traditions. In contrast, Cognition and Culture scholars have argued 
that essentialism is an evolved cognitive predisposition which underpins 
social categorization and thereby stereotyping.
The rationale for exploring how research on category representation can 
shed light upon the study of stereotypes was quite straightforward. 
Stereotypes are based or rely upon categories, and in particular they rely 
on categories of people. As noted in Chapter II, perhaps the clearest
225
articulation of the link between essentialism and stereotyping is provided 
by Susan Gelman and is worth reiterating here:
Essentialism seems to motivate and underlie stereotyping. To put it  
bluntly, stereotyping borrows the language and conceptual framework of 
essentializing. Different groups of people are treated in distinct, non- 
obvious ways, and social group differences are assumed to be innately 
determined and fixed. To the extent that people buy into this way of 
thinking they w ill have a basis fo r treating social group differences as 
central to an individual’s identity, fo r drawing inferences about an 
individual based on the group to which the individual belongs. The 
stereotyping individual treats social groups as natural kinds (2003: 13-14).
Hence, my argument was that rather than viewing stereotypes, in and of 
themselves, as naturalising social status differences, we should consider 
that such naturalization occurs as a result of the essentialist nature of 
social group category representations.
Two potential ways in which psychological essentialism may facilitate the 
naturalization of status differences between groups was explored. Firstly, 
given that psychological essentialism is triggered by the salience of social 
categories within a cultural context (Hirschfeld, 2001), and given the 
proposed evolved sensitivity to social status (see Chapter II), it  is possible 
that social status differences increase the salience of a social group and 
thereby trigger essentialist beliefs about associated social groups. In other 
words, we essentialize membership in social groups which vary in social 
standing (for e.g. ‘ racial’ groups). On this view, the social status of the 
group is external to the essentialist representation of the group. This 
proposition was supported by the findings of experiment 4 in which it was 
found that participants were more likely to essentialize a social group when 
the groups varied in social status. Secondly, it  was argued that the social 
status of a social group might be essentialized by proxy - it could construed 
as an attribute of an essentialized social group. Psychological essentialism
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as a theory of category representation leads us to assume a causal 
relationship between membership in a social group (i.e. its essence) and 
the various attributes (both perceptual and behavioural) of group members. 
It is important to point out that the argument was not that social status 
itself is essentialized but rather that the social status of a group is 
conceived of as an attribute of a social group which is causally linked to 
the group essence. In the same way that skin colour may be esentialized as 
an attribute of racial groups. The results of experiment 6  supported this 
proposition as it was found that people assume the essence of a group 
resides within the soul of members of a social group, and social status was 
essentialized as an attribute of the group. Hence, aside from studying the 
contents of social categories and the processing of information about such 
contents, social psychologists could gain further insights into stereotyping 
by examining beliefs about the conceptual structure of the categories 
themselves. By studying evolved cognitive predispositions social 
psychologists might be able to explain why stereotypes which help to 
naturalise social status differences between groups prove to be so “ sticky” .
Overall, the most important implications of the present work for the social 
psychology of stereotyping is that it  challenges the extant and often 
implicit conception of the nature of the human mind more generally, and 
the nature of social cognition more specifically. Cognition and Culture 
scholars argue that not all concepts are equal, and that their contents and 
structure varies in important ways across distinct domains (Hirschfeld and 
Gelman, 1994). The Cognition and Culture approach allows for an 
integration of the study of cognitive processes/structures and contents as 
this approach, unlike the social cognition approach, makes claims about 
universality of cognitive processes/structures and contents across cultures.
However, while Cognition and Culture scholars highlight how domain- 
specific competences may result in the universality of cognitive contents 
across cultures, such contents tend to be quite generic, and often pertain 
to structural contents. The Cognition and Culture approach can gain useful
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insights about more specific contents from social psychological research. 
For instance, in the context of the present work the Stereotype Content 
Model provided invaluable insights into universal dimensions upon which 
stereotypes of social group are based. By integrating theoretical and 
empirical insights from the social psychology of stereotyping and the 
Cognition and Culture approach this thesis illustrates that these approaches 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but can be seen as complementary.
VIII.2.2 The Cognition and Culture Approach
For Cognition and Culture scholars the theoretical framework and empirical 
findings of this thesis provided affirmations, but they also raised questions 
regarding the nature of the cognitive structures underpinning social 
cognition. The results of experiments 1-3 contribute to a debate concerning 
the independence of a domain-specific competence underpinning group- 
based social cognition, a Folk Sociolosy (FS), from a domain-specific 
competence underpinning human representations of the mental states of 
individuals, a Theory o f Mind (ToM). Before considering the implications of 
the findings of experiments 1 -3, a brief review of the evidence supporting a 
ToM and a FS w ill be presented.
If you see a person looking up at the sky and taking out their umbrella from 
their bag you are likely to interpret the person as an intentional agent who 
believes that it  is going to rain and who wants to avoid getting wet. 
Cognition and Culture scholars have argued that our capacity to understand 
such behaviour relies on our having a “ theory” about the minds of others, 
and this capacity is governed by a domain-specific competence namely a 
Theory of Mind (ToM). Formally, a ToM refers to the capacity to interpret, 
predict and explain the behaviour of others in terms of their underlying 
mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, etc.) (Leslie, 
1994). It has been argued that ToM capacities are responsible for key social 
skills including intentional communication, persuading/deceiving others, 
developing shared goals, and the development of cultural representations
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(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Tomasello, 2008). There is evidence to support a ToM 
from several lines of empirical research; developmental, cross-cultural and 
neurobiological.
A ToM has often been thought to require its owner to have acquired the 
concept of a false belief. In the example above, someone might reason that 
the person took out their umbrella because it was going to rain even if this 
person's belief was false and it  does not actually rain. Subsequently, much 
ToM research has focused on a single task paradigm examining children's 
understanding of false beliefs. The standard version of the false belief task 
presents the child with a character, Sally, who leaves a bar of chocolate in 
her basket before leaving the room. During her absence, another character, 
Anne, enters the room and removes the chocolate bar from the basket and 
places it in a box. Children are asked to predict where Sally w ill look for 
the chocolate bar when she returns to the room. There is considerable 
evidence that four-year olds tend to succeed at this task -, saying she will 
look for the chocolate in the basket, correctly attributing a false belief to 
Sally - while younger children tend to fail (saying she w ill look in the box) 
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986; Avis and 
Harris, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1999). Some researchers have used the fact 
that 3 year-olds fail false belief tests while 4 year-olds pass, to support the 
view that at four years of age a fundamental shift takes place in children's 
understanding of others' behaviour; more specifically a shift from a non­
represen tational to a representational theory of mind. However, other 
researchers have suggested that a representational theory of mind is 
present much earlier and younger children's failure in passing the false 
belief test is the result of excessive linguistic and other task demands 
(Leslie, 1987; Chandler, Fritz and Hala, 1989; Fodor, 1992). Indeed, there is 
evidence that 3 year olds and even some 2-year olds succeed at non-verbal 
false belief tests (Clements and Perner, 1994; Garnham and Ruffman, 2001, 
Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).
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In recent years there has been much criticism of the false belief task as a 
litmus test for a ToM (see Bloom and German, 2000; Dennett, 1979). There 
is a significant body of research showing that children younger than 3 years 
of age demonstrate an ability to understand the knowledge, goals and 
intentions of others even though they fail tests of false belief (see Call and 
Tomasello, 2008 for a review). Consequently, many researchers increasingly 
subscribe to a broader definition of a ToM that encompasses a wider range 
of mental states (perception, intention, emotion, etc) (for a review see 
Flavell, 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 2001).
There also appears to be evidence for a developmental program governing 
the elaboration of ToM capacities. Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and 
Moll (2005) have suggested the following developmental sequence: 3 month 
old infants are able to engage in dyadic relations (child-other); they 
understand intentional action as animate and can take part in 
protoconversations (mutual gaze, turn taking in smiling). By 9 months 
infants engage in triadic relations (child-other-object); they understand 
intentional action as goal-directed and they can share goals and 
perception. By 14 months infants can take part in collaborative relations 
(child-other-shared goal); they understand intentional action as intentional 
and they can share intentions.
There is evidence to suggest that the development of ToM skills in young 
children may be universal. Cross-cultural research using a verbal false 
belief task indicates that ToM skills are present in children by the age of 
five across different cultural settings (Callaghan, Rochat, Lillard, Claux, 
Odden, Itakura, Tapanya and Singh 2005). Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses and 
Lee (2006) found that Chinese and American children are the same age 
when they pass the false belief task (age 4). Avis and Harris (1992) 
conducted a study of ToM skills among 2-6 year old children of the Baka, a 
preliterate hunter-gatherer people of South-East Cameroon. Using a 
culturally sensitive version of the false belief test they found that by the 
age of 4-5 years Baka children were able to understand false beliefs.
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However, there is some evidence for cross-cultural differences in the use of 
ToM. Wu and Keysar (2007) for instance found that participants from China 
were far more likely to take the perspective of another person than 
participants from the United States who were far more ego-centric in their 
approach to a communication game. They concluded that there are no 
differences across cultures in ToM capacities, however culture influences 
people's tendency or motivation to adopt the perspective of the other. It 
has also been argued that ego-centricism in communication is a cognitive 
default and the use of ToM is failure-driven (Franks, 2011; Franks and 
Dhesi, 2011).
In recent years, cognitive neurologists and neuroscientists have begun to 
explore the neural bases of ToM skills (see Siegal and Varley, 2002, for a 
review). Several functional imaging studies using multi-modal and diverse 
cognitive paradigms indicate that ToM abilities appears to be mediated by a 
specific region of the brain, namely, the anterior paracingulate cortex 
(McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith and Trouard 2001; Gallagher, Jack, 
Roepstorff and Frith, 2002, Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Further evidence to 
support the view that a ToM is a domain-specific cognitive competence 
comes from studies of autism (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Autism is a 
neuro-cognitive developmental disorder characterized by impairment in 
social and communicative functioning that affects roughly 1/250 individuals 
(Gillberg and Wing, 1999). It has been argued that selective impairment of 
a ToM is a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum disorders (Baron- 
Cohen, 2001). Many children with autism fail to pass false belief tests, even 
though children with Down's syndrome of an equivalent mental age pass 
these tests (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985). A large number of studies 
have demonstrated that children with autism not only have difficulties in 
understanding false beliefs but also understanding knowledge (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986; Leekam and Perner, 1989; Reed and 
Peterson, 1990; Swettenham, 1996; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez and 
Walsh (1996); complex emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, Spitz 
and Cross, 1993); an inability to use gaze direction as indicative of what
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other people might want or are referring to (Baron-Cohen and Cross, 1992; 
Hobson, 1984).
There is considerable debate within the literature concerning the extent to 
which a ToM is a uniquely human cognitive capacity or whether it is present 
in other non-human primates. The majority of studies of non-human 
primates suggest chimpanzees may possess low level ToM skills for 
example, they appear to understand that visual gaze is an indicator of 
mental focus, but these skills appear to be restricted to competitive (as 
opposed to collaborative) situations (see Tomasello, Call and Hare, 2003 for 
a review). Furthermore, there is disagreement regarding the nature of the 
adaptive mechanisms responsible for a ToM. Some have argued strongly 
that a ToM is a domain-specific and modular cognitive competence (Fodor, 
1992; Leslie and Thaiss, 1992; Baron-Cohen, 1996). While others have 
argued that a ToM is underpinned by two general purpose adaptations; (i) 
understanding intentional action as goal directed (shared by human and 
non-human primates) and (ii) a motivation and ability to share mental 
states (distinctly human) (Tomasello et al., 2005).
Hirschfeld (2001) has argued that aside from a Theory of Mind, humans 
have evolved a cognitive competence which governs group-based social 
cognition i.e. our capacity categorize humans into groups and to explain 
human behaviour by reference to membership in a group. This proposition 
is fairly non-controversial as most social psychologists would accept that 
group-based reasoning is a universal cognitive ability. However, Hirschfeld 
(2001) makes the stronger claim that humans have evolved a domain- 
specific cognitive competence, a Folk Sociology, which governs the 
development of group-based reasoning i.e. our ability to represent, acquire 
and communicate about human social groupings (see Chapter II).
There is evidence for the existence of a Folk Sociology from several lines of 
research. A surprisingly small number of social taxonomies appear to 
predominate in all cultures and across all historical periods: sex/gender,
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age, kinship, language spoken, and race/ethnicity (Hirschfeld, 2001). 
Furthermore, Hirschfeld (2001) notes that these social taxonomies appear 
to be linked to a singular mode of reasoning; psychological essentialism. 
There is support from experimental studies for essentialist beliefs about 
social groups across cultures, including caste groups (Mahalingham, 2001) 
gender (Taylor, 1996; Prentice and Miller, 2006), kinship (Hirschfeld, 1986), 
‘ race* (Hirschfeld, 1996) and ethnicity (Gil-White, 2001, McIntosh, 2005).
There is evidence for the early development of Folk Sociology capacities in 
infants and young children. Developmental research suggests that human 
infants are capable of categorizing humans into social groups. Three month 
olds have been found to prefer their own race to other race faces (Kelly, 
Quinn, Slater, Leek, Gibson, Smith, Ge and Pascalis, 2005). Six month olds 
distinguish their mother's native language when spoke in a foreign accent 
from mother's native language not spoke in a foreign accent (Kinzler, 
Dupoux and Spelke, 2007). Two year old children are capable of 
distinguishing people by gender and kinship status (Katz, 1983; Hirschfeld, 
1989). Three year old children are able to grasp the constancy of gender 
(Taylor and Gelman, 1998) and racial categories (Hirschfeld, 1996) contrary 
to conventional wisdom (Aboud, 1988; Semaj, 1980). Three year olds 
attend to verbal (culturally rich) input over visual information even for 
perceptually marked groups such as ‘race' (Hirschfeld, 1995). Three year 
olds predict that some groups (based on race) predict language differences, 
whereas others do not (based on age) (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1997). Four 
year olds have been found to express negative attitudes and stereotypes 
towards racial out-groups (Aboud, 1988; Hirschfeld, 1998; Bigler and Liben, 
2006). Finally, there is also evidence suggesting that even young children 
essentialize groups such as ‘ race', gender and ethnicity (Hirschfeld, 1996; 
Taylor, 1996).
Another line of research which supports the proposal of a Folk Sociology is 
research on implicit or automatic prejudice and stereotyping (Hirschfeld, 
2001). There is evidence that stereotypes of various social groups (e.g. age,
233
sex, race) can be automatically or unconsciously activated (Devine, 1989; 
Perdue and Gurtman, 1990; Pratto and Bargh, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen, 
Milne and Jetten, 1994). Recent research on the development of implicit 
attitudes in children has shown that an implicit racial in-group bias 
emerges early in White American children (age 6), and remains stable into 
adulthood (Baron and Banaji, 2006). Dunham, Baron and Banaji (2006) 
examined 6 year old White American children's implicit and explicit ‘ race' 
attitudes toward their own group, compared with two out-groups: Black 
Americans and Japanese. Six year olds were found to show an implicit 
preference for White over Black and Japanese. Similar findings of in-group 
bias have been found among samples of children belonging to majority 
groups in the UK and Japan (Rutland, Cameron, Milne and McGeorge, 2005; 
Dunham et al., 2006). Put together, this research suggests that very young 
children possess adult-like attitudes about social groups at a very early age 
and this strongly challenges the protracted domain-general social learning 
models prevalent within the social sciences (Dunham, Baron and Banaji, 
2008).
In recent years cognitive neuroscientists have begun to explore the neural 
bases of stereotyping and prejudice. Although this research is in its early 
stages it has been found that racial stereotypes activate unique patterns of 
neural activation (Phelps, O'Connor, Cunnigham, Funayama, Gatenby and 
Gore, 2000; Hart, Whalen, Shin, Mclnerney, Fischer and Rauch, 2000; 
Wheeler and Fiske, 2005; Eberhardt, 2005). For example, Phelps et al. 
(2000) were the first to link the amygdala to implicit attitudes about 
‘ race'. They used fMRI to measure blood-oxygen dependent (BOLD) 
responses in White American participants while they were viewing faces of 
unfamiliar Black and White males. They also assessed the participants' 
implicit attitudes about ‘ race'. They found that the magnitude of the 
amygdala response when participants viewed Black as opposed to White 
faces was significantly correlated with measures of participants' implicit 
race-related attitudes. Cunnigham, Johnson, Raye, Gattenby, Gore and 
Banaji (2004) replicated these findings in a study in which the faces of
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Whites and Blacks were presented to the participants subliminally. In 
another study, Wheeler and Fiske (2005) found a heightened amygdala 
response to Black (compared to White) faces when participants were given 
a social categorization task; to judge whether the person was older or 
younger than 21 years of age but such a response disappeared when 
attention was directed away from the social category and participants were 
given an individuation task; whether the person pictured liked a certain 
vegetable.
As the review above suggests there is considerable evidence to support the 
existence of a Theory of Mind which governs our capacity to explain the 
behaviour of others in terms of their mental states. Within the social 
sciences there is a widespread assumption that group-based reasoning is 
governed by the same cognitive processes and mechanisms that governs 
person perception (Crawford, Sherman and Hamilton, 2002; Sherman and 
Hamilton, 1996). However, Hirschfeld (2001) has argued that we may have 
evolved a Folk Sociology which governs our capacity to explain the 
behaviour of others in terms of their group membership. There is also 
evidence supporting this proposition as seen above. There is empirical 
support for the independence of a Theory of Mind and a Folk Sociology 
from recent neuro-cognitive research.
In a study of brain localisations of social concepts, Sanders, McClure and 
Zarate (2004) found that the left cerebral hemisphere was more heavily 
implicated in processing social group information, whilst the right 
hemisphere was heavily implicated in processing information about 
individuals. Evidence for the selective impairment in a Theory of Mind but 
not in a Folk Sociology would provide strong support for the independence 
of group-based reasoning from reasoning about individual mental states. 
Indeed, there is evidence of such selective impairments in studies of people 
with neuro-cognitive disorders. For example, research has shown that 
although individuals with autism have difficulty recognizing emotional 
mental states when shown pictures of people’s faces expressing various
235
emotions, they had no trouble discerning the social categories to which 
these individuals belonged (such as gender or age) (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright and Joliffe, 1997). Another study found that adults suffering 
from Aspergers Syndrome who had significantly impaired Theory of Mind 
skills, were not impaired in attributing stereotypes to photographs of 
individuals (White, Hill, Winston and Frith, 2006). In a study of children 
suffering from autism it was found that six year old autistic children who 
failed false belief tests, despite being severely impaired in their capacity 
to interpret and predict others' actions in terms of mental states, held 
gender and racial stereotypes and used these stereotypes to predict other 
people's behaviour (Hirschfeld, Bartmess, White and Frith, 2007). These 
findings are consistent with the view that group-based reasoning is 
subserved by a distinct domain-specific competence i.e. a Folk Sociology, 
and that this is independent of a cognitive competence for reasoning about 
the mental states of individuals i.e. a Theory of Mind.
The theoretical framework developed within this thesis aimed to provide 
evidence to support the claim that cognitive predispositions arising from a 
Folk Sociology shape the contents of social group stereotypes. This claim 
was supported by the findings of experiments 1-3. These experiments 
provided evidence for the default stereotyping of minimal groups along the 
dimensions of competence and morality/warmth. Social psychological 
theories are (implicitly or explicitly) based on an assumption that human 
cognitive capacities are domain-general. Furthermore, they assume that 
the same cognitive processes and structures underpin our representations 
of and reasoning about physical objects, individuals and social groups. In 
contrast, the Cognition and Culture approach provides a domain-specific 
account of the cognitive processes and structures underpinning group-based 
reasoning. These findings lend further empirical support to this domain- 
specific view and to the existence of a Folk Sociology. As discussed in the 
previous section, these findings could neither be predicted nor explained 
by drawing on social psychological theories of stereotyping which assume 
that the contents of stereotypes are derived wholly from the social
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context. Furthermore, these findings contribute to the debate about the 
independence of a Folk Sociology which governs reasoning about groups qua 
groups from a Theory of Mind which governs reasoning about individuals 
qua individuals. In each of these experiments (1-3) participants inferred 
the traits of individuals based on their membership in a group. In 
experiment 1, participants assumed that all members of their in-group 
were highly competent and moral/warm. In experiment 2 participants 
stereotyped all members of a high status group as being highly competent 
i.e. intelligent, motivated, confident etc, while all members of the low 
status group were stereotyped as being highly incompetent i.e. stupid, 
lazy, etc. Experiment 3 provided even stronger support for such 
stereotyping by utilizing an implicit or unconscious measure of 
stereotyping. These findings are consonant with Hirschfeld’s (2001) claim 
that group-based reasoning (Folk Sociology) is independent of reasoning 
about individuals (Theory of Mind). Indeed, the very advantage (or 
disadvantage) of stereotypes is that they act as heuristics and enable us to 
assume that all members of a particular group share various traits, beliefs, 
etc and we are not required to consider them as individuals in their own 
right. Stereotypes lead us to assume that a specific social group member is 
essentially identical to other members of the group, and the group as a 
whole is thus perceived and treated as being homogeneous. As Hilton and 
von Hippel (1996) point out, although heuristics such as stereotyping 
involves “ information loss” through failure to recognize the individuality of 
each group member, stereotyping also provides “ information gain” through 
ascribing group characteristics to individual members. Hence, once an 
individual is categorized as a group member the observer can assume that 
person possesses many features characteristics of group members, even in 
the absence of empirical evidence about that particular individual. As 
Allport (1954: 21) aptly noted “ If I can lump thirteen million of my fellow 
citizens under a simple formula ‘Negroes are stupid, dirty, and inferior, I 
simplify my life enormously” .
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The present work also raises other questions about the nature of the 
cognitive structures underpinning social relations. The sociologist Max 
Weber (1922) distinguished between systems of horizontal segregation, for 
instance ethnicity, and systems of vertical segregation such as ‘caste’ . He 
elaborates this distinction as follows:
The difference is that the horizontal relationships of ethnic groups, which 
leads to mutual repulsion and contempt, permit each ethnic community to 
consider its own status as the highest, whereas a caste system brings with 
it  a hierarchy of subordination and a recognition of the ‘higher status' 
conferred on the privileged castes (Weber, 1922/1978: 51).
It was argued in Chapter II that the domain of a Folk Sociology could be 
expanded to include a social status detector. Dunham, Baron and Banaji 
(2008) have similarly proposed a broadening of a Folk Sociology's domain to 
include the detection of hierarchical relations between social groups. An 
extensive review of existing developmental, cross-cultural and primate 
research presented in Chapter II supported this possibility. The experiments 
reported in this thesis also supported the view that humans are sensitive to 
inter-group social status differentials. For example, in experiments 2 and 3 
participants formed stereotypes about minimal status groups. These 
findings suggest that there is a cognitive component to group status 
stereotypes, aside from social, economic and political components. It was 
argued in Chapter II that the proper domain of the proposed status detector 
would be hierarchical social relations, triggered by any reliable cues of 
differential ability to acquire resources whether that be via dominance (as 
seen in non-human primate hierarchies) or social status (as found in human 
social hierarchies).
It was also noted in Chapter II that in our closest primate relatives, while 
there is plenty of evidence for intra-group hierarchies there is little  
evidence of the type of inter-group social hierarchies found in many human 
societies (such as racial hierarchies) (Cummins, 2005). However, as Sidanius
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and Pratto (1999) point out almost all modern human societies contain 
group-based social hierarchies. They argue that a group-based social 
hierarchy is something quite distinct from an individual-based social 
hierarchy. In an individual-based social hierarchy, individuals enjoy great 
power, prestige or wealth by virtue of their own highly valued 
characteristics such as athletic ability, high intelligence, or artistic, 
political or scientific talent or achievement. Group-based social hierarchy 
on the other hand refers to the social power, prestige and privilege that an 
individual possesses in virtue of his or her ascribed membership in a 
particularly socially constructed group such as race, religion, clan, tribe, 
lineage, ethnic group, or social class (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).
As highlighted in Chapter II, there is a general consensus in the 
anthropological and evolutionary psychology literature that prior to the 
Neolithic few (if any) members of the species Homo Sapiens would have 
lived in societies large-scale and complex to support institutionalized social 
hierarchies (Boehm, 1993). Nonetheless, it has been argued that rank 
differentials existed in simple hunter-gather societies and social rank was 
associated with differences in reproductive success (Buss, 1994). Hence, 
given that hierarchies among non-human primates and amongst humans in 
the Pleistocene are usually intra-group hierarchies, I suggested that proper 
domain for the proposed status detector is intra-group hierarchical 
relations. The actual domain also includes inter-group hierarchical 
relations. The cultural domain includes inter-group hierarchical relations 
such as caste, or ‘racial’ hierarchies.
However, there is another possibility that needs to considered which is that 
perhaps there is more than a single cognitive competence underlying the 
representation of social groups. It is possible that the representation of 
social groups may the by-product of two distinct cognitive competences, 
one which evolved to represent horizontal forms of segregation i.e. social 
groups; a Folk Sociology, and the second for representing vertical forms of 
segregation i.e. social hierarchies; tentatively labelled a Folk Politics.
239
Boyer (2001) has suggested that different inferential processes may be 
activated in the interpretation of a single input. Following this, Cosmides, 
Tooby and Kurzban (2003) posited that different folk beliefs about ‘ race’ 
may be generated by different inferential machinery. Hence, in contexts 
where the concept ‘ race’ represents a system of horizontal segregation it 
may be underpinned by a Folk Sociology, while in contexts where ‘ race’ 
represents a system of vertical segregation it may be underpinned by both 
a Folk Sociology and a Folk Politics. Such a combination of core cognitive 
competences is supported by Spelke and Kinzler’s (2007) account of the 
development of human cognition. Indeed even Hirschfeld (1994) has 
suggested that although he has argued there is a single cognitive 
competence for the social domain, there may be several such competences 
for different aspects of this domain. While a Folk Politics appears to be a 
plausible candidate for an evolved domain-specific competence, empirical 
tests need to be carried in order to uncover whether the human mind 
discriminates between vertical and horizontal systems of segregation.
Another issue that needs to be considered is the fact that a single model of 
essentialism may not suffice. The results of experiment 4 supported Haslam 
et al.9s (2000) findings that essentialism may not be not unitary but based 
on two independent dimensions: naturalness and entitativity.
Furthermore, it was found that social status triggers beliefs about the 
naturalness of social groups but not their entitativity. Therefore, future 
research needs to explore what triggers beliefs in the entitativity of social 
groups. Research on entitativity has a long history in social psychology as 
domain of study in its own right and another possibility is that it  is not a 
dimension of essentialism after-all. Barrett (2001) has argued while it  may 
be true that people essentialise everything from tigers to ethnic groups the 
term “essentialism”  may be too broad to explain the subtleties of 
representation and inference which characterize these different cases. 
Barrett argued that there may be functionally incompatible modes of 
essentialist thinking for different kinds (and as suggested above even the 
same ‘kinds’ ). Furthermore, Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999) also concede it
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is not known if each instance represents the same notion of essence as 
phenomena which appears quite similar might represent wholly distinct 
conceptualizations.
VIII.3 Limitations and Future Research
Despite support for the theoretical framework developed, the empirical 
and theoretical work in this thesis are not without limitations.
I shall begin by considering some of the methodological limitations of the 
research. The use of Internet-based methods allowed for an efficient large- 
scale recruitment of participants. This method also helped to minimise the 
impact of experimenter effects. Previous studies have shown that the 
pairing of experimenter gender and participant gender can influence 
participant response. Such studies have manipulated both participant and 
experimenter gender and demonstrated effects involving pain (Levine and 
Simone, 1991) exertion (Boutcher, Fleischer-Curtain and Gines, 1988), sex- 
role attitudes (Galla, Frisore, Jeffrey and Gaer, 1981), and competence 
(Etaugh, Houtler and Ptasnik, 1988). Men have evolved preference for 
healthy, fertile mates, which are related to perceptions of female 
attractiveness, and signal a woman's reproductive value, while females 
have evolved a preference for high status males (Miller, 2001). Hence, in 
the context of the experiments described above, given that the 
experimenter is a young, attractive female, in an attempt to impress the 
experimenter male participants may explicitly or implicitly reject 
assignment to the low status group. This may result in the failure of the 
status manipulation which is the key independent variable in some of 
experiments in this thesis. Therefore, it  is important to control this 
potential source of bias, and this is one of the advantages of the fact that 
all but one of the experiments (which needed to be conducted in a 
laboratory as a requirement of the experiment paradigm used) were
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conducted via the Internet, and participants were informed of their status 
assignment via a computer screen.
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that internet experiments have their 
drawbacks. For instance, they do not provide a consistent setting like a 
laboratory. Furthermore, there is the issue of invariable screen-size and 
viewing distance which are problematic for experiment 3 which was reliant 
on the perceptual measure of a semantic priming task. Assuming that the 
less stringent controls possible in this research did not produce any 
systematic biases, any remaining variables that could not be controlled for 
must be treated as random errors in the interpretation of the experiment 
results. The use of Internet experiments may have influenced the 
demographics of the samples, although this problem has decreased over the 
past few years. In an attempt to reduce any response biases in experiments 
1, 2, 3 ,5 and 6 participants were offered prize draw entries to win Amazon 
vouchers, while students in experiment 4 participated in exchange for 
course credits. Nonetheless, it  is possible that some self-selection biases 
and responses biases remained. Although, given that the purpose of 
experimental research is to compare across experimental conditions, 
random assignment to experimental conditions renders some non-random 
biases somewhat less challenging than other research methods. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that, as with most experimental 
studies, caution must be used in assessing the generalisability and 
ecological validity of the results obtained in the present research.
The participants which took part in the research were mostly Western, 
English native speakers. There is an opportunity for future research to 
broaden the diversity of participants. The experiments here could easily be 
adapted for use in other cultures, and in other languages. I would predict 
that these results would, broadly speaking, be replicated in such research. 
However, I would also expect some differences across cultures. There is 
some indication from previous research that people living in collectivist 
cultures show a greater sensitivity to cues of morality/warmth, while
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people living in individualistic cultures show a greater sensitivity to cues of 
competence (Wojcizke, 1997). Research on the concept of ‘face1 (public 
image maintenance) in cross-cultural psychology also points to some 
potential cultural differences. Mao (1994) notes that in Chinese two 
Chinese characters are used to convey the meaning of the word ‘face*; 
mianzi and lian. Mianzi stands for prestige and reputation earned via 
achievements, and lian refers to the respect of a group for someone with a 
good moral reputation. Mianzi appears to map onto the competence 
dimension, while lian maps on the morality/warmth dimension. Mao (1994) 
argues that in the West we tend to focus solely on mianzi and neglect lian. 
According to Ho (1975), in China to lose lian is considered far more serious 
than to lose mianzi. Therefore, it is important for future research to 
explore how culture may influence/change the default stereotypes found in 
the current research. Furthermore, in this research the focus, as in the 
Stereotype Content Model research, has been on generic traits for 
competence and morality/warmth. However, often the contents of 
stereotypes are more specific, groups are perceived to be competent in 
particular domains. For instance, Asians are assumed to be highly 
competent in mathematics, while African Americans are assumed to be 
highly competent in athletics. While a study of evolved cognitive 
predispositions can inform us which dimensions stereotypes are based 
upon, and that we are sensitive to, we still need to consider the economic, 
social and political factors which result in the more specific stereotypes 
that people form in any particular social or cultural context about any 
specific social group.
From its beginning, social psychological research has defined the contents 
of stereotypes in terms of traits. In the three experiments conducted to 
explore the impact of evolved cognitive predispositions on the contents of 
social group stereotypes (Chapters III, IV, and V), stereotypes were assessed 
in relation to traits denoting competence and morality/warmth. However, 
this focus on traits has been criticised as failing to adequately capture 
stereotype content. As Hamilton, Gibbons, Stroessner and Sherman (1992:
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103) point out stereotypes “ also include mental representations of specific 
instances of experiences with group members as well as of other general, 
non-trait features, such as physical features, occupation and socio­
economic characteristics, and likely behaviour patterns.”  While accepting 
this highlights a limitation of the research reported in this thesis, the 
reason the present research focused on traits was in order to highlight how 
evolved cognitive predispositions shape stereotype contents. As yet, the 
only aspect of stereotypes which social psychologists have found to be 
universally invariant are traits based on the competence and 
morality/warmth dimensions. Future research in social psychology needs to 
investigate whether other aspects of stereotype content are similarly 
universal. Based on the Cognition and Culture perspective, I would predict 
that humans across cultures are likely to have evolved a sensitivity to 
features and behaviours of group members which signal competence and 
morality/warmth and social status.
The focus in this thesis has been on the cognitive aspects of stereotypes, 
and therefore it neglects the emotional components of stereotypes. There 
is significant evidence to support the view that human mental 
representations are not merely descriptive, but are intertwined with 
emotions (see Clore and Huntsinger, 2008; Wilson, 2002). Indeed, Fiske and 
colleagues have expanded the Stereotype Content Model to focus on how 
structural factors and stereotype contents predict emotional prejudice 
towards specific groups. For example, high warmth and high competence 
stereotypes elicit admiration, while high warmth and low competence elicit 
pity (Cuddy et al., 2007). Future research needs to investigate the 
emotional components of stereotypes. There is a potential role for an 
evolutionary perspective in understanding the emotional aspects of 
stereotypes. For example, Keltner, Haidt and Shiota (2006) have argued 
that many emotions have specific adaptive functions. In relation to group 
relations, they have argued that emotions such as gratitude and guilt help 
to support reciprocal altruism, while emotions such as pride and shame 
help to support dominance or status hierarchies. It is highly plausible that
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humans may have evolved default emotional responses to social groups. 
This could be investigated by adapting the experimental paradigm used in 
experiments 1-3.
Stereotypes are primarily of interest to social psychologists because they 
are shared. Social psychologists would argue that such sharing results from 
a shared common environment. Although, it has not been the focus of the 
present research the theoretical framework developed in this thesis could 
be used to study how these cognitive predispositions influence the 
communicability and cultural transmission of social group stereotypes. 
According to the Cognition and Culture approach both ecological and 
psychological factors need to be taken into account in order to explain the 
cultural success of cultural representations. One of the key psychological 
factors are domain-specific cognitive competences which predispose 
humans to particular kinds of conceptual representations. Furthermore, 
cultural representations in order to become stabilized rely on and exploit 
these domain-specific competences. Therefore, Cognition and Culture 
scholars argue that cultural transmission is biased toward information 
which falls under the domain of a domain-specific competence.
In Chapter II it  was argued that humans may have evolved a sensitivity to 
traits denoting competence and morality/warmth as a result of a Folk 
Sociology. If this is the case then stereotypes based on these two 
dimensions should enjoy a selective advantage in cultural transmission over 
stereotypes not based on these dimensions. It was also argued that humans 
may have evolved a sensitivity to cues of social status. It is plausible that 
stereotypes about groups varying in social status would have a higher 
selective advantage in cultural transmission than stereotypes about equal 
status social groups. In order to explore the impact of cognitive constraints 
on the cultural transmission of stereotypes, the transmission chain method 
could be used. This method, originally developed by Bartlett (1932) is 
similar to the children's games “ Chinese Whispers” or “ Broken Telephone” 
and involves passing material (usually written text) relevant to the
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hypothesis being tested along chains of participants. The first participant in 
the chain reads or hears the material, and following a short delay or 
distracter task, attempts to recall it. The resultant recall is then given to 
the second part participant, who does the same. Their recall is in turn 
passed to the third participant, and so on along the chain. The changes that 
occur to the material as it  is transmitted along the chain, and/or the 
different degradation rates of different types of material, can then reveal 
systematic biases in cultural transmission. This method was recently used 
by Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar (2006) to test the Machiavellian 
intelligence hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988) which posits that primate 
intelligence evolved primarily to deal with complex social problems (as 
opposed to ecological ones). They found that social information or gossip 
(information about intense third-party social relationships) was transmitted 
with greater accuracy and in greater quantity than non-social information 
(information about the physical environment or information concerning 
individual behaviour). In the present case, the information or material 
would be contrived social group stereotypes: social group stereotypes 
based on the dimensions competence and morality/warmth versus 
stereotypes based on dimensions unrelated to competence and 
morality/warmth and stereotypes based on groups varying in status versus 
groups equal in status. This research would, of course, be a natural 
extension of the present work, and would provide evidence that some 
stereotypes are more contagious than others, in other words they are 
indeed ‘made to stick'.
As mentioned, some unresolved questions remain at the end of thesis. 
Clearly, there is a need for a fuller understanding of the interrelationship 
between contents and cognitive processes/structures in the formation of 
social group stereotypes. Although I hope I have shown the fruitfulness of 
the Cognition and Culture approach as an overarching conceptual 
framework which allows the integration of the study of contents and 
process/structure. The research presented here can be further developed 
in several important directions. In this research I have focused on one
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structural factor which predicts stereotype contents, inter-group status 
differentials. According to the Stereotype Content Model stereotypes of 
morality/warmth are better predicted by inter-group competition. Future 
research needs to investigate whether we have default stereotypes when 
groups are in a cooperative or competitive relationship. I would predict, 
based on the SCM model, that cues of cooperation between groups would 
result in stereotypes of the out-group as moral/warm and cues of 
competition between groups would result in stereotypes of the out-group as 
immoral/cold. Furthermore, there is evidence for discrimination and 
negative attitudes towards high status groups by low status groups if the 
status differences are perceived illegitimate. I did not manipulate 
legitimacy of status differentials in this research. However, I would predict 
a reversal of the findings of experiments 2 and 3 if the status difference 
between the groups was illegitimate. Low status group members would 
presumably rate members of the high status group as lacking both 
competence and morality /warmth.
Finally, there are some limitations of the Cognition and Culture approach 
which need to be considered. Recent accounts of embodied cognition 
rejects standard theories of cognition which assume that knowledge is 
represented by abstract amodal symbols stored in memory. Embodied 
cognition theorists asserts that mental representations and processes are 
intrinsically grounded in the body, or the brain's modality-specific systems 
for perception (e.g., vision), action (e.g., movement) and introspection 
(e.g., emotion) (Wilson, 2002). The Cognition and Culture view of the 
mind, as it currently stands, does not appear to be compatible with the 
main tenets of embodied cognition (for a detailed discussion see, Franks, 
2011). There is a growing body of evidence which suggests that, like all 
knowledge structures, social group concepts are embodied in various ways. 
One example of how social group information processing is embodied comes 
from category priming research. In a classic study Bargh, Chen and Burrows 
(1996) found participants primed with the elderly stereotype walked slower 
down a corridor than control participants. Presumably this occurred
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because the social category priming activated the stereotype of the elderly 
which triggers action schemas leading to the embodiment effect of walking 
slower. As Franks and Dhesi (2011) note, a complete explanation of human 
social relations necessarily needs to account for how our mental 
representation of social groups are embodied by being intrinsically 
connected with dispositions towards action and emotions. This would also 
result in a more complete account of the emotional and behavioural 
components of social group stereotypes.
VIII.4 Social Policy Implications
As Solomon Asch noted “ the term stereotype has come to stand for nearly 
all that is deficient in popular thinking” (1952: 232). If stereotypes are, as 
this thesis claims, ‘made to stick* then one could wonder what hope there 
is for social policy interventions aimed at combating stereotyping. Indeed 
as Ehrenreich and McIntosh (1997) have pointed out social scientists often 
posit a false dichotomy according to which if something is entirely socially 
constructed it is malleable, whereas if  it is influenced by cognitive 
predispositions it is inevitable and immutable. I hope I have shown in the 
course of this thesis that by exploring the role of cognitive predispositions 
we can greatly enrich our understanding of the contents of stereotypes, 
their functions, and their ability to become widespread in cultural 
populations. Therefore, I argue that without knowledge of the properties of 
the human mind which makes humans susceptible to stereotyping our 
understanding of stereotypes is incomplete and as a result there is even 
less hope for social policy interventions. I shall now consider some 
potential implications of the research presented in this thesis for social 
policies aimed at improving inter-group relations.
First and foremost, it is important to consider the extent to which the 
stereotype one is trying to combat is true or false. It is often assumed by 
social psychologists that all stereotypes are inaccurate. McGarty, Yzerbyt
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and Spears (2002), in an attempt to challenge this view, ask ‘if  stereotyping 
is so central to our understanding of the world how plausible is that the 
process could be so deficient?’ (2002: 4). Furthermore, as Asch discusses at 
some length:
It is wrong to assume that we can best achieve a correct view of a person 
by ignoring his group relations. Not only is the advice fu tile  because it  
violates our modes of functioning; but also it could lead to our excluding 
relevant data. The issue is not whether to take into account or ignore 
group data, but rather whether our knowledge of group facts is adequate 
or not. The effort to see an individual in his group relation is not in itself 
invalid. What causes error is a grossness in the understanding of group 
qualities or a tendency to see group characteristics as inherent in 
individuals as firs t causes or the failure to understand their causal 
conditions. To ignore group facts can be right only assuming that 
conceptions formed of groups are necessarily subjective and factually 
wrong. They often are, but they need not be (1952: 238).
It is important to remember, as noted in Chapter I, that the extent to 
which stereotypes are accurate or not is an empirical question.
It has been argued in this thesis that stereotypes fall under a domain- 
specific competence, a Folk Sociology, which predisposes humans to seek 
out information about the social groups that are salient in diverse cultural 
populations. It is important to note that a Folk Sociology does not 
determine which social groups we divide humans up into, this is determined 
by various social, political and economic factors operating in specific 
cultural populations. What a Folk Sociology does do is help us to explain 
why the social construction of many groups has proven so effective. I think 
it  would be naive in the extreme to assume that humans could stop 
classifying people into groups, and judge each individual in their own right, 
or indeed that we can eradicate stereotyping. Nonetheless, I do believe 
that attempts can be made to reduce the salience of various social groups
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which ultimately would make us less susceptible to stereotypes about those 
specific groups. For instance, Gelman, Taylor and Nguyen (2004) have 
suggested that children may use indirect cues to inform them about which 
categories are salient in the cultural environment. One way of doing this is 
the use of generics which implies commonalities among members of a 
group and serves to highlight the salience of the group per se. Aside from 
avoiding such generics, in relation to the social category gender for 
example, the salience of gender categories can be attenuated by avoiding 
use of gendered practices such as providing gender-specific clothing (i.e. 
blue for boys and pink for girls) or toys.
I have argued, and presented some indirect evidence to support the view, 
that humans may have evolved a cognitive predisposition sensitive to cues 
of group status. This has potential implications for attempts to reduce 
prejudice. The contact hypothesis states that an increase in contact 
between two groups would lead to a subsequent reduction in inter-group 
prejudice (Williams, 1947). This idea has become something of a truism 
amongst policy makers. However, in his development of the intergroup- 
contact theory Allport (1954) emphasized the importance of establishing 
optimal conditions within the contact situation; 1) equal status between the 
groups in the situation; 2) common goals; 3) no competition between the 
groups; and 4) authority sanction for the contact. Hence, based on the 
theoretical framework presented here, contact may reduce prejudice when 
groups are of equal status, but may fail to do so when groups are of unequal 
status. It has been found that members of different status groups show 
dramatically different responses to the same contact experience (Devine and 
Vasquez, 1998). In a meta-analytic analysis of 515 studies conducted in 38 
countries over the past 60 years, Tropp and Pettigrew (2005), found that the 
contact-prejudice effect varied significantly in relation to the societal status 
of the groups involved. Specifically they found contact-prejudice 
relationships were generally weaker for members of minority status groups 
than for members of majority status groups. In order to explain this finding
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they suggest that perhaps minority group members are not able to 
overcome their internalized group devaluation.
In recent years dual process models of prejudice postulate that while 
explicit prejudice is flexible, labile, motivated, implicit prejudice, as a 
consequence of years of exposure to associations, in the environment is 
impervious to conscious control and relatively stable (Devine and Monteith, 
1999). However, recent research has challenged the dual-process 
assumption that implicit prejudice is impervious to change by 
demonstrating that it  can be reduced or even reversed by social context 
(reviewed in Blair, 2002). Nevertheless, according to Henry and Hardin 
(2006) it may be easier for friendly interpersonal contact to reduce implicit 
prejudice towards groups for whom positive associations are broadly 
represented in society, that is, high-status groups, and more difficult for 
friendly interpersonal contact to reduce implicit prejudice towards groups 
for whom positive associations are not as broadly represented in society, 
that is, lower-status groups. In two parallel experiments examining 
intergroup contact and implicit prejudice between Whites and Blacks in the 
United States and between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, Henry and 
Harden (2006) found that intergroup contact only reduces the implicit 
prejudice of low status groups towards high status groups but not vice 
versa.
Fiske and colleagues have extended the 'Stereotype Content Model’ to 
show how stereotype contents based on the dimensions competence and 
warmth predict emotional responses and behaviour towards groups. The 
SCM focuses on how the contents of social group stereotypes are 
determined by the structure of inter-group relations. I have shown in this 
thesis that stereotype contents may also be partly shaped by evolved 
cognitive predispositions arising from a Folk Sociology. In fact, I argued 
that cognitive and structural factors act in concert and are mutually 
reinforcing. I believe this may have implications for improving inter-group 
relations. I propose that changes to inter-group relations can be achieved
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by manipulating both the cognitive and structural components of group- 
relations. It is difficult, of course, to eradicate competition over resources 
or socio-economic and power inequalities between groups. Therefore, the 
cognitive components may be easier to manipulate. For example, 
manipulating the perceived warmth of members of a group may help to 
change the perception of inter-group relations from competitive to 
cooperative. Similarly, manipulating the perceived competence of 
members of a low status group may help to change the perception of inter­
group relations from unequal to equal group status. This can be achieved 
by disseminating information/stories highlighting the warmth of members 
of a group in the former case, and competence of members of a group in 
the latter case.
It has been shown in this thesis that studying the conceptual structure of 
representations of social groups, namely psychological essentialism as a 
mode of category representation, can enrich our understanding of 
stereotypes. The negative consequences of essentialist beliefs are well- 
documented both by critical social theorists and cognitive psychologists. 
Prentice and Miller (2007) extensively discuss the social consequences of 
essentialist beliefs. They point out how the fact that psychological 
essentialism leads to a belief in the stability and immutability of social 
groups and their attributes can result in a reduced motivation to change 
essentialized groups or their members. Williams and Eberhardt (2006) found 
that people who endorsed an essentialist conception of ‘ race* saw racial 
disparities as more insurmountable and less problematic than those who 
endorsed a social conception of race. In this thesis it has been shown that 
essentialist beliefs may facilitate the naturalization of social status 
differences between groups. Critical social theorists have attempted in 
various guises to try and de-naturalize or de-essentialize social groups. As 
Wagner, Holtz and Kashima (2009) point out there have been heated 
debates amongst feminists about essentialism. On the one hand, feminists 
have been trying to replace the representation of men and women as 
naturally different, but on the other hand attributing an essence to a group
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helps to given them visibility in political struggles. This dilemma is best 
articulated by Fuss (1989: 2): “ Essentialism emerges most strongly within 
the very discourse of feminism, a discourse which presumes upon the unity 
of its object of inquiry (women) even when it  is at pains to demonstrate 
the differences within this admittedly generalizing and imprecise 
category.”
Although essentialism may be an evolved cognitive predisposition there 
may be ways of attenuating it. Humans do not essentialize all social groups 
but only those groups marked as important in the cultural environment they 
inhabit. As noted above, there are ways in which we may reduce the 
salience of social groups. Furthermore, Haslam et al. (2000) and I have 
shown (see Chapter VI) that there are two distinct forms of essentialism - 
naturalness and entitativity. As Haslam et al. (2000) suggest this means 
that policy-makers may have to adopt two distinct strategies. Any attempts 
at changing representations of social groups as being natural would have to 
challenge beliefs about the immutability, stability, discreteness and 
necessary features. While attempts at changing representations of social 
groups as being entitative need to challenge beliefs about their uniformity, 
exclusivity, informativeness and inherence.
VIIL5 Conclusion
In conclusion, as McGarty et al. (2000) aptly point out, the human mind is 
not a blank slate on which stereotypes can be inscribed but rather it  is 
shaped by grooves arising from human cognitive architecture. I hope I have 
shown how this thesis contributes to existing knowledge by providing a 
more coherent account of the cognitive ecology of stereotyping. More 
specifically, how applying the Cognition and Culture approach to the study 
of social group stereotypes can facilitate an integration of the study of 
stereotype contents, and the cognitive processes/structures underpinning 
stereotyping by explicating the role of cognitive predispositions in
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influencing both the contents and functions of stereotypes. Of course, I 
would not claim to have fully integrated a study of stereotype contents and 
cognitive processes/structures. However, I have attempted to highlight the 
potentials of the Cognition and Culture approach in facilitating such an 
integration. As discussed above this research has implications for the social 
psychology of stereotyping and the Cognition and Culture approach, and 
demonstrates how integrating insights from both is mutually beneficial. 
Finally, it  has been shown that this thesis also has potential social policy 
implications. While I don't believe we can eliminate stereotyping, which 
would be a Sisyphean task if ever there was one, if  an attempt is to be 
made to design policies or campaigns that counteract prevailing 
stereotypes they need to be based on a comprehensive understanding of 
the conceptual underpinnings of stereotypes. The present research 
constitutes a modest step in this direction. Of course, I acknowledge that 
understanding alone is not sufficient but as McIntosh (1997) claims:
Understanding the cognitive architecture that may undergrid social 
attitudes could help us to recognize and, i f  it  should ever be possible, 
thwart what can otherwise be a mutually reinforcing link between innate 
cognitive predisposition and local hegemony (1997: 4).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Perceptual Styles Minimal Groups Pre-Test Materials
Method
The study appeared online as a web-based ‘Perceptual Styles Study’ . 
Invitations to participate went to various email lists. The survey’s first page 
provided information about the general nature of the survey, stating “You are 
invited to participate in an on-line study about perceptual style which forms 
part of a doctoral project in Social Psychology” . Participants were informed 
that the survey will take no longer than 5 minutes to complete and that they 
would be given further instructions if they chose to participate. The 
remainder of the text related to ethical issues: potential benefits and risks 
and informed consent.
Instructions asked participants to read the following information about 
perceptual styles:
Psychologists have found differences in the way in which people organize 
visual information. Although there are many individual differences, two 
different perceptual styles have been identified:
(1) Figure Style: people with the figure style organize information by primarily 
focusing on figures (the objects that attracts attention) in a visual scene 
and only later turning their attention to the surrounding background.
(2) Ground Style: people with a ground style choose the opposite sequence: 
focusing on the surrounding background and only later turning their attention 
to any figures or objects in a visual scene.
Participants answered 6 questions about perceptual styles. These questions 
are designed to elicit whether participants have any a priori assumptions 
about these perceptual styles. It is emphasized that they are no right or
307
wrong answers and that the researcher is only interested in their personal 
opinion.
The questions and response options were as follows:
“ Do you think either of the perceptual styles (Figure or Ground) described 
above indicates greater competence in visual information processing?” and 
they responded by clicking one of the following options: ‘Yes', ‘No', or ‘Don’t 
Know’ .
“ If yes, which perceptual style do you think indicates greater competence in 
visual processing” and the options are ‘Figure’ or ‘Ground’ .
“ Do you think either of the perceptual styles (Figure or Ground) described 
above indicates greater warmth as a personality characteristic?” and the 
options were again ‘Yes’ , ‘No’ , or ‘Don’t Know’ .
“ If yes, which perceptual style do you think indicates greater warmth as a 
personality characteristic: and the options were ‘Figure’ or ‘Ground’ .
The final two questions were designed to elicit whether participants had any 
ideas about their own perceptual style and whether they showed any 
preference towards either of the two styles and the options for both questions
were ‘Figure’ , ‘Ground’ , ‘Both’ , ‘Neither’ and ‘Don’t Know’ . The questions 
were as follows:
“Which perceptual style do you think you have?”
“Which perceptual style would you prefer to have?”
Clicking a ‘submit survey’ button recorded the data.
308
Appendix B: Word Selection Pre-Test Materials
Method
Rosenberg (1978) noted that the notion of psychological relatedness between 
2 traits may be interpreted in at least 2 ways, each of which implies 
somewhat different research purposes and measurement procedures. One 
interpretation is that of tra it similarity i.e. the semantic substitutability of 
the two traits i.e. synonyms. The second interpretation is that of the co­
occurrence i.e. the degree to which 2 traits are perceived as occurring in the 
same individual. For e.g. ‘ intelligent' and ‘industrious' are not likely to be 
judged as synonyms but they are likely to be seen as going together in the 
same individual. While ‘Adept' and ‘skillful' are judged as highly similar and 
will also be attributed to the same person.
For the purposes of the present pilot, a trait co-occurrence measure was 
constructed. The reason for this is that we are interested in the words people 
use to assess the morality, competence and warmth of people. Hence, it was 
decided to frame the task in terms of assessing personality characteristics as 
opposed to word meaning.
Materials and Procedure
The study appeared online as a web-based ‘Personality Characteristics Study'. 
Invitations to participate went to various email lists and postings on 3 online 
psychology studies directories (Social Psychology Network, Online Psych 
Research and Psychological Research On The Net).
The survey's first page provided information about the general nature of the 
survey, stating “You are invited to participate in an on-line study about 
personality characteristics. This study forms part of a doctoral project in 
Social Psychology''. Participants are informed that the survey w ill take no 
longer than 15 minutes to complete and that they would be given further 
instructions if they chose to participate. The remainder of the text related to 
ethical issues: potential benefits and risks and informed consent.
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There were six versions of the survey and each participant was randomly 
allocated to complete one version in which they rated the words for 
competence or morality or warmth. As asking participants to rate 144 words 
was a tall order, these words were randomly divided into 2 lists of 72 words 
each. Hence, the following design was used: 3 (domain: 
competence/morality/warmth) X 2 (Word List: 1 and 2).
Participants were given the following instructions in Versions 1 and 2:
“We are interesting in finding out which personality characteristics you think 
are likely to go together in the same individual. Psychologists have found that 
one of the characteristics we use to assess individuals is competence. A 
competent person is one who is able or has the potential to efficiently attain 
a goal, whatever the goal may be. In contrast, an incompetent person is who 
is unable or lacks the potential to efficiently a attain a goal, whatever the 
goal may be. We would like you to rate each of the personality characteristics 
listed below according to whether a person who exhibited each of the 
characteristics would be a COMPETENT or an INCOMPETENT person. There is 
no right or wrong answer, we are just interested in your person opinion. In 
making your ratings use the following scale, 1 = Competence, 7 = 
Incompetent.
Instructions for versions 3 and 4 were identical except participants were asked 
to rate the words for morality, defined as “A moral person is one who follows 
moral rules and/or does good things for others. In contrast, an immoral person 
is one who breaks moral rules and/or does bad things to others” . Instructions 
for versions 5 and 6 were identical except participants were asked to rate the 
words for warmth, defined as “A warm person is one who has positive 
intentions towards others. In contrast, a cold person is one who has negative 
intentions towards others” .
Responses to the 72 items were made by clicking one of seven response 
options where 1 = Moral and 7 = Immoral (Version 1, 2), 1 = Competent and 7 
= Incompetent (Version 3, 4) and 1 = Warm and 7 = Cold (Version 5, 6). The 
final section asked for participants' nationality, first language, fluency in
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English (ranging from Native Speaker, Fluent, Basic, Poor), gender and name 
and email address (the final two are optional and only participants who 
wanted to enter into a prize draw to receive £15 Amazon vouchers needed to 
complete these). Clicking a ‘submit survey' button recorded the data.
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Appendix C: Perceptual Styles Test Materials and Stimuli (used in 
Experiments 1-3)
TASK 1: PERCEPTUAL STYLE TEST
Your first task is to complete an online test which assesses your perceptual 
style.
CONTINUE
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Read the information below and follow the instructions at the bottom of
the screen.
Perceptual Styles
Psychologists have found differences in the way in which people organize 
visual information. Although there are many individual differences, two 
different perceptual styles have been identified:
(1) Figure Style: people with the figure style organize information by 
primarily focusing on ‘figures’ (the objects that attracts attention) in a 
visual scene and only later turning their attention to the surrounding 
background.
(2) Ground Style: people with a ground style choose the opposite 
sequence: focusing on the surrounding background and only later 
turning their attention to any figures or objects in a visual scene
According to psychologists both of these perceptual styles are equally valid 
ways of organizing visual information.
Instructions: You are now required to complete a short online test which is 
designed to identify a person’s perceptual style. Your task w ill be to look 
at eight different pictures (some of which you may recognise). Each 
picture w ill be shown on the screen for a few seconds and w ill be followed 
by the presentation of two or three alternative interpretations. There is 
no right or wrong interpretation and you may be able to see the picture in 
either way. You need to indicate which of the alternatives was prevalent 
for you or firs t came into your mind. Then, continue with the next picture, 
until you have done all of them. Finally, you w ill be given the results of 
the test.
START TEST
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What did you see first?
1. Bats
2. Angels
314
p \ ^  ,
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What did you see first?
1. hand(s)
2. a piece of paper
3. pen(s)
315
What did you see first?
1. white geese flying from left to right
2. a village
3. black geese flying from right to left
316
What did you see first?
1. black geese
2. white fish
317
What did you see first?
1. white man
2. black man
3. something else
318
What did you see first?
1. a man’s face
2. young woman sitting
319
What did you see first?
1. white fish
2. black fish
3. eye(s)
What did you see first?
1. eye
2. skull
321
You have successfully completed this test. Please Wait. Your data are being
processed
Test Results
An analysis of your test results places you in the Figure Group. You may recall 
that members of this group organize visual information by primarily focusing 
on ‘figures' in a visual scene and only later pay attention to the surrounding 
background.
In contrast members of the Ground Group choose the opposite sequence: 
they primarily focus on the surrounding background and only later turn their 
attention to any figures or objects.
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Appendix D: Example of Consent Form (Experiment 1)
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Institute of Social Psychology
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712 
Fax: 020 7955 7565
Research Consent Form
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
You are invited to participate in an experimental study about perceptual styles. 
The study forms part of a doctoral project being undertaken at the Institute of 
Social Psychology at the LSE. Participants w ill be asked to complete 2 tasks 
which measure perceptual style and its correlates.
PROCEDURES
The study is expected to take approximately 30 minutes to complete. If you 
choose to participate in this study, please select continue at the bottom of this 
page and you w ill be given further instructions.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND BENEFITS
There are no risks associated with this research.
It is not expected that you w ill receive direct benefits by participating in this 
research. However, it is hoped that it w ill be an interesting experience and will 
allow you to learn more about how psychological research is conducted.
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PARTICIPANTS* RIGHTS
You should not feel obliged to agree to participate.
If you first agree to participate and then you change your mind, you are free 
to withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any time 
during the study.
Your identity w ill be kept as confidential as possible as required by law. The 
results of this research survey may be presented at social science conferences 
or published in social science journals. However, your identity w ill not be 
disclosed as you will be identified only by a unique code number.
This study has been approved by the London School of Economics Institutional Review 
Board
You can print a copy of the consent form by clicking here.
CONTACT INFORMATION
Principal Researcher: Miss Japinder Dhesi
Institute of Social Psychology
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712 
Fax: 020 7955 7565
PhD Supervisor: Dr. Bradley Franks
Institute of Social Psychology
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712
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Fax: 020 7955 7565
If you want to know more about your rights, you may contact the head of the 
Departmental Ethics Committee at the Institute of Social Psychology:
Professor Catherine Campbell 
Institute of Social Psychology 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7712 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7565 
E-mail: c.campbell@lse.ac.uk
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INFORMATION, AND GIVE MY 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.
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Appendix E: Bogus Article (Chapter IV)
Before receiving your test results, we'd like you to read the following 
article about perceptual styles.
Perceptual Style
Research Into An Important New Individual Difference Variable 
[excerpted from Psychology Today, 2008]
For almost a century, psychologists have been working to develop tests that 
would predict an individual’s occupational and social status. Many tests have 
been developed, the most famous of which is the IQ test.
Now, researchers believe they have developed a test that w ill predict status 
and success even better than the IQ test does. The test is extremely simple, 
and, on the face of it, unrelated to success of any kind. It is a test of 
perceptual style. To give you a sense of what perceptual style means, take 
the following simple test. Just read the sentence in the following triangle.
I love 
to go to 
Paris in the 
the 
springtime.
As you were reading the sentence, did you notice any errors? It turns out 
that there are some people who do not notice the extra "the" in the sentence, 
and there are others who do notice it. What is interesting is that people who 
do not notice the extra word in this test behave quite consistently across a 
wide variety of other similar tests. That is, they almost never notice any 
words, letters, or symbols that are inconsistent with their preconceptions. 
Other people show a quite different style on such problems, consistently 
noticing anything unusual. What’s more, even though this test of perceptual
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style is quite simple, it  reveals a great deal about a person: It predicts their 
choice of major in college, their level of occupational attainment, their salary 
10 years after college, and their scores on the Myers-Briggs Inventory and the 
MSCEIT test of emotional intelligence. All that, from a brief and seemingly 
meaningless test of error-detection!
Psychologists are turning to tests of perceptual style in increasing numbers. 
The most popular is still the error-detection test, but tests of figure vs. group 
perceptual style are also being used, with considerable success. The simplicity 
of these tests, combined with their predictive power, means we are likely to 
be seeing much more of them in the years to come.
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Appendix F: Experiment 2 (Chapter IV) - Additional Statistical Analysis of
Main Effects and Interactions
Simple contrasts for three-way interaction between experimental condition, 
group status and stereotype dimension:
To analyse this interaction, simple contrasts were performed comparing high 
status and low status mean ratings at each level of stereotype object (in­
group, out-group) and across each level of stereotype dimension compared to 
the first category of stereotype dimension (high competence). The first 
contrast revealed a non-significant difference between the responses of 
participants assigned to a high status group and participants assigned to a low 
status group when comparing in-group mean ratings to out-group mean ratings 
on the high competence scale compared to the low competence scale, F (1, 
165) = .151, p = .699. The second contrast revealed a significant difference 
between high and low status when comparing in-group mean ratings to out­
group mean ratings on the high competence scale compared to the high 
morality/warmth scale, F (1, 165) = 369.130, p < .001, n 2 = .870. The final 
contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low status when 
comparing in-group mean ratings to out-group mean ratings on the high 
competence scale compared to the low morality/warmth scale, F (1, 165) = 
367.708, p<  .001, n 2 = -870.
Other main effects and interactions:
The main effect of status failed to reach statistical significance, F (1, 55) = 
.007, p = 934. The main effect of stereotype dimension (high competence, 
low competence, high morality/warmth, low morality/warmth) failed to 
reach statistical significance, F (3, 165) = 2.812, p = .062. There was a 
significant two-way interaction between status and stereotype dimension, F 
(3, 165) = 16.524, p < .001, n 2 = .231. To break down this interaction, 
contrasts were performed comparing each level of stereotype dimension to 
the first level of stereotype dimension (high competence) across status (high 
status and low status). The first contrast revealed a non-significant difference
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between high and low status when comparing high competence mean ratings 
to low competence mean ratings, F (1, 165) = 3.909, p = .053. The second 
contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low status when 
comparing high competence mean ratings to high morality/warmth mean 
ratings, F (1, 165) = 27.344, p < .001, q 2= .332. The final contrast revealed a 
significant difference between high and low status when comparing high 
competence mean ratings to low morality/warmth mean ratings, F (1, 165) = 
32.966, p < .001, q 2 -  .375. As Table 1.0 illustrates mean ratings of 
participants assigned to the high status group were slightly higher for high 
morality/warmth compared to high competence and slightly higher for low 
morality/warmth compared to high competence. While mean ratings of 
participants assigned to the low status group were slightly higher for high 
competence compared to high morality/warmth and slightly higher for high 
competence compared to low morality /warmth.
Table: 1.0 Mean Ratings for all Stereotype Dimensions by Group Status
Stereotype
Dimension
Group Status
High Status Low Status
High Competence 3.31 3.58
(0.28) (0.33)
Low Competence 3.43 3.58
(0 .2 1 ) (0.42)
High Morality/Warmth 3.47 3.33
(0.40) (0.40)
Low Morality/Warmth 3.52 3.28
(0.39) (0.46)
n 30 32
Note. Judgements were made on a 5 point-scale: High Competence and High 
Morality /Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. Low 
Competence and Low Morality/Warmth Scale: 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly 
disagree. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means.
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Appendix G: Experiment 3 (Chapter V) - Additional Statistical Analysis of
Main Effects and Interactions
Simple contrasts for three-way interaction between prime, group status and 
stereotype dimension:
To break down this interaction further, simple contrasts were performed 
comparing high status and low status mean ratings at each level of prime 
(FIGURE, GROUND and NEUTRAL) and across each level of stereotype 
dimension compared to the first category of stereotype dimension (high 
competence). The first contrast revealed a significant difference between 
high and low status when comparing the FIGURE prime mean response times 
to the GROUND prime mean response times on the high competence scale 
compared to the low competence scale, F (1, 134) = 18.192, p < .001, rj 2-  
.120. The second contrast revealed a significant difference between high and 
low status when comparing the FIGURE prime mean response times to the 
GROUND prime mean response times on the high competence scale compared 
to the high morality/warmth scale, F (1, 134) = 16.746, p .001, rj 2 = .111. The 
third contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low status 
when comparing the FIGURE prime mean response times to the GROUND prime 
mean response times on the high competence scale compared to the low 
morality/warmth scale, F (1, 134) = 45.789, p .001, rj 2 = .255.
The fourth contrast revealed a non-significant difference between high and 
low status when comparing the FIGURE prime mean response times to the 
NEUTRAL prime mean response times on the high competence scale compared 
to the low competence scale, F (1, 134) = 2.122, p = .148. The fifth  contrast 
revealed a significant difference between high and low status when comparing 
the FIGURE prime mean response times to the NEUTRAL prime mean response 
times on the high competence scale compared to the high morality/warmth 
scale, F (1, 134) = 36.458, p .001, rj 2 = .214. The sixth contrast revealed a 
significant difference between high and low status when comparing the 
FIGURE prime mean response times to the NEUTRAL prime mean response 
times on the high competence scale compared to the low morality/warmth 
scale, F (1, 134) = 25.282, p .001, /? J = . 159.
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Further simple contrasts were performed to compare the GROUND prime to 
the NEUTRAL prime by making GROUND (as opposed to FIGURE) the first 
category for the factor prime. The first contrast revealed a significant 
difference between high and low status when comparing the GROUND prime 
mean response times to the NEUTRAL prime mean response times on the high 
competence scale compared to the low competence scale, F (1, 134) = 
25.282, p < .001, rj 2 -  -159. The second contrast revealed a significant 
difference between high and low status when comparing the GROUND prime 
mean response times to the NEUTRAL prime mean response times on the high 
competence scale compared to the high morality/warmth scale, F (1, 134) = 
33.861, p .001, rj 2 = .202. The third contrast revealed a significant difference 
between high and low status when comparing the GROUND prime mean 
response times to the NEUTRAL prime mean response times on the high 
competence scale compared to the low morality /warmth scale, F (1, 134) = 
105.729, p .001 , n 2= .441.
There was a significant main effect of prime (FIGURE, GROUND, NEUTRAL), F 
(2, 268) = 9.545, p < .001, rj 2 = .066. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
mean response times were slightly lower for the FIGURE prime (M =935.95, SE 
= 3.96) compared to the GROUND (M = 956.34, SE = 5.18), p < .001 prime and 
compared to the NEUTRAL prime (A4 = 953.06, SE = 4.49), p < .01. There was a 
significant main effect of group status, F (1, 134) = 71743.10, p < .001, r j2 -  
.360. Pairwise comparisons revealed that mean response times were slightly 
lower for the high status group (M =917.69, SE = 5.01) compared to the low 
status group (M = 979.214, SE = 4.93), p < .001. There was a significant main 
effect of stereotype dimension (High Competence, Low Competence, High 
Morality/Warmth, Low Morality/Warmth), F (2, 268) = 9.545, p < .001, rj 2 = 
.066. Pairwise comparisons revealed that mean response times were higher 
for the low competence dimension (M =1 103.88, SE = 4.90) compared to the 
high competence dimension (M = 842.28, SE = 3.50), high morality/warmth (M 
= 852.10, SE = 4.75) and low morality/warmth (M = 956.34, SE = 5.85), p < 
.001.
There was a significant two-way interaction between group status and prime, 
F (2, 268) = 48.34, p < .001, rj 2 = .265. To break down this interaction,
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contrasts were performed comparing each level of prime to the first level of 
prime (FIGURE) across group status (high status and low status). The first 
contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low status when 
comparing mean response times following the FIGURE prime to mean response 
times following the GROUND prime, F (1, 134) = 17.323, p < .001, rj 2 = .114. 
The second contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low 
status when comparing mean response times following the FIGURE prime to 
mean response times following the neutral prime, F (1, 134) = 30.133, p < 
.001, r j2-  .184. As Table 2.0 shows high status group members mean response 
times were lower for the FIGURE and GROUND prime compared to low status 
group members mean response times. There was no difference in the mean 
response times for high and low status group members for the neutral prime.
Table 2.0: Mean Response Times by Group Status and Prime
Group Prime
Status FIGURE GROUND Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Status Group 902.56 902.34 948.16
(80.74) (84.19) (82.71)
Low Status Group 969.33 1010.34 957.97
(91.40) (110.29) (91.78)
Note. Means are in milliseconds. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
below means.
There was a significant two-way interaction between group status and 
stereotype dimension, F (3, 804) = 41.203, p < .001, rj 2 = .235. To break down 
this interaction, contrasts were performed comparing each level of stereotype 
dimension to the first level of stereotype dimension (High Competence) across 
group status (high status and low status). The first contrast revealed a 
significant difference between high and low status when comparing mean 
response times for the high competence dimension compared to the low 
status dimension, F (1, 134) = 40.014, p < .001, rj 2 = .230. The second 
contrast revealed a significant difference between high and low status when 
comparing mean response times for the high competence dimension compared
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to the high morality/warmth dimension, F (1, 134) = 146.646, p < .001, n 2 = 
.523. The final contrast revealed a non-significant difference between high 
and low status when comparing mean response times for the high competence 
dimension compared to the low morality/warmth dimension, F (1, 134) = 
3.489, p = .064. As Table 2.1 shows there was no difference in the mean 
response times of members of the high status and low status groups for the 
high competence dimension or low morality/warmth dimensions. However, 
mean response times of members of the high status group were lower than 
mean response times of members of the low status group for the low 
competence and high morality/warmth dimensions.
Table 2.1: Mean Response 
Dimension
Times by Group Status and Stereotype
Stereotype Group Status
Dimension High Status Low Status
Group Group
High Competence 835.09 849.47
(66.53) (77.95)
Low Competence 1067.12 1140.64
(70.98) (104.99)
High Morality/Warmth 789.97 914.23
(71.05) (99.62)
Low 978.57 1012.52
Morality/Warmth (94.95) (108.99)
Note. Means are in milliseconds. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
below means.
Finally, there was a significant two-way interaction between prime and 
stereotype dimension, F (6 , 804) = 395.600, p < .001, r\ 2 = .747. To break 
down this interaction, contrasts were performed comparing each level of 
prime to the first level of prime (FIGURE) compared to each level of 
stereotype dimension to the first level of stereotype dimension (high 
competence). The first contrast revealed a significant difference when 
comparing mean response times for the high competence dimension compared
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to mean response times for the low competence dimension when comparing 
the FIGURE prime to the GROUND prime, F (1, 134) = 1614.922, p < .001, n 2-  
.923. The second contrast revealed a significant difference when comparing 
mean response times for the high competence dimension compared to mean 
response times for the high morality/warmth dimension when comparing the 
FIGURE prime to the GROUND prime, F(1, 134) = 380.416, p < .001, r j2 = .740. 
The third contrast revealed a significant difference when comparing mean 
response times for the high competence dimension compared to mean 
response times for the low morality/warmth dimension when comparing the 
FIGURE prime to the GROUND prime, F (1, 134) = 335.773, p < .001, n 2= .715. 
The fourth contrast revealed a significant difference when comparing mean 
response times for the high competence dimension compared to mean 
response times for the low competence dimension when comparing the 
FIGURE prime to the neutral prime, F (1, 134) = 2465.971, p < .001, n 2= .948. 
The fifth contrast revealed a significant difference when comparing mean 
response times for the high competence dimension compared to mean 
response times for the high morality/warmth dimension when comparing the 
FIGURE prime to the neutral prime, F (1,134) = 251.891, p < .001, n 2~ -653. 
The third contrast revealed a significant difference when comparing mean 
response times for the high competence dimension compared to mean 
response times for the low morality/warmth dimension when comparing the 
FIGURE prime to the neutral prime, F (1, 134) = 609.048, p < .001, x\2 -  .820. 
As Table 2.3 shows for the high competence dimension mean response times 
were lower following the FIGURE prime compared to the GROUND prime and 
the neutral prime. For the low competence dimension mean response times 
were higher following the FIGURE prime compared to the GROUND prime and 
the neutral prime. For the high morality/warmth dimension mean response 
times were lower following the FIGURE prime and the GROUND prime 
compared to the neutral prime. For the low morality/warmth dimension mean 
response times were slightly higher following the FIGURE prime and the 
GROUND prime compared to the neutral prime.
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Table 2.3: Mean Response Times by Prime and Stereotype Dimension
Stereotype Prime
Dimension FIGURE GROUND Neutral
(XXXXXX)
High Competence 629.22 961.27 936.35
(63.29) (91.55) (66.32)
Low Competence 1292.12 1027.74 991.78
(97.35) (102.79) (78.55)
High 815.52 823.10 917.67
Morality/Warmth (109.06) (103.56) (83.46)
Low 1006.92 1013.25 966.47
Morality/Warmth (111.63) (132.03) (93.73)
Note. Means are in milliseconds. Standard deviations are in parantheses below 
means.
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Appendix H: Experiment 5: Participants* qualitative responses for 
dependent measure 1
Control Condition:
No Change in Damorin’s Status Justifications
He is An Orinthian, who have high social status.
Because he is a member of the 'Orinthians' who are a group with high social 
status.
because once high social status is obtained it is generally kept
It says he belongs to the orinthians, who have high social status.
member of the higher staus group
We are imagining that Damorin is an Orinthian, the high social status group, so 
it is more probable, but not sure, that he has this social status.
Because he belongs to the Orinthians and you said they have high social 
status.
Damorin is an Orinthian, and Orinthians have high social status.
Damorin is a member of the Orinthians and the story says they have high 
social status.
Damorin is an orinthian
he belongs to a high-status group
Since Damorin is a member of the Orinthians and they have high social status, 
the odds (actual odds, not test odds where the exception is put in) that he / 
she has high social status is far greater than the odds that he / she is an 
Ackmains pretending to be and Orinthian
I think he has a high social status because he is part of the Orinthians.
Being a member of the Orinthians, a group with high social status, Damorin 
should also have a high social status.
He is from the Orinthians, which was described as the high social status group.
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Transplant Condition:
Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
He will appear the same to his friends and Orinthian society, the change in his 
personality to that of Dolack will now be seen, maybe as eccentric, but also 
as high.
He w ill look like high social status still (Body mass index, clothing, haircut 
etc) though when he starts to talk it w ill become apparent he is actually low 
status (accent, level of education, way of speaking and acting etc)
He now has a low social status because he basically just switched positions 
with Dolack.
Social status is often based on reputation and physical features
He has a new brain, there for he is a new person.
I'm thinking of it  as a Metropolis kind of scenario whereby other people are 
unaware of the brain swap. So Damorin, now in Dolack's body is thought by 
others to be of low social status. Because of this, he will likely be ignored if 
he were to protest otherwise.
Damorin now has Dolack's brain, which would have knowledge suited for the 
lower class.
The way you think determines where you stand in life.
Damorin, being in the body of Dolack, takes on the status of the physical body 
he inhabits.
social status is about perception
They switched the brain
Becuase they put a brain of an Ackmian in Damorin.
Damorin is now going to experience low social status thus making part of the 
group.
If Damorin has the brain of Dolack, his mind, beliefs, opinions, and 
mannerisms are that of a member of a low social staus.
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No Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
He was born into his high social status. Just because his brain has changed 
doesn't mean he is a different person.
the brain is not the essence of a person, Damorin still has the same soul and 
therefore is still an Orinthian.
Status is something conferred on others, not something we necessarily choose 
to have, regardless of which 'brain' we possess. Thus continued physical 
association with the Orinthians will make others think Damorin still has a high 
social status. Intrinsically, however, Damorin may not feel an affiliation with 
the Orinthians and may not continue his association.
Social status is a web-relationship feature, does not depend (within limits) on 
the behaviour of the single person but more on the acknowledgement of the 
status from others. A lord is whoever is considered a lord.
Because he belongs to the group Orinthians,who, according to this paragraph 
have high social status.
He still has high social status because to the Orinthians he is still known as 
Damorin not Dolack even though Damorin might think he is low social status 
and might view things differently because the brains were switched.
If Damorin's brain was put into Dolack's body, he would still have a high social 
status. Just because his brain switched, doesn't mean it changes how he acts 
with people.
The Orthians have a high social status and if a damorin is part of them, and 
the Dolack is put inside them then they have high status.
Damorin's brain contains all his personal information, including his cognitive 
processes (such as thinking, memory, intelligence). So even though Damorin's 
brain is now inside a body that "belongs" to a low social status, his BEHAVIOR 
will remain the same (high-social-status group behavior).
Damorin is a member of the group Orinthians. Orinthians are a group who 
have high social status
Even though he doesn't have the same brain, he still is associated with the 
group with the high social status.
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Adoption Condition:
Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
His status is determined by his current social group. Therefore, he has low 
status.
Everyone thinks he's Ackmian, so they treat him accordingly.
He is raised by the low-status group, and people don't know of his true origin.
because you said the Ackmians have low social status, so, according to what 
you said, Damorin was brought up by Ackmians, and Ackmians have low social 
status.
Assuming he was raised in the group with the lower social status and no one 
ever realised he was switched at birth, he'd of known no other life. So he'd 
grown up and lived as any other Ackmian would have.
He was raised with low status therefore he is low status too
I believe that low social status is more often associated with factors that 
relate to the environment that a person is raised in, rather than genes. 
Darmorin may experience such factors as less wealth/poverty and social 
disadvantage (eg limited access to jobs, education, health services, good food 
and internet communication). Behaviors and culture w ill be learned from 
experiences within the Ackmians environmental context; so music, sporting 
and cultural preferences associated with Orinthians would be limited. Forever 
entrenching him as being labelled an Ackmian. He will eat like an Ackmian, 
play like an Ackmian and speak like an Ackmian. Damorin should really get t
because social status is something you are born with in most cases. If there is 
a reason for Ackmians having lower social statuses than Orinthians like they 
are only 3 feet tall and can't learn to speak a language, then I Damorin was 
probably taken care of and put back into a group of Orinthians. Another thing 
would be if some group, government or social, recognized that Damorin was 
not actually Ackminian and thought it was blasphemous, and stuck him in a 
group of Ackmians.
Because he was switched at birth and brought up by the Ackmians (the low 
social class), he will continue to have a low social status because of his family 
upbringing.
Upbringing is all social.
I believe environment plays a critical role in social status
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Appendix I: Experiment 6: Participants* qualitative responses for 
dependent measure 1
Soul Exchange Condition:
Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
because Damorin now has the soul of someone from the lower class and will 
begin to act in a way that is similar to the lower class and then people might 
think Damorin belongs in the lower class.
Damorin’s soul exchanged was someone of lower social status
Because social status' are based on which group your physical body belongs to, 
and Damorin is now in the body of a Ackmian.
because it is Dolack's soul in Damorin’s body so Damorin associates with the 
low social status
Damorin’s soul is in the body of someone already categorized as having low 
social status.
Since they switched souls Damorin is no longer the person but is now Dolack 
with a different name.
Social status is a concept defined by the society in which the individual lives, 
and, as such, if Damorin's soul switched with the lower status Dolack, the 
society would perceive Damorin as a low social status individual.
Because his soul is in the body of the lower class person, you cannot take 
mortal possessions with you when your soul leaves your body.
Because Damorin would act differently, Orinthians would view him 
differently.
his soul was exchanged, therefore he is not the same person
As the group that wields higher social status it's likely the Orinthians would 
look down on Damorin or consider Damorin a threat.
Damorin isn’t in the same body and is now in the body of a lower status 
citizen.
As the group that wields higher social status it ’s likely the Orinthians would 
look down on Damorin or consider Damorin a threat.
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Soul Exchange Condition:
No Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
Damorian was born an Orinthian, I don’t think having his soul switched would 
make his social status change.
Society has still labeled Damorin as an Orinthian, and therefore has high social 
status in their eyes.
Damorin continues high social status, as Damorin’s origination is absolute 
Orinthian. Damorin’s purpose has already been established as part of the 
Orinthians genetic makeup. Another soul cannot change this value.
Because Damorin is still part of the Orinthians.
Damorin has been brought up with high status morals and belief just because 
Damorin has swapped bodies doesnt mean this has changed
Having a soul is only a theory. Unless you meant mind or personality and you 
can't place one personality into another.
Because other people might not know that Damorin has Dolack’s soul.
The soul exchange makes no difference and Damorin is still a member of the 
high status group.
Damorin is still an Orinthian so nothing has changed.
341
Personality Exchange Condition:
The change in Damorin's personality would be noticed by the other members 
of the group, and therefore Damorin would be outcasted.
Low status because when the personality is switched Damorin has Dolack’s 
personality which was influenced by the low status.
Because normally your status predicts how you act in your normal day to day.
Now that Damorin has Dolack's personality Damprin views things as a low 
classman, and would not be able to aassociatw himself with the 
upperclassman. He would fall into a state of disrepair. His personality is a 
poor man, so he shall become a poor man.
Change in Damorin's Status Response Justifications
If Damorin is placed in the low social status group, then it  is likely that the 
high social status group will conform to believe Damorin is of low social 
status.
Personality has a profound influence on an idividuals drive to succeed, social 
skills, and relationship skills, all of which play a role in where you will fall in 
social rank.
People of high social status are that way because of their personality. They 
know how to conduct themselves with others. Status goes with the 
personality.
Damorin has Dolcak's personality which would have developed around people 
with a low social status, so Damorin w ill not have much self-worth.
Damorin himself might still believe that he is high social status, but in fact 
others treat him as a low-social-status person. Social status is about how 
others perceive particular group, how we think about ourselves is the result of 
this
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Personality Exchange Condition:
No Change in Damorin’s Status Response Justifications
I think Damorin would still have high social status regardless of personality. 
Damorin might be more passive but would still feel dominant compared to 
members of the other group.
Damorin is a member of the group "Orinthians" whom traditionally have high 
social status.
The body of Damorin w ill still be perceived as a member of the high social 
class.
I say high status because that is what Damorin’s status was originally.
Simply switching Damorin’s personality didn't change Damorin’s environment 
and being used to a high social status,
i don’t think the exchange would affect social status.
Only the personalities have been changed. That doesnt mean that Damorin is 
going to be poor just because their personalities have been switched.
Others think Damorin is an Orinthian, so they treat Damorin like a high status 
person.
Damorin has the same body and social status isn't dependent on personality.
Because I do not believe status determines the personality of a person.
Social status is external and internal changes do not remove Damorin’s 
applied status.
Damorin is a member of the Orinthians group.
Damorin already identifies with the Orinthians so will still feel and think 
superior.
Damorin is still a part of the Orinthians.
Damorin is a member of the Orinthians and Orinthians have high status. 
Therefore, Damorin has high status.
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